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FOREWORD
The global economy is driven, to a large extent, by international 
investment undertaken by multinational enterprises. As Dr. Karl P. 
Sauvant and Dr. Federico Ortino write in their report Improving the 
international investment law and policy regime: Options for the fu-
ture, around 100,000 such enterprises control over 900,000 foreign 
affiliates worldwide, with average investment outflows of US$ 1.7 
trillion annually during 2007-2011. A great number of these in-
vestments were made under more than 3,000 international invest-
ment agreements. Foreign direct investment has become the most 
important vehicle to bring goods and services to foreign markets.
This independent study offers an important contribution to the 
discussion on the international investment regime. The particular 
strength of the study lies in is its authoritative expert analysis of the 
current system, its strengths and weaknesses, and challenges to its 
development. Furthermore, the authors present reasoned propos-
als on possible options for improving the system, as well as ideas 
towards the development of a more coherent multilateral regime.
The study concludes that extensive support by key stakeholders 
is essential for any international regime to function properly. The 
Helsinki Investment Seminar – organized by the Ministry for For-
eign Affairs of Finland in Helsinki in 2013, in the framework of the 
Helsinki Process – was an important step that sought to enhance 
such a dialogue. (A separate report on the Seminar is being pub-
lished). The report at hand offered essential food for thought for 
the Seminar and is made available in this booklet to enrich the dis-
cussion on the international investment regime for years to come. 
We warmly thank the authors for this valuable contribution.
Helsinki, 15 December 2013
 
Erkki Tuomioja Alexander Stubb  Pekka Haavisto
Minister for       Minister for   Minister for       
Foreign Affairs  European Affairs International Development
 and Foreign Trade
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The global economy is now driven, to a large extent, by interna-
tional investment (and especially foreign direct investment) made 
by multinational enterprises. The nature and direction of this in-
vestment has evolved rapidly over recent decades, with new play-
ers, new mechanisms and new sectors becoming increasingly 
important. At the same time, the web of treaties, guidelines and 
policies dealing with international investment has grown quickly, 
and has become increasingly complex. The resulting international 
investment law and policy regime faces a number of critical is-
sues, which could serve as catalysts for change and improvement, 
or could undermine the viability and legitimacy of the regime it-
self. In response to these challenges, stakeholders have advanced 
a variety of options for reform -- each with its own strengths and 
weaknesses, supporters and opponents.
The purpose of this paper is to outline the key features of the in-
ternational investment regime, identify drivers of change, discuss 
critical issues, and describe some proposals for reform of the re-
gime. It does not provide a comprehensive list of reform options, 
but instead presents a range of suggestions and focuses on the 
challenges facing their design and implementation. 
The paper is divided into five sections; a brief summary of each is 
set out below. 
a.  Salient features of foreign direct investment
International investment, and especially foreign direct investment, 
has become the most important vehicle to bring goods and ser-
vices to foreign markets and to integrate the national production 
systems of individual countries. Around 100,000 multinational 
enterprises control over 900,000 foreign affiliates worldwide, with 
average investment outflows of US$ 1.7 trillion annually during 
2007-2011. Governments around the world seek to attract foreign 
investment as a tool to advance their economic growth and de-
velopment. For this purpose, states have created investment pro-
motion agencies, liberalized their regulatory frameworks and con-
cluded a large number of international investment agreements. 
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b. Key features of the current international investment 
regime
In the past (and still today), the principal dual aims of the re-
gime have been to promote and protect foreign investment. The 
scope of the regime’s application has been as broad as the range 
of investments made by foreign entities, spanning many differ-
ent types of economic interests, and protecting the interests of a 
broad range of “investors” – whether individuals or legal persons. 
However, the regime’s thematic focus has been narrow – exclud-
ing, for the most part, public policy issues such as health, environ-
ment and labor considerations. The key standards promulgated in 
international investment agreements provide for the protection of 
established investments, including assurances on compensation 
and fair process where an investment is expropriated, fair and eq-
uitable treatment, full protection and security, and to treat inves-
tors no less favorably than national investors. Some agreements 
now also provide for “pre-establishment” commitments, so that 
foreign investors will have access to the parties’ markets on the 
same terms as national investors. The primary mechanism relied 
on to enforce those standards and to settle disputes is investor-
state arbitration, with a number of disputes referred to arbitral 
panels every year. The decisions of these tribunals, although not 
binding on one another, do form one source of the law that shapes 
the regime. Other sources of law include international investment 
agreements, customary international law in relation to the treat-
ment of foreign persons, and the range of “soft law” standards that 
have emerged over the past fifty years. As each of these sources is 
constantly evolving in its own right, the regime as a whole is sub-
ject to change, although not always in a coherent manner. Further, 
the regime’s light and fragmented institutional structure makes it 
difficult to co-ordinate the harmonization of standards and norms, 
or to direct international efforts.
c. Drivers for change: changing circumstances, 
constituencies, issues, and challenges
This section seeks to identify the most important changes that 
are driving the evolution of the international investment regime. 
In particular, as emerging markets are becoming important out-
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ward investors, the considerations that shaped international in-
vestment agreements in the past are changing. In line with the 
greater influence of emerging markets, the typical corporate struc-
ture, values and methods of investors have also changed. Notably, 
the growth of state-controlled entities as investors and concerns 
about national security have caused some developed countries to 
take a more nuanced approach to investment policy. Rather than 
viewing all foreign investment as a good thing, governments are 
becoming more nuanced in their approach.  Increasingly, the focus 
is on how states can attract the right kind of investment for their 
circumstances, how best to secure its benefits and how to manage 
its risks.  As such, a number of countries are reconsidering their 
national approach to foreign investment, including by reviewing, 
renegotiating or rescinding existing international commitments, 
and by introducing domestic measures. Of particular concern is the 
rising cost and frequency of treaty-based investment arbitrations. 
The significant increase in the number of disputes has, at least to 
a certain extent, been a product of the growth of the worldwide 
international investment volume, but it has also drawn attention 
to difficult issues of treaty interpretation and caused some govern-
ments to attempt to reduce (or eliminate) their potential scope of 
liability.  In connection with this, a number of studies that seek to 
assess the effectiveness of investment agreements for attracting 
foreign investment have drawn uncertain conclusions, which has 
undermined one of the key rationales for the regime. Further, civil 
society groups continue to be an important voice in the debate 
surrounding the regime, and have contributed to shaping some of 
the “new” norms in international investment agreements. Finally, 
states too are taking an active, engaged role in the regime, includ-
ing through the formation, adjustment and interpretation of in-
vestment agreements, but also through providing direct support 
for their firms that invest abroad. 
d. Critical issues affecting the investment regime
The critical issues discussed in this Section reflect the features 
of the investment regime as outlined in Section B. The first set of 
critical issues relates to identifying what should be the purpose 
of the international investment regime and, in particular, whether 
states should continue to focus on the protection of investors, or 
9
whether this aim should be complemented with the promotion of 
sustainable international investment. Second, issues around the 
scope of investment agreements are discussed, including how to 
define “investment”, how to identify an investor as “foreign”, the 
protection of state-controlled entity investments, the temporal 
scope of treaties, and express sectoral or policy exclusions from 
international investment agreements. Third, several critical issues 
have arisen around the substantive content of investment norms, 
including the development of investment protection norms as 
open-ended “standards”, the appropriate balance between inves-
tor protection and the right of the state to regulate, whether or 
not to incorporate pre-establishment investment liberalization 
commitments, and whether to incorporate disciplines on home 
countries and foreign investors within international investment 
agreements. Fourth, critical issues arise from the current frame-
work for, and the dynamics of, investor-state arbitration. These 
issues relate to both the process and outcomes of investment ar-
bitration, and threaten the legitimacy of investment arbitration 
from the perspective of states, investors and other stakeholders. 
Fifth, a number of issues arise from the interplay, inconsistency 
and overlap of the multiple legal sources that comprise the inter-
national investment regime. Finally, the lack of an institutional 
structure (whether at the bilateral, regional or multilateral levels) 
affects how the investment law and policy regime is set and im-
plemented. In particular, the regime has so far put a substantial 
burden on ad hoc arbitral tribunals to determine how to interpret 
and implement investment agreements. 
e.  Options for the way forward
While each of these issues can be, to some extent, addressed by 
individual states on a progressive or ad hoc basis, there are also 
specific advantages that occur with a coordinated international 
approach.  In order to make progress in this respect, there is a need 
to raise the awareness of policy decision-makers about the impor-
tance of international investment and the promise of regulatory 
reform.  The final section of the paper outlines some of the options 
for improving the international investment regime and discusses 
their purposes, strengths and challenges. 
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Various fact-finding processes would allow stakeholders gain a 
more accurate and complete picture of the international invest-
ment regime, its legal norms and its impact on a broad range of 
constituents.  International hearings could seek to gather infor-
mation about the current state of the international investment 
regime, its strengths and flaws, as well as ideas for future reform 
from a large number of stakeholders.  A restatement could also 
incorporate research and consultation with stakeholders, but 
could focus on producing a clear and comprehensive account of 
the legal norms contained in investment agreements, highlighting 
areas of inconsistency in arbitral decision-making and outlining 
options for resolving those issues. Once published, a restatement 
would need to be updated regularly to ensure that it remained a 
relevant resource for negotiators, policy-makers, arbitrators, and 
parties to investment disputes. These fact-finding approaches 
would require international collaboration, but could be facilitated 
by non-government organizations and the academic community. 
They would require substantial funding and time commitments, 
but could help to prepare a sound foundation for further reforms 
or initiatives.
Given their important but, historically, oppositional influence on 
the development of the international investment regime, any re-
form must engage meaningfully with both the business commu-
nity and civil society organizations in different regions of the world. 
A dialogue roundtable between business and civil society could be 
a useful means to strengthen lines of communication and gener-
ate solutions to address key challenges facing the regime.  Where 
contentious issues require more in-depth and focused effort, 
working groups could be a useful means to build consensus.  Such 
working groups could address a broad range of substantive or pro-
cedural issues.  Substantive questions that lend themselves to a 
working group process include: what are the appropriate purposes 
for the investment regime? How best to incorporate the concept 
of sustainable development into the regime? How should particu-
lar norms be interpreted and defined?  And, how should states and 
tribunals address treaty shopping?  Procedural issues revolve pri-
marily around the dispute-settlement arrangements for interna-
tional investors and the feasibility of various reform options.  One 
proposal that might merit further attention is the creation of an 
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appellate body to hear investor-state disputes (whether arbitrated 
in the first instance under ICSID or UNCITRAL, or under ad-hoc pro-
cedures).  A working group could consider the policy arguments for 
and against an appeals mechanism, consider various options for 
institutional design and rules and assess the costs and benefits of 
such a mechanism.  To ensure that their outcomes are robust and 
respected, these working groups would need to be composed of 
representatives of key stakeholder groups, from all regions, and be 
equipped with adequate resources to undertake consultation and 
research as necessary.  
To help address the fragmentation of the international investment 
regime, a Model International Investment Agreement could be for-
mulated, with guidance on the interpretation of, and possible vari-
ations to, common investment norms.  Such a model could draw 
on existing models and frameworks developed by governments, 
inter-governmental organizations and civil society.  It might present 
a more flexible option than a multilateral treaty, but would still en-
able states to work toward the harmonization of standards and to 
test and discuss new formulations (e.g., of “purpose” clauses).
A range of specific mechanisms could be introduced to improve 
the investment regime. These include a dedicated FDI Protection-
ism Observatory, to track, monitor and publicize regulatory policy 
changes made by states.  Initiatives to facilitate access to dispute-
settlement could lend greater legitimacy to the regime, for ex-
ample, through providing technical and policy assistance to least 
developed countries in relation to their investment policy and in-
vestment disputes.  A small claims settlement court might provide 
small and medium-sized enterprises with expedited, reduced-cost 
investment-dispute resolution.  In addition to adversarial process-
es, it could promote negotiation and mediation between investors 
and the state.  Another issue that could be addressed through a 
specific mechanism is preparing guidelines or rules for third-party 
funding of investment disputes.
Finally, intergovernmental processes play an important role in es-
tablishing lines of communication between states on key issues, 
and are essential to ensure greater co-ordination of the regime in 
the future.  Although attempts to negotiate a multilateral frame-
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work on investment have failed in the past, there may now be 
pockets of opportunity and consensus within the international 
community that could form the basis of future cooperation.  On 
the multilateral level, an informal meeting of ambassadors to the 
WTO could be a good way to raise awareness among decision-
makers about investment issues, in light of a possible new WTO 
agenda. There are benefits and drawbacks to deal with investment 
in the WTO – or, for that matter, UNCTAD or the OECD - and these 
deserve careful analysis and debate.  On the plurilateral level, an 
open, stand-alone intergovernmental process (perhaps serviced 
by staff from interested international organizations) could provide 
a means for states to build consensus on key issues; it could be 
launched by an existing international forum, such as the G-20. 
Whether multilateral or plurilateral, any negotiating process could 
be preceded by careful preparations. Independently of that, a num-
ber of significant bilateral and plurilateral investment agreements 
are currently under negotiation; these may well result in a de facto 
template for other bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, and for a 
multilateral framework.
In order to assess the various options for reform in further detail, 
and to direct a collaborative approach to their development, an 
International Investment Consensus-building Process could be 
initiated.
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INTRODUCTION
In today’s global economy, the importance of international invest-
ment (often referred to as “foreign direct investment”) cannot be 
understated. As a consequence, any laws and policies affecting 
such investment are becoming the object of greater attention and 
controversy. The aim of the present paper is to lay out options to 
improve the international investment law and policy regime. The 
paper opens with a brief description of the salient features of for-
eign direct investment (section A) and the key features of the inter-
national investment regime (section B). In section C, the paper sets 
out the drivers for change, focusing on changing circumstances, 
constituencies, issues, and challenges. Section D identifies the 
critical issues with regard to the current regime, and section E pre-
sents several options for improving the overall regime, focusing on 
initiating inclusive processes involving various stakeholders, with 
the substantive outcomes to be decided by participants.
A few preliminary remarks are in order. First, while a wide range 
of contracts, national laws and international agreements (the “in-
ternational investment regime”) defines the relationship between 
international investors and governments,1 the present paper fo-
cuses on the international dimension of the regime (although 
domestic policy measures and contracts are referred to on occa-
sion). The international investment regime is actually very young. 
As Salacuse and Sullivan aptly noted when writing about the re-
gime as it existed in the mid-1970s: “foreign investors who sought 
the protection of international investment law encountered an 
ephemeral structure consisting largely of scattered treaty provi-
sions, a few questionable customs, and contested general princi-
ples of law.”2 Today, investor-state relations have moved a long way 
from a relationship defined by power toward one defined by law, 
1  See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Three Laws of International Investment: Na-
tional, Contractual, and International Frameworks for Foreign Capital (New 
York: OUP, 2013).  
2  Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, “Do BITs Really Work? An Evalu-
ation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,” 46(1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 67 (2005), p. 68.
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with foreign investors benefitting from a regime that is stronger 
than it has ever been, including direct recourse to investor-state 
dispute settlement. Yet, the landscape is complicated and chal-
lenging, given the different perspectives that stakeholders have 
on the investment regime. While some stakeholders are basically 
satisfied with most of the current regime, others advocate various 
improvements, and again others seek a fundamental reorientation 
of a regime that they see as one-sided, beginning with its purpose, 
content and dispute-settlement mechanism.  
Second, in light of its ultimate objective and the controversial 
nature of many aspects of the investment regime, this paper at-
tempts to highlight the key controversial issues and various (often 
opposing) solutions suggested by various stakeholders. The paper 
does not advocate a particular position either with regard to what 
are the particular strengths and weaknesses of the current regime 
or with regard to which processes should be explored in the future 
in order to improve the regime. However, the underlying premise 
of the paper is that action is needed. Whether this action will in-
volve minor adjustments, more substantial recalibration or a para-
digm shift with regard to the international investment regime, is 
left for future discussion and reflection.
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A. SALIENT FEATURES OF FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important vehicle to 
bring goods and services to foreign markets and to integrate the 
national production systems of individual countries. While annual 
FDI outflows during the 1980s barely averaged about US$ 100 bil-
lion, they averaged US$ 1.7 trillion during 2007-2011; these flows 
peaked at US$ 2.2 trillion in 2007, the year before the Western 
financial and economic crises struck.3  The world’s outward FDI 
stock grew from US$ 2 trillion in 1990 to US$ 21 trillion by the end 
of 2011. This stock generated some US$ 28 trillion in sales, com-
pared to world exports of US$ 22 trillion that year (annex table 1). 
The lion’s share of the world’s FDI is in the services sector (some 
two-thirds), followed by manufacturing (about one-quarter) and 
natural resources (less than one-tenth).
Foreign direct investment is undertaken by multinational enter-
prises (MNEs), i.e., firms that control assets abroad. At the end of 
2010, there were at least 100,000 such firms worldwide, control-
ling at least 900,000 foreign affiliates. Obviously, many of these 
MNEs are small and medium-sized enterprises, although the larg-
est of them control the bulk of FDI. To a considerable extent, they 
enter foreign markets through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
rather than greenfield projects. Increasingly, these firms slice up 
the value-added chain and locate the production of various parts 
of their goods and services where they can be produced best from 
the firm’s point of view. The resulting portfolio of locational assets 
becomes itself a source of the international competitiveness of 
the outward investing firms, by providing them with better access 
to markets and various tangible and intangible assets required 
for the production process. It is for this reason that a number of 
home countries – especially developed countries – have a range 
of policy instruments in place that support their firms seeking to 
3   As for over 20 years, FDI trends, their composition and their development 
impact have been discussed in UNCTAD’s annual World Investment Report 
(WIR) series, all data, unless otherwise indicated, are from UNCTAD, World 
Investment Report (Geneva: UNCTAD, various years) [hereinafter UNCTAD, 
WIR].
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invest abroad.4 Moreover, there are many non-equity relationships 
(management contracts, franchising, etc.) that bring production 
abroad under the common governance of MNEs, further increas-
ing the importance of these firms in the world economy. This, in 
turn, leads to the emergence of firm-level integrated international 
production networks that, at the aggregate level, integrate the 
production systems of individual countries. It is also within these 
production networks that roughly one-third of world trade takes 
place (as intra-firm trade), and a good part of especially tacit tech-
nology and skills are transferred. This makes FDI and the enterpris-
es that undertake it important actors in national economies and 
international economic transactions.  
Given the importance of FDI for bringing tangible and intangible as-
sets to host countries, it is not surprising that governments around 
the world seek to attract such investment as a tool to advance their 
economic growth and development. As a result, the world market 
for FDI is highly competitive: virtually every country has an invest-
ment promotion agency, and many countries also have such agen-
cies at the provincial and city levels. There may well be some 8,000 
agencies worldwide that actively seek to attract FDI.5 Among other 
things, these agencies provide information about investment op-
portunities, target investors, offer various incentives, help foreign 
investors to establish themselves in the host country, provide after-
care investment services, and engage in policy advocacy. But inves-
tors, too, compete to find profitable investment opportunities. The 
degree of firm competition varies across industries and reasons for 
investing abroad. For example, it is higher in scarce natural resource 
industries, while it is lowest in export-oriented industries, where 
firms are typically spoiled for choice.6
4  See, Karl P. Sauvant, Persephone Economou, Ksenia Gal, Shawn Lim, and 
Witold P. Wilinski, “ Trends in FDI, Home Country Measures and Competitive 
Neutrality”, in Andrea Bjorklund, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law 
and Policy 2012-2013 (New York: OUP, forthcoming).
5   Millennium Cities Initiative, The Earth Institute at Columbia University, 
Handbook for Promoting Foreign Direct Investment in Medium-Size, Low-Budg-
et Cities in Emerging Markets (New York: Columbia University, 2009), p. 1, avail-
able at http://mci.ei.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/MCI-City-Investment-Promo-
tion-Handbook-FINAL.pdf.
6   Countries often establish export-processing zones to attract FDI; however, 
most of these zones do not live up to expectations.
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Also to attract FDI, countries have made their FDI regulatory frame-
works more welcoming, both at the national and international lev-
els. At the national level, the great majority (annex table 2) of all 
regulatory changes during 1991-2011 involved the facilitation of 
entry and establishment, better treatment of foreign affiliates and 
the easing of their operations, and stronger investment promo-
tion and facilitation (including the offering of new incentives). At 
the same time, the share of policy changes that make the invest-
ment climate less welcoming has been rising to over one-quarter 
in the past five years (figure 1), involving, among other measures, 
the establishment of entry conditions, ownership restrictions and 
screening procedures and the reversal of incentives. This reflects, 
among other things, that the expectations of governments about 
the role of FDI are changing.7
 
Figure 1. National regulatory changes, 2000-2011
Source: UNCTAD WIR 2012, Table III.1. National Regulatory Changes. p. 76.
7  For an elaboration, see the discussion in Section C on the greater recogni-
tion of the importance of sustainable international investment.
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At the international level, the welcoming approach to internation-
al investment is reflected in the rise in the number of international 
investment agreements (IIAs), especially bilateral investment trea-
ties (BITs), whose principal purpose is to protect this investment 
(figure 2);8 in a number of cases, they also facilitate the operations 
of investors in their host countries. The salient features of this de-
velopment are discussed in the next section.
Figure 2. Trends of BITs and other IIAs, 1980 – 2011 (Number of treaties)
Source:  UNCTAD, WIR 2012, Fig. III.2, p. 84.
8  As will be discussed below, IIAs typically use a broader definition of “in-
vestment” than the definition of “FDI.” An equity capital stake of 10% or more 
of the ordinary shares or voting power for an incorporated enterprise, or its 
equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise, is normally considered as the 
threshold for the control of FDI assets. See IMF, Balance of Payments Manual 
(Washington: IMF, 2009), 6th ed., p. 86, available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/bopman/bopman.pdf. 
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B. KEY FEATURES OF THE CURRENT 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
REGIME
The international investment regime is characterized by the fol-
lowing key features: (i) the dual aims of the regime have tradition-
ally been the promotion and protection of foreign investment, (ii) 
the regime has covered a broad spectrum of activities, including 
FDI and portfolio investment, (iii) investment protection standards 
are at the core of the regime, (iv) arbitration is the chosen mecha-
nism to settle investment disputes, (v) the regime is composed of 
multiple legal sources, and (vi) the regime lacks a developed insti-
tutional framework. The aim of this section is briefly to explain 
each of these key features in order to set the ground for the more 
critical analysis in subsequent sections.
1. The promotion and protection of foreign investment 
are the traditional aims of the regime
In order to encourage capital flows across countries (promotion), 
IIAs have traditionally focused on protecting foreign investments 
(protection). Accordingly, IIAs have principally contained protec-
tion norms, as promotion of foreign investment was seen as a by-
product of affording protection to foreign investment. This is par-
ticularly true of the earlier north-south BITs, which were founded 
on a grand bargain: “a promise of protection of capital in return for 
the prospect of more capital in the future.”9 Such a grand bargain 
would in turn lead to economic cooperation, economic develop-
ment and mutual prosperity for parties to an agreement.10
9   Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 
111.
10   See section below on whether such prosperity has indeed materialized 
across the board.
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2. The regime has a broad subject-matter coverage
The definition of foreign investment covered by IIAs has been quite 
broad. BITs have, for the most part, adopted an open-ended asset-
based definition, including a broad variety of economic interests 
such as movable and immovable property, shares, claims to mon-
ey, intellectual property rights, and business concessions. Similar-
ly, a great number of IIAs have also adopted a broad definition of 
covered foreign investors, including nationals of either contracting 
party and legal persons incorporated or constituted under the law 
of either contracting party.11
More recently, some IIAs have used various techniques to narrow 
their subject-matter coverage. Equally, arbitral decisions have con-
sidered certain elements necessary in order for an investment to 
qualify for protection under an IIA, including: (i) a certain duration, 
(ii) an expectation of profit, (iii) an element of risk, (iv) a substan-
tial commitment of capital, and (v) a contribution to the economic 
development of the host country.12
3. Investment protection standards are at the core of 
the regime
Another key feature of the international investment regime is its 
focus on providing a set of broad and open-textured standards for 
the protection of foreign investors and investments. Investment 
protection standards have principally imposed on host countries 
the obligations (a) to grant foreign investors “no less favourable 
treatment”, both vis-à-vis domestic investors and other foreign 
investors;13 (b) “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection 
and security”; (c) not to impair the foreign investment by “arbi-
trary,” “unreasonable” or “discriminatory” measures; and (d) to pay 
compensation to a foreign investor in case its property is, directly 
11   See generally UNCTAD, Scope and Definition (A Sequel) (Geneva and New 
York: UNCTAD, 2011), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20102_
en.pdf. 
12   See the discussion in section D.2.a below on the notion of “investment” 
for purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of a tribunal under the ICSID 
Convention.
13   These are the national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment 
clauses, respectively.
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or indirectly, expropriated. Additional clauses dealing with “trans-
fer of funds,” “entry of personnel” and “observance of undertak-
ings” can commonly be found in IIAs.
Historically, international investment law only focused on post-es-
tablishment (or post-entry), leaving states full control over whether 
or not to admit foreign investments (see, for example, the BIT prac-
tice of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). 
However, more recently a few states have concluded agreements 
that, in addition to traditional investment protection standards, 
include binding commitments (subject to country-specific and 
sectoral or other exceptions)14 with regard to pre-establishment, 
principally taking the form of non-discrimination obligations with 
regard to the admission of foreign investors and investments (e.g., 
Articles 1102 and 1103 NAFTA),15 as well as performance require-
ments (a notable feature of most United States and Canadian 
treaties). Accordingly, these agreements include investment lib-
eralization obligations in addition to more traditional investment 
protection obligations. Furthermore, a few IIAs focus principally on 
providing investment liberalization obligations. Usually mirroring 
the approach taken in the General Agreement on Trade in Servic-
es (GATS),16 such obligations include market access and national 
treatment provisions subject to specific commitments, but do not 
include most of the typical investment protection guarantees.17 
14   For example, Mexico excludes investment in the petro-chemical industry 
and Canada has high thresholds that trigger review.
15   Among others, Canada, Japan and the United States have adopted this 
approach: See, for example, the 1997 Azerbaijan–U.S. BIT, art. II; the 1998 
Canada–Costa Rica BIT, art. III; and the 2003 Japan–Vietnam BIT, art. 2.
16   The General Agreement on Trade in Services adopts a broad definition 
of “trade in services,” including the provision of services via a “commercial 
presence” (i.e., foreign direct investment (defined here as entailing majority 
control)). General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 15 April 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, (Marrakesh 
Agreement), Annex 1B, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, p. 285, art. I, para. 
2(c), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf.
17    For example, Article 60 of the 2008 CARFORUM-EC EPA expressly identifies 
the “progressive, reciprocal and asymmetric liberalization of investment 
and trade in services” as the core objective of Title II of the agreement. 
CARIFORUM-EC EPA, signed 15 October 2008, entered into force on December 
29, 2008, art. 60, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CAR_EU_EPA_e/
EU_OJ_L289_30.10.2008_e.pdf.
23
Equally, international investment law does not usually impose ex-
press obligations on home countries, for example, for the promo-
tion and encouragement of foreign investment; or on foreign in-
vestors, aside from conditioning an IIA’s protection on the foreign 
investment’s compliance with the laws of the host country.18  
Historically, international investment law has been thematically 
rather narrow (i.e., insular), excluding any express consideration of 
other relevant public policies (such as public health, environmental 
protection, public morals, cultural diversity, labor rights), aside from 
a few clauses addressing “national security” or “balance-of-pay-
ments” concerns. However, recently, a few IIAs have included general 
exceptions clauses or provisions restricting a host country’s ability 
to reduce the level of social and environmental protection.19
4. Arbitration is the chosen mechanism to settle 
investment disputes
A further key feature of the investment regime revolves around 
dispute settlement. International arbitration is the chosen mecha-
nism to settle both state-to-state and investor-to-state disputes. 
Most IIAs include one and/or the other form of dispute settle-
ment. Investor-state arbitration, which may take place within the 
specialized system of the Convention on the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(ICSID Convention)20 or according to other commercial arbitration 
rules (like the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules), is by far the most used 
mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes.
18   Investment tribunals have denied the protection of IIAs (including the 
right to arbitration) to those investors that have acted fraudulently or through 
corruption. See Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/26 (El Salvador-Spain BIT), Award, August 2, 2006.
19   For a survey of recent IIA practice in this regard, see Kathyrn Gordon 
& Joachim Pohl, “Environmental Concerns in International Investment 
Agreements: A Survey” (2011) OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, No. 2011/1, OECD Investment Division, online: www.oecd.org/
daf/investment.
20  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), signed March 18, 1965, entered 
into force on October 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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The past two decades have witnessed an exponential growth of 
investment treaty arbitrations, mirroring to a certain extent the 
growth of FDI and of IIAs.21 The first international arbitration based 
on a BIT commenced before an ICSID tribunal in 1987. The tribunal 
in AAPL v Republic of Sri Lanka issued its decision, together with a 
dissenting opinion by one of the three arbitrators, in 1990, award-
ing the claimant US$ 460,000 plus interest as compensation for 
the destruction of the claimant’s shrimp farm by Sri Lanka’s securi-
ty forces during a military operation against local rebels.22 By 2000, 
the number of known investment treaty arbitrations had reached 
50 (with 20 arbitral decisions on jurisdiction or the merits having 
been rendered by investment tribunals); by the end of 2011, there 
were 450 known disputes brought on the basis of an investment 
treaty (with several hundred decisions rendered by investment tri-
bunals) (figure 3),23 and by the end of 2012, the number of known 
treaty-based disputes had reached 518.24
21   See UNCTAD, “Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,” 
IIA Issues Note, April 2013.
22   AAPL v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, June 27, 1990.
23  UNCTAD, “Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,” IIA 
Issues Note, No. 1 (2012), p. 3, fig. 1, “Known investment treaty arbitrations 
(cumulative and newly instituted cases),” available at http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2012d10_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Latest 
Developments, 2012]. Investment treaty arbitrations differ from investment 
contract arbitrations based on the different jurisdictional ground and cause 
of action: with regard to the former, an international investment treaty 
constitutes both the jurisdictional basis and cause of action, while with regard 
to the latter, a contract constitutes the jurisdictional basis and cause of action. 
ICSID has reported that it registered 48 arbitration cases under the ICSID 
Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility in 2012. In addition, the Centre 
registered two conciliation cases. This is consistent with the general trend of 
increasing numbers of investment dispute settlement cases. See ICSID, The 
ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2013-1 (Washington DC: ICSID, 2013), pp. 7-8.
24  UNCTAD, “Towards a New Generation of International Investment Policies: 
UNCTAD’s Fresh Approach to Multilateral Investment Policy-Making” (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2013), p. 5.
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Figure 3. Known investor-state treaty-based disputes, 1987 – 2011
Source:  UNCTAD, WIR 2012, Fig. III.4, p. 87.
Host country measures subject to review by investment tribunals 
on the basis of “national treatment,” “expropriation” and “fair and 
equitable treatment” standards have included Canada’s ban on haz-
ardous waste exports,25 Mexico’s non-renewal of a hazardous in-
dustrial waste operating license,26 California’s state ban on the use 
or sale of a methanol-based gasoline additive,27 Ecuador’s denial of 
VAT refunds in the oil sector,28 the Imposition by the Czech National 
Bank of the forced administration of a bank,29 and Argentina’s emer-
gency legislation following the financial crisis of 2001-2002.30
25   S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, November 13, 2000.
26   Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, May 29, 2003. 
27  Methanex v. United States, Final Award, August 3, 2005.
28   Occidental v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UNC3467, Award, July 1,2004; EnCana 
v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award and Partial Dissenting Opinon, 
February 3, 2006. 
29   Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, March 17, 2006.
30   See, for example, CMS v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, May 
12, 2005; Enron and Ponderosa v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision 
on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim), August 2, 2004; LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/1, Award, July 25, 2007.
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Each investment treaty tribunal is formally independent from any 
previous or future tribunal (even if adjudicating a dispute based 
on the same IIA). Although there are certain differences depending 
on whether arbitration is conducted on the basis of ICSID rules, 
like arbitration in general, investment treaty arbitration is charac-
terized by the enhanced role of the disputing parties (e.g., in the 
appointment of the arbitral tribunal’s members), flexible proce-
dures, finality of the arbitral award (e.g., with limited possibility of 
review), and relative confidentiality of the entire process.
Investment arbitral tribunals play a crucial, yet increasingly contro-
versial, role in the functioning of the regime: First, investment pro-
tection standards (whether treaty- or custom-based) are broad and 
open-textured and thus leave a great margin of interpretation to 
the adjudicator. Second, the several interconnections between inter-
national investment law and customary international law and be-
tween international investment law and other specialized areas of 
international law (such as trade, environment, human rights)31 re-
main contested and thus are left to the adjudicator to resolve. Third, 
most IIAs (and, for that matter, the fora in which an arbitration takes 
place) do not always provide for detailed procedural rules (e.g., on 
the issue of available remedies for a violation of international invest-
ment law), and these are therefore left to be decided by arbitrators 
(if the applicable arbitration rules are silent on the matter).
5. The regime is shaped by a multiplicity of legal 
sources
IIAs represent the first set of norms that are central to the current 
international investment regime. Traditionally, IIAs took the form 
of BITs, the first of which was signed between Germany and Pa-
kistan in 1959. As documented by UNCTAD’s WIRs over time, the 
number of BITs grew from 370 at the end of the 1980s32 to close to 
31  These interactions may involve question of applicable law (e.g., to what 
extent does an investment treaty provision replace an international customary 
norm?) and questions of interpretation (e.g., to what extent should human 
rights norms influence the interpretation of investment treaties?).
32  Communication by UNCTAD, December 6, 2012. UNCTAD Bilateral 
Investment Treaties 1959-1999 (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000), p. iii.
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2,850 at the end of 2012.33 In the past fifteen years, IIAs have also 
included more comprehensive economic integration agreements 
such as free trade agreements (FTAs); at the end of 2011, some 350 
such agreements included investment rules.34 The international 
regime governing international investment consists therefore of 
over 3,000 agreements. While there are substantial similarities 
among many of them, there are also substantial differences, mak-
ing this treaty network a highly fragmented regime governing in-
ternational investment.
A second set of relevant norms stems from the customary inter-
national law applicable to any foreign persons as developed in 
the past 150 years. For example, states are required under cus-
tomary international law to accord aliens and their property the 
“minimum standard of treatment” revolving around notions such 
as “denial of justice,” “due process,” “due diligence,” and “non-
arbitrariness.”35 Equally, states are bound to provide appropriate 
compensation if they expropriate a foreign national’s property.
A third type of source of investment law is represented by the 
many arbitral and judicial decisions that have been rendered by in-
ternational tribunals in the past 150 years.36 It is often up to these 
tribunals to determine the existence of customary law as well as 
to interpret the often vague provisions in investment treaties, and 
to assess the interaction between them.37
33   UNCTAD, “Towards a New Generation”, op. cit., p. 4. Each year, UNCTAD’s 
WIR provides an update on the numbers of BITs and “other IIAs”. Since 
2010, this information is included in a dedicated chapter III on national and 
international investment policies. Between the annual WIRs, UNCTAD’s 
quarterly Investment Policy Monitors offers regular updates on IIAs.
34  UNCTAD, “Towards a New Generation”, op. cit., p. 4.
35  See Andrew Newcombe & Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties: Standards of Treatment (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International), 
pp. 235-253.
36  According to Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, the ICJ shall apply judicial 
decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. In 
addition, it should be noted that Article 38(1) also treats “the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations” as subsidiary 
means. See Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), 59 Stat. 1055, June 26, 1945.
37   Given the relevance of the decisions rendered under investment treaty 
arbitration, see the discussion in section B.3.
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A fourth set of relevant norms consists of “soft law” instruments.38 
These may have different origins (governmental; intergovernmen-
tal; non-governmental, including academic) as well as different 
objectives (such as to codify existing norms or propose new ones). 
Given the lack of binding multilateral rules on foreign investment, 
several non-binding instruments have been developed in the past 
fifty years, principally by various intergovernmental organizations: 
these range from the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protec-
tion of Foreign Property, the 1976 OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises (revised several times), and the 1992 World Bank 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, to the 
2012 UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable De-
velopment.39
It follows from the investment regime’s multiplicity of legal sourc-
es that (i) it is difficult accurately to describe the regime, as it is 
not a monolithic creature; (ii) the regime itself is in a permanent 
state of flux, with new arbitral decisions being issued and new or 
revised IIAs being signed on a regular basis; and (iii) law-making 
and law-application lacks consistency.
38   See generally Andrea K. Bjorklund & August Reinisch (eds.), International 
Investment Law and Soft Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2012).
39   Examples of governmental soft law instruments include the various 
restatements by the American Law Institute (ALI) available at www.ali.org, and 
the several national model BITs. Examples of non-governmental instruments 
include: the International Law Association (ILA) resolutions, available at 
www.ila-hq.org, and the model treaty prepared by the International Institute 
on Sustainable Development, Howard Mann, Konrad von Moltke, Luke Eric 
Peterson & Aaron Cosbey, IISD Model International Agreement on Investment 
for Sustainable Development (Model Agreement for Sustainable Development) 
(Winnipeg: IISD, 2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/
investment_model_int_handbook.pdf. As noted above, authoritative 
scholarly writings may be subsidiary means of determining international law 
rules as per Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, op. cit.  
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6. The regime has a light and fragmented institutional 
structure
A final key feature is the light and fragmented institutional struc-
ture underlying the international investment regime. Overall, 
the regime lacks strong, developed institutions (whether at the 
multilateral or bilateral level) in charge of setting, administering 
and implementing investment law and policy. The traditional BIT 
does not normally envisage any standing institutional framework, 
whether in terms of (regular) meetings of the contracting parties, 
in terms of specific tasks attributed to a standing secretariat or in 
terms of a dispute settlement body. A few of the more compre-
hensive economic integration agreements (like NAFTA and ASEAN) 
do however envisage some level of built-in policy-making activity 
(e.g., interpretative statements by the NAFTA contracting parties)40 
and administrative support (e.g., in the area of environmental and 
social policies).41 The most developed institution is arguably the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID),42 which exercises an important role in the administration 
of investor-State arbitrations; however it does not have a broader 
political role.
While there are several international organizations whose activi-
ties are relevant for the regulation of foreign investment (such as 
40   North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed December 17, 
1992, entered into force on January 1, 1994, art. 2001 (establishing the NAFTA 
Free Trade Commission).
41  North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), signed 
September 13, 1993, entered into force on January 1, 1994, art. 8 (establishing 
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation); see also Charter of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN Charter), November 20, 2007, 
art. 1 (stating that the Purposes of ASEAN include promoting greater “socio-
cultural cooperation”); ibid. at art. 9 (establishing the ASEAN Community 
Councils, including the Socio-Cultural Community Council). ASEAN members 
have agreed to a number of environmental measures since the 1981 Manila 
Declaration on the ASEAN Environment (April 30, 1981), which adopted the 
ASEAN Environmental Programme. See generally ASEAN Cooperation on 
Environment, http://environment.asean.org (last visited February 26, 2013).
42   ICSID was established by the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the 
ICSID Convention). Many IIAs list ICSID Convention arbitration as one of the 
options available to claimants who see to challenge government measures as 
violations of an investment treaty.
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the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD), the World Bank Group, the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Energy Charter Treaty, and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation (OECD)), they do not provide a comprehensive and inte-
grated multilateral institutional structure.43 Furthermore, the vari-
ous attempts over the past sixty years to provide for a multilateral 
structure (whether under the auspices of the International Trade 
Organization, the United Nations or as part of the negotiating 
agenda of the Doha Round within the WTO) all failed.44
As a consequence of the investment regime’s very light and frag-
mented institutional structure, the level of formal participation of 
various stakeholders is generally very limited, and any activity linked 
with an IIA (whether in the area of treaty making or dispute settle-
ment) is for the most part not formally monitored or publicized.
*****
In summary, the international investment regime has traditionally 
aimed at the promotion of foreign investment. The subject mat-
ter coverage of the regime has been rather broad, both in terms 
of covered “investments” and “investors.” In terms of substantive 
disciplines, while the main object of the regime has historically 
43  For example, the WTO’s role in shaping foreign investment law and policy 
remains rather limited, despite the inclusion of some investment norms in 
the GATS, op. cit., and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs), Marrakesh Agreement, op. cit., p. 143 (1999), 1868 U.N.T.S. 186. 
Similarly, while it includes quite extensive norms on trade and investment in 
the energy sector signed by 52 contracting parties, the Energy Charter Treaty 
is a sectoral and regional agreement, signed December 17, 1994, entered 
into force on April 16, 1998, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95. The OECD, too, is the home of a 
number of binding instruments directly relevant to international investment, 
but they are limited in geographical scope.
44   The document founding the ITO was to incorporate provisions on private 
investment, “Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, 
including Annexes” (Havana Charter) in United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Employment: Final Act and Related Documents, E/CONF.2/78, March 
24, 1948, art. 12, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
havana_e.pdf. WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration (Doha Declaration) WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, November 20, 2001, paras. 20-22, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm; see also 
the OECD negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, DAFFE/
MAI(98)7/REV1, April 22, 1998, available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/
pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf.
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been the protection of foreign investment, there are growing de-
mands for liberalization commitments as well as the recognition 
of the developmental implications of foreign investment. Invest-
ment treaty arbitration plays a crucial role in the development 
of the regime, particularly as it is through this mechanism that 
international investment law is actually interpreted and applied. 
Lastly, while the regime is characterized by a complex network of 
different norms developed over the past fifty years, it lacks strong, 
developed institutions in charge of coordinating the setting, ad-
ministration and implementation of investment law and policy.
32
C. DRIVERS FOR CHANGE: CHANGING 
CIRCUMSTANCES, CONSTITUENCIES, 
ISSUES, AND CHALLENGES
It is against the background of the salient features of international 
investment and the regime governing it that the current discus-
sion about the future of this regime needs to be seen. This section 
discusses some of the developments during the past fifteen years 
or so that are most likely to bear directly on the future evolution 
of that regime.
1. Emerging markets play an increasingly prominent 
role in the world FDI market
Among these developments, none is more important than the in-
creasingly prominent role that emerging markets play in the world 
FDI market. More specifically, in the past few years, emerging mar-
kets (roughly all non-members of the OECD) have come to attract 
slightly more than half of all inward FDI flows (an average of US$ 776 
billion during 2010-2012),45 and in 2011 they hosted over one-third 
of the world’s inward FDI stock; increasing amounts of this inward 
FDI comes from other emerging markets. Equally remarkable (and 
importantly), in 2009-2011 emerging markets accounted for some-
what more than one-quarter (an average of US$ 412 billion) of the 
world’s outward FDI flows – compared to negligible amounts during 
the 1980s; their outward FDI stock had accumulated to over US$ 4 
trillion by the end of 2011.46 This stock had been created by at least 
45   UNCTAD, “Global FDI Recovery Derails” Global Investment Trends Monitor, 
No. 11, January 23, 2013 (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2013), pp. 2-3. Note 
that, in this report, we include both “developing economies” and “transition 
economies” as “emerging markets.” 
46  For a discussion of the rise of emerging market MNEs, see, among others, 
Marin A. Marinov and Svetla T. Marinova (eds.), Emerging Economies and Firms 
in the Global Crisis (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Karl P. Sauvant and 
Geraldine McAllister, with Wolfgang A. Maschek (eds.), Foreign Direct Invest-
ments from Emerging Markets: The Challenges Ahead (New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2010); and Ravi Ramamurtri and Jitendra V. Singh (eds.), Emerging Multi-
nationals in Emerging Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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30,000 MNEs headquartered in emerging markets.47 Firms of each 
of the following economies invested an average of more than US$ 
10 billion dollars abroad annually during 2010-2011: Hong Kong 
(China) (US$ 89 bn), China (US$ 67 bn), Russian Federation (US$ 60 
bn), Singapore (US$ 23 bn), Republic of Korea (US$ 22 bn), Malaysia 
(US$ 14 bn), India (US$ 14 bn), Taiwan Province of China (US$ 12 bn), 
Mexico (US$ 11 bn), and Chile (US$ 11 bn).48 For comparison, dur-
ing the same period, only firms from France, Germany, Japan, Swit-
zerland, the United States, and the United Kingdom invested more 
than Chinese firms abroad, and only firms from the United States 
invested more abroad than Hong Kong (China).
The implication of this structural change is that a rising number 
of emerging markets (and their firms), as new key active investors 
in the world FDI market, now have a stake in the international in-
vestment regime as home countries seeking to protect their firms 
abroad and facilitate their operations (including in other emerg-
ing markets). Nowhere can this changing interest-situation be 
seen more clearly than in the development of China’s BITs.49 For 
example, China now accepts investor-State dispute settlement 
and incorporates more comprehensive substantive provisions into 
its BITs, in line with the practice of other major capital exporting 
countries.50 In recent BITs, China has also recognized the impor-
47   A number of emerging market MNEs are state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
However, if one analyzes the world’s 100 largest non-financial MNEs and 
the 100 largest non-financial MNEs headquartered in emerging markets 
(both ranked in terms of foreign assets), the following results for 2010 are 
obtained: in terms of numbers, there were more SOEs from emerging markets 
(29) than developed countries (20); however, in terms of value, SOEs from 
developed countries controlled US$ 1.4 trillion, while those from emerging 
markets controlled US$ 0.4 trillion. See Karl P. Sauvant & Jonathan Strauss, 
“State-Controlled Entities Control Nearly US$ 2 Trillion in Foreign Assets,” 64 
Columbia FDI Perspective (2012), p. 2 (FDI by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
has been negligible so far).
48  UNCTAD, UNCTADStat database, “Inward and outward foreign direct 
investment flows, annual, 1970-2011,” available at http://unctadstat.unctad.
org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 (last visited February 27, 2013). 
Tax havens are excluded.
49   Valentina Vadi, “Converging Divergences: The Rise of Chinese Outward 
Foreign Investment and Its Implications for International (Investment) Law” in 
Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy: 2011-
2012 (New York: OUP, 2013), pp. 705-724.
50   Ibid., p. 706.
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tance of maintaining health, safety and environmental measures 
whilst promoting and protecting investment.51 
As a result of investors from emerging markets becoming key players 
in the world FDI market, the traditional distinction between home 
and host countries, capital importing countries and capital export-
ing countries, and North and South is beginning to become less 
sharp – in this case from the perspective of traditional host coun-
tries, when emerging markets were overwhelmingly capital-import-
ing countries. This blurring of the boundaries, in turn, changes the 
interest-situation of key actors among emerging markets concern-
ing the future development of the international investment regime 
as more emerging markets can be expected to seek to balance their 
interest as host countries (to maintain national policy space) with 
their interest as home countries (in protections of their firms abroad, 
as well as liberal entry and operating conditions). 
2. Non-traditional investors are playing a greater role in 
key developed countries
The rise of emerging markets as outward investors is, not surpris-
ingly, mirrored by the increasing role of non-traditional investors 
in key developed countries, including in particular in the United 
States. Japanese firms led this process in the 1980s. In the second 
half of the 1980s, these firms began to invest in the United States 
on a large scale: their FDI inflows grew from an average of US$ 
2 bn in 1980-1981 to US$ 16 bn in 1990-1991.52 It was followed 
in the 2000s by firms from emerging markets: their FDI inflows 
into the United States grew from an average of US$ 19 bn in 2000-
2001 to US$ 22 bn in 2010-2011.53 Some of these investors have 
different approaches to doing business, are less transparent than 
51   For example, see the preambles of the 2004 China-Trinidad and Tobago 
BIT, and the 2004 China-Guyana BIT.  See discussion in Vadi, op. cit., p. 712.
52   Data calculated from information available from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United States: Country Detail for Capital Inflows,” available at www.bea.gov/
itable/.  
53   Data provided by the Division on Investment and Enterprise, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, January 12, 2013, on file with author. 
“Emerging markets” include all countries that are not “developed countries.”
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the traditional ones and, in many instances, are state-controlled 
entities (especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but also sov-
ereign wealth funds (SWFs), including from China) that are seen 
to pursue non-commercial interests.54 Moreover, the United States 
experienced the trauma of the World Trade Center attacks in 2001, 
which made national security concerns of priority importance. At 
the same time, the number of treaty-based investment disputes in 
which the United States was a respondent rose.
The implication of these developments is that the United States 
– traditionally the most important home country – began to pay 
more attention to its (also traditional) role as a host country, i.e., a 
country that seeks to maintain sufficient policy space to protect 
its own legitimate interests. Thus, the rise of Japanese FDI led to 
the establishment of a national security review process for for-
eign investments in the United States in 1988, conducted by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS);55 
the rise of emerging market FDI then led to the strengthening of 
CFIUS through the Foreign Investment and National Security Act 
in 2007.56 The changing interest-situation of the United States (in-
cluding its responsiveness to other objectives and to other stake-
holders) is reflected in its Model BITs. The 1984 US Model BIT (and 
the treaties based on it) arguably represented one of the most 
investor-friendly texts on record. The country’s 2004 Model BIT,57 
on the other hand, exhibits a perceptibly more cautious approach. 
In particular, it defines “fair and equitable treatment” to consist of 
not more than the customary international law minimum stand-
ard of treatment, it circumscribes indirect expropriation, it drops 
54   See Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs & Wouter P. F. Schmit Jongbloed (eds.), 
Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions (New York: OUP, 2012).  
55   See the Exon-Florio Amendment (50 U.S.C. App § 2170) of the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. § 2601 et seq.). CFIUS was originally 
established by an Executive Order of President Ford in 1975.
56   Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), Pub. L. 110-
49, 121 Stat. 246, enacted July 26, 2007.
57   U.S. Department of State, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 2004 (U.S. 
Model BIT 2004) (Washington D.C.: USDS, 2004). For an analysis, see Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, “A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model BITs: Rebalancing 
Investor and Host Country Interests” in Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on 
International Investment Law & Policy: 2008-2009 (New York: OUP, 2009), pp. 
283-316. The 2012 Model BIT did not change much in the balance achieved in 
2004. See Jamie Strawbridge, “Revised Model BIT Contains New Language on 
SOEs, Technology Transfer,” 12(17) Inside US – China Trade (2012). 
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the umbrella clause,58 it refines the definition of “investment,” it 
excludes local government from national treatment and most-
favored-nation treatment, it pays more attention to the question 
of environmental and labor standards and, above all, it contains a 
self-judging essential security clause.59 This blurring of the sharp 
boundaries of the past – in this case, from the perspective of tradi-
tional home countries, when developed countries focused on their 
interests as capital-exporting (home) countries – changes the 
interest-situation of key actors among developed countries con-
cerning the future development of the international investment 
regime. With the Lisbon Treaty60 giving the European Union insti-
tutions the competence to deal with FDI matters, it remains to be 
seen how this new actor will define its approach to international 
investment law and policy. 
As a result, the United States – traditionally the strongest proponent 
of IIAs with high-standards – can be expected to continue to seek to 
balance its interests as a home country with its interests as a host 
country. Other developed countries may well follow this approach 
in the future.61 The changing interest-situation of emerging markets 
as traditional host countries (discussed earlier), together with the 
changing interest-situation of developed countries as traditional 
58  Though it (and the 2012 Model), each retain a “procedural umbrella clause” 
via specific coverage of “investment agreements” and consent to arbitrate 
disputes under “investment agreements” (as distinct from disputes arising 
under treaty obligations).
59   The Peru-United States FTA, for example, contains a self-judging essential 
security clause (see art. 22.2, para. 2); furthermore, a footnote to that article 
affirms that, if a party invokes Article 22.2 in an arbitral proceeding (including 
an investment arbitration proceeding), the tribunal or panel hearing the 
matter shall find that the exception applies (see art. 22.2, para. 2, footnote 2). 
However, the subsequent 2012 United States Model BIT omits this footnote.
60   Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (Lisbon Treaty), 2007/C 306/01, signed 
December 13, 2007, entered into force on December 1, 2009, point. 157, 158. 
61   Japan, for example, has included a self-judging essential security clause 
in some of its recent BITs, for example, the 2008 Japan-Peru BIT, art. 19, the 
2008 Japan-Uzbekistan BIT, art. 17, and the 2011 Japan-Colombia BIT, art. 15. 
The 2003 Canada BIT also includes a self-judging essential security clause, 
although the security interests covered by the clause are defined to relate to 
traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war, supplies to military or 
security establishments, or to actions taken in times of war or international 
emergency as well as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (see art. 10, 
para. 4(b)); see also Katia Yannaca-Small, “Essential Security Interests under 
International Investment Law” in International Investment Perspectives: 
Freedom of Investment in a Changing World (Paris: OECD, 2007), p. 98.
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home countries are the most important factors influencing the fur-
ther development of the future international investment regime.  A 
paradigm shift might well be taking place, toward a more balanced 
international investment regime.
3. Government expectations about the role of FDI are 
changing
The changing interest-situation of host and home countries needs 
to be seen against the background of changing expectations of gov-
ernments regarding the role of FDI. For governments, especially in 
the case of inward FDI, the starting point is that this investment is 
but a tool to help them advance the economic growth and sustain-
able development of their countries. However, the consensus that 
all FDI is equally beneficial in this respect is fracturing. First, more 
governments consider (certain) M&As as less beneficial than green-
field investments, especially when they are being undertaken by 
state-controlled entities and the targets are in sensitive industries 
or are national champions. The principal reasons include that M&As 
do not add productive capacity (as opposed to greenfield FDI) and 
often may reduce employment levels, and because they can involve 
targets that are considered sensitive on account of national secu-
rity,62 or economic or cultural considerations. Second, governments 
are now actively encouraging and demanding more sustainable FDI, 
i.e., investment that makes a maximum contribution to economic, 
social and environmental development and takes place within mu-
tually beneficial governance mechanisms while being commercial-
ly viable – sustainable FDI for sustainable development. In other 
words, governments are increasingly concerned with the quality 
of investment, not simply its quantity. This reflects, in part, the fact 
that markets and resources in developing countries are in demand 
now, giving developing countries more power to determine which 
investors they will, and will not, accept. Finally, governments are 
paying more attention to competing objectives, especially national 
interests, essential security, the promotion of national champions, 
and the protection of certain national industries.
62  This is reflected, for example, in the review mechanisms various countries 
have established to screen incoming M&As.
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In addition, more investors recognize the need to adapt their in-
vestments to respond to the sustainable development needs of 
host countries. Indeed, more and more now incorporate such plan-
ning into the fabric of their investments, not simply as corporate 
social responsibility add-ons, but as core strategies and practices. 
IIAs today appear to lag behind this thinking, reflecting the lowest 
common denominator of enterprises that continue to have diffi-
culties with this linkage, as opposed to those who promote it.
The implication is that the national approach (reflected also in the 
changing nature of some IIAs, as discussed earlier) toward FDI is 
under review in a number of countries. For example, such coun-
tries as Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Canada, China, Germany, India, Sri Lanka, Russia, and the United 
States have strengthened or established screening mechanisms, 
or have passed laws restricting FDI in certain sectors or, more gen-
erally, have become less welcoming for foreign investors.63 This is 
reflected, for example, in the fact that the share of national FDI 
policy changes worldwide that have made the investment climate 
less welcoming (which averaged around 5% during the 1990s) rose 
from 7% in 2001-2002, to 11% in 2003-2004, to 18% in 2005-2006, 
to 23% in 2007-2008, and to 27% in 2009-2011 (annex table 2). 
Also indicative is that the number of notifications to CFIUS rose 
from 72 in 2000,64 to 111 in 2011 (with a high of 155 in 2008);65 
at the same time, the Committee’s number of investigations grew 
63   UNCTAD, WIR 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (New 
York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012), available at http://www.unctad-docs.org/
files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf, “Box III.4. Examples of FDI restrictions 
and regulations in 2011-2012.” 
64   Edward M. Graham & David M. Marchick, US National Security and Foreign 
Direct Investment (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2006), 
available at http://labhi.staff.umm.ac.id/files/2010/12/U.S.-National-Security.
pdf, p. 57, tbl. 2.1: “CFIUS notifications and investigations, 1988-2005.”
65   Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), Annual 
Report to Congress: Report Period: CY 2011 (Washington DC: CFIUS, 2012), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Documents/2012%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20PUBLIC.
pdf, p. 3, tbl. I-1: “Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 
2009-2011.”; CFIUS, Annual Report to Congress: Report Period: 2009 (Calendar 
Year) (Washington DC: CFIUS, 2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS%20
Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress%20for%20CY09.pdf, p. 3, tbl. B-1: 
“Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions 2007-2009”.
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from 1 in 2000 to a high of 40 in 2011.66 These numbers indicate 
that, in 2011, 36% of the filings went on to become investigations, 
compared to 1% in 2000. While these developments suggest that 
the investment climate is becoming less welcoming for MNEs and 
perhaps even harbors the possibility of a rise in FDI protectionism, 
the dominant approach remains to welcome FDI, protect it and fa-
cilitate the operations of investors (as reflected in table 2, but also 
in the fact that the number of IIAs continues to grow) – red tape 
has not replaced red carpet.
The result is that national approaches to FDI are becoming more nu-
anced in a number of countries and pay more heed to objectives oth-
er than the quantity of FDI inflows. As countries seek to protect their 
domestic approaches vis-à-vis their international commitments, this 
change in the expectations of governments regarding the role of FDI 
can be expected to be increasingly reflected in the purpose and con-
tents of IIAs. 
4. The number of treaty-based investment disputes is 
increasing
Reference has already been made to the rise of treaty-based in-
vestment disputes. While there had been (as noted earlier) few 
such disputes until the end of the 1990, their number had risen to 
518 at the end of 2012,67 with about a third of these disputes hav-
ing arisen in the past five years.68 Over the years, respondents have 
included 18 developed countries, 61 developing countries and 16 
economies in transition.69 The damages awarded in such disputes 
66   Graham & Marchick, op. cit., p. 57, tbl. 2.1; CFIUS, 2012, op. cit. p. 3, tbl. I.1. 
67  UNCTAD, “Towards a New Generation”, op. cit., p. 5.
68   This number of disputes may not appear high; however, by comparison, 
there were 91 panel reports issued under Article XXIII of the GATT between 
1948 and the end of 1994 (several panel reports were not adopted) General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), Marrakesh Agreement, op. cit. 
There were also 24 panel reports issued under the Tokyo Round codes, of which 
many were also not adopted. See Karl P. Sauvant,  “Driving and Countervailing 
Forces: A Rebalancing of National FDI Policies,” in Sauvant, 2009, op. cit., pp. 
259-260. There is of course an important difference between disputes under 
the investment and trade regimes, namely that, in the latter, disputes can be 
brought only by governments.
69   UNCTAD, Latest Developments, 2013, op. cit., p. 4. 
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can be high. For example, in the case of CME v Czech Republic, the 
arbitral tribunal awarded US$ 269.8 million, plus 10% interest and 
costs, to the plaintiff; 70 the (October 5, 2012) award in Oc-
cidental v. Ecuador of US$ 1.76 billion (plus interest) is the highest 
to date. It has been calculated that, as of February 2011, the sum of 
all awards against Argentina amounted to US$ 430 million (after 
two committees had annulled awards amounting to over US$ 200 
million), with the country currently facing approximately US$ 65 
billion in outstanding ICSID claims.71  In addition, the rise of inves-
tor-state disputes has also drawn attention to the costs and ben-
efits of using arbitration as the mechanism to settle investment 
treaty disputes, including in terms of transparency, efficiency and 
cost of the process.  For example, the length of investment arbitra-
tion proceedings can vary from as little as sixteen months to as 
long as eight years (not including possible review proceedings).72 
Also, the costs of litigating an investment treaty claim can be high 
(they can easily range between US$ 1-30 million, including the to-
tal of all arbitration costs and legal fees), with longer disputes pos-
sibly costing more.73
The implication of this greater assertiveness of investors in bring-
ing treaty claims is twofold: On the one hand, the rise of treaty-
based investment disputes seems to show that there is a need for 
IIAs and a dispute-settlement mechanism to deal with grievances 
by investors; on the other hand, more and more governments – 
70   CME v. Czech Republic, Final Award, March 14, 2003, available at http://
italaw.com/documents/CME-2003-Final_001.pdf, p. 161, paras. 1-2. On May 
16, 2003, the Czech Republic paid the amount awarded. Peter S. Green, “Czech 
Republic Pays $355 Million to Media Concern,” New York Times, May 16, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/16/business/czech-republic-pays-355-
million-to-media-concern.html.
71  Luke Eric Peterson, “Argentina by the Numbers: Where Things Stand 
with Investment Treaty Claims Arising Out of the Argentine Financial Crisis,” 
International Arbitration Reporter, February 1, 2011, http://www.iareporter.
com/articles/20110201_9; “Argentina Faces 65bn Dollars in Claims; Plans to 
Abandon International Litigations Court,” MercoPress, November 28, 2012, 
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/11/28/argentina-faces-65bn-dollars-in-
claims-plans-to-abandon-international-litigations-court. It should be noted, 
though, that tribunals seldom award the full amount to claimants even when 
arbitration claims are successful.
72   See UNCTAD, Latest Developments, 2012, op. cit., p. 12.
73  UNCTAD, IIA Monitor, No. 1 (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009), 
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf, p. 11. 
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from developed countries, developing countries and economies 
in transition – are potentially respondents in treaty-based invest-
ment disputes and, again potentially, face substantial claims. This 
potential is defined not only by the number of IIAs with investor-
state dispute-settlement provisions, but also by the fact that there 
are (as noted above) some 100,000 MNEs and at least 900,000 for-
eign affiliates, many of which (depending on the presence of an IIA 
and its provisions) may be able to initiate disputes. This makes it all 
the more important that the dispute-settlement process is a fair 
as possible and accepted by all major stakeholders.
As a result, governments from all country groups can be expected 
to seek clearer and more circumscribed definitions of their respon-
sibilities to protect themselves against claims, if they do not seek 
to abandon the investor-state dispute-settlement mechanism alto-
gether. Furthermore, there will be continuing pressure on improving 
the dispute-settlement process.
5. Questioning whether IIAs attract FDI
In the case of emerging markets, another consideration needs to 
be added, namely the role of IIAs (and especially BITs) in attract-
ing FDI. To repeat the quote from Salacuse, a BIT between a devel-
oped and a developing country was founded on a grand bargain: “a 
promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect of more 
capital in the future.”74 However, it is not clear to what extent both 
sides of this “grand bargain” have materialized. While it is clear that 
the regime to protect foreign investors and investments is highly 
developed (and also facilitates their operations), it is less clear that 
IIAs per se are important to attract FDI. Intuitively, the protection 
that IIAs provide, and the signaling effect they can have, should 
encourage FDI flows. But the empirical studies that have been un-
dertaken in this respect come, when taken together, to a mixed 
74   Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties, op. cit., p. 111.
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result.75 This is not surprising: After all, the regulatory framework 
(including IIAs) comprises only one set of factors determining the 
flow of FDI. Once it is enabling (which, basically, means that FDI 
is permitted), economic factors (such as market size and growth, 
the quality of the infrastructure, the presence of natural resources, 
the availability of skills and technology) determine whether or not 
investments actually take place. In other words, an enabling en-
vironment does nothing if the economic determinants are not in 
place. In addition, it is difficult to isolate the specific impact of (dif-
ferent facets of) IIAs on the flow of investments from other factors, 
including, in addition to economic factors, the presence or absence 
of, for example, liberalization measures undertaken unilaterally or 
in the context of trade agreements.
The implication – and result – of this situation is that the argument 
that IIAs are crucial to attract FDI is no longer necessarily persuasive. 
And this, in turn, undermines one important rationale for entering 
into such agreements (which, after all, tie the hands of governments 
in terms of treating foreign investors). There are of course other ra-
tionales for such treaties, such as to help policy makers implement 
domestic reforms and, most importantly, to develop a law-based re-
gime governing international investment. But one of the bases of 
the “grand bargain” has become questionable, reducing the impor-
tance of this driver of the expansion of the investment regime.
75   Most of them are contained in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (eds.), 
The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, 
Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows (New York: OUP, 2009). Most 
BITs contain protection clauses only and do not, in particular, contain the 
market-opening provision of pre-establishment national treatment (although 
the number of countries whose BITs do is rising); free trade agreements, on 
the other hand, tend to liberalize entry. Opening an economy (or certain 
sectors) to FDI when the economic determinants are right most likely 
leads to additional investment inflows, regardless of whether such market-
opening is done unilaterally or through treaty provisions. See also UNCTAD 
“The Rise of International Investment Agreements in Attracting FDI to 
Developing Countries”,  UNCTAD’s Series on International Investment Policies 
for Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009).
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6. Greater influence of civil society
Civil society – especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and trade unions76 – play an increasing role in the debate sur-
rounding the evolution of the international investment law and 
policy regime. This role manifested itself dramatically in 1998 in 
the abortive negotiations, within the OECD, of a Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment. NGOs have continued to take an interest in 
the development of the international investment regime and, in 
particular, issues relating to IIAs.77 They typically question an over-
emphasis of the benefits of FDI, while at the same time support-
ing the quest of host country governments to maintain sufficient 
policy space to pursue legitimate public policy objectives.78  In ad-
dition, they have been strong advocates of including provisions in 
IIAs that specify the responsibilities of MNEs to balance the rights 
that these firms have under these treaties; that increase transpar-
ency in the investor-state dispute-settlement process (or abandon 
this process altogether); and that pay more attention to sustaina-
bility issues.79 Trade unions, for their part, have sought to enshrine 
76   The concept of “civil society” also includes local communities and indig-
enous peoples. These groups represent important stakeholders in the inter-
national investment regime as they may be fundamentally affected by in-
vestments, especially in natural resources; there is a growing recognition by 
governments, international organizations and the business community of 
their importance.
77   See, e.g., recent publications by a number of NGOs: Corporate Europe 
Observatory (CEO) and the Transnational Institute (TNI), Profiting from Injustice 
(Brussels/Amsterdam: CEO & TNI, 2012), available at http://corporateeurope.
org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf; Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, “A Critical Opportunity for Transparency in Investor–
State Disputes as Government Delegations and Arbitration Experts Meet 
in New York,” IISD Commentary (2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/
pdf/2012/critical_opportunity.pdf;  Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Aaron 
Cosbey, Lise Johnson & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Investment Treaties and Why 
They Matter to Sustainable Development: Questions and Answers (Winnipeg: 
IISD, 2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/investment_treaties_
why_they_matter_sd.pdf; Martin Khor “The Emerging Crisis of Investment 
Treaties,” 69 South Bulletin 2, (2012), available at http://www.southcentre.
org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1888%3Asb69&catid
=144%3Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&Itemid=287&lang=en. 
78   CEO & TNI, op. cit., p. 49. 
79   As regards the last of these issues, see especially the pioneering model 
developed in the framework of IISD, the Model Agreement for Sustainable 
Development, op. cit. 
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workers’ rights in IIAs, especially relating to core labor standards.80 
The influence of civil society is reflected, for example, in the United 
States Model BIT, which contains specific articles dealing with the 
environment81 and social issues.82 If anything, the role of civil soci-
ety in future investment negotiations is likely to increase.
The implication – and result – of this development is that the fur-
ther evolution of the international investment law and policy re-
gime will increasingly involve, if not require, a multi-stakeholder 
process that takes into account the concerns of civil society. While 
this might make the process more complex, it reflects the pluralis-
tic nature of modern societies.
7. A greater role for governments
Finally, governments (including home country governments) are 
also stakeholders in the investment relationship. Their role has 
several dimensions. One is that they are parties to IIAs. While the 
original intention of IIAs (and especially BITs) was to depoliticize the 
relationship between foreign investors and host country govern-
ments (via the investor-state dispute-settlement mechanism),83 
it may be that governments are slowly beginning to become re-
engaged (and formally so84) in this relationship, e.g., through the 
80   See, for example, the discussion of labor union positions set out in a 
collective statement by Linda Andros, Owen Herrnstadt and others in Annex B 
of the Report of the Subcommittee on Investment of the Advisory Committee on 
International Economic Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
September 30, 2009, part IV, Recommendation 4, available at http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2009/131118.htm#b. 
81   U.S. Department of State, Model Biltateral Investment Treaty 2012 (U.S. 
Model BIT 2012) (Washington D.C.: USDS, 2012), available at http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf, art. 12: Investment and 
Environment. Not surprisingly, the Model BIT is a compromise and, therefore, 
does not reflect fully the views of neither civil society nor business.
82   Ibid., art. 13: Investment and Labor; Annex B: Expropriation, para. 4(b).
83   See discussion in R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford & W. Michael Reisman, 
Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Alphen: 
Kluwer Law International, 2005), pp. 3-8. 
84  David Schneiderman, “Revisiting the De-Politization of Investment 
Disputes” in Sauvant, 2011, op. cit., pp. 693-714.
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issuance of interpretive statements85 and the possible greater use 
of state-to-state dispute settlement.86 The principal driving force 
for this re-engagement is the desire of governments to ensure that 
their intentions reflected in IIA provisions are properly understood 
and interpreted, especially in the context of claims that may in-
volve substantial sums of money. The risk in such a re-engagement 
include that investment relationships may move from law-based 
relationships to power-based relationships.87
Another aspect of the role of countries in their capacity as home 
countries receiving increasing attention relates to the fact that 
85   See, for example, NAFTA Free Trade Commission, “North American Free 
Trade Agreement Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions,” 
July 31, 2001, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/
CH11understanding_e.asp. However, such government re-involvement is 
(still?) quite rare.
86   Some states have opted to exclude investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) 
entirely from their BITs, particularly when those agreements are concluded 
with other developed economies (for example, the investment chapter of 
the 2004 United States-Australia FTA refers to future consultations on ISDS, 
if needed (art. 11.16), and the 2011 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations Investment Protocol provides merely for consultation between the 
parties (art. 25)). Other states are showing an increasing willingness to resort 
to state-state arbitration in the absence of an effective appeal mechanism 
for investor-state dispute awards (see, for example, Ecuador’s initiation of 
proceedings against the United States pursuant to Article VII of the United 
States-Ecuador BIT. Ecuador v. U.S., Request for Arbitration, June 28, 2011, 
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1878). The case 
sought to overturn the interpretation of Article II(7) of the BIT (requiring that 
states provide foreign investors with “effective means” of asserting claims and 
enforcing rights”) adopted by the tribunal in Chevron v. Ecuador, Partial Award 
on the Merits, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 34877, March 30, 2010. The latter 
approach has been recommended by UNCTAD as part of their Investment 
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development, “… if a question about the 
meaning of a specific IIA obligation arises, and the Contracting Parties fail to 
resolve the uncertainty through consultations, a State-State arbitration can be 
a useful mechanism to clarify it. In this sense, State-State procedures retain 
their ‘supportive’ function for ISDS.” UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development (IPFSD) New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012), p. 56; 
see also the recommendation that solely state-state arbitration be permitted 
in respect of pre-establishment issues, ibid., p. 61. 
87  See in this context, for example the decision of the United States to 
withdraw Generalized System of Preference  benefits from Argentina 
in relation to the country’s non-payment of awards.  USTR, “U.S. Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk Comments on Presidential Actions Related to the 
Generalized System of Preferences” (Washington D.C., March 26, 2012) 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/
march/us-trade-representative-ron-kirk-comments-presidenti.
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most governments of developed countries (and a rising num-
ber of those of emerging markets) typically support their firms 
that invest abroad in various ways. They do that through “home 
country measures,” i.e., measures that governments of these 
countries take to support the international expansion of their 
firms through FDI.88 Such measures can take the form of provid-
ing information about investment opportunities; finance; fiscal 
incentives; insurance; etc.89 A discussion has begun (especially 
in the OECD and the negotiations of a Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement) on whether such measures, especially when they are 
available to state-controlled entities, represent a disregard of the 
“competitive neutrality” principle and hence might need to be 
disciplined.90 
The underlying dilemma that home country governments face in 
relation to outward FDI and home country measures relates to 
the fact that governments know that, in an open world econo-
my, they need internationally competitive firms headquartered 
in their territory. And being internationally competitive requires 
more and more that firms have a portfolio of locational assets, 
i.e., establish a network of foreign affiliates, in order to have 
better access to foreign markets and tangible and intangible re-
sources of all kinds, and that firms seek to maximize the benefits 
of their investments in the framework of their global corporate 
networks. This, in turn, requires that a part of the investments of 
these firms is undertaken abroad, including by shifting (if need 
be) existing production capacities abroad, with the associated 
consequences for employment, trade, the conduct of research 
and development, the payment of taxes, etc. Thus, outward FDI 
is not necessarily always entirely favorable for home countries, 
whose governments seek to maximize the benefits of invest-
ments in the framework of their national economies. In other 
words, there is a tension between what may be good (from a 
88  See UNCTAD, Home Country Measures (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 
2001), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd24.en.pdf, pp. 8-11.
89  See, Sauvant et al., forthcoming.
90  See Antonio Capobianco & Hans Christiansen, “Competitive Neutrality and 
State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options,” OECD Corporate 
Governance Working Papers, No. 1 (Paris: OECD, 2011), available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9xfgjdhg6-en.
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micro-economic perspective) for firms (and may even be required 
to have internationally competitive firms) on the one hand, and 
what may be good (from a macro-economic perspective) for the 
economic development of home countries. It is an issue that sur-
faces from time to time in developed countries (e.g., in the con-
text of “offshoring” and “delocalization”), and it is bound to do so 
in the future in emerging markets as well. 
The implications – and results – of this situation are several-fold. 
For one, there may be a shift in the interpretive power of IIAs to-
ward giving governments a greater role. In particular, it can be ex-
pected that home country governments will become more actively 
involved in the dispute-settlement process, for instance by providing 
more guidance to arbitral tribunals, reserving possibilities for the 
state-to-state resolution of disputes and/or perhaps even eventu-
ally establishing an appeals mechanism. There is also a possibility 
that separate disciplines may emerge, focused on a particular class 
of investors, namely state-controlled entities. (One such discipline, 
albeit of a soft-law nature, was adopted in 2008 under the aegis of 
the IMF, the “Generally Accepted Principles and Practices” relating to 
sovereign wealth funds.91) This raises the question of whether this 
might be the beginning of the fragmentation of the international 
investment law regime in terms of classes of investors. Finally, the 
fact that the governments of some home countries from time to 
time look with unease at outward FDI (and that more governments 
might do so in the future) introduces an uncertainty whose implica-
tions for the international investment regime (a slowing down of 
the liberalization of the outward FDI regime in a number of coun-
tries? The rise of outward FDI protectionism?) are not yet clear.
*****
91   See generally International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practice “Santiago 
Principles” (Santiago Principles), (IWG, 2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.
org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
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In spite of all these factors driving change in the international in-
vestment law and policy regime, few (if any)92 question the need 
for a regime to govern international investment as the most im-
portant vehicle for international economic transactions. And this 
is in spite of the denunciation of their BITs by some governments,93 
the withdrawal of some countries from the ICSID Convention94 
and the expression of strong and general dissatisfaction in some 
academic circles95 and among NGOs96 with various aspects of the 
current regime.
It is clear, however, that the regime can – and must – be improved 
to take into account the profound changes in the international in-
vestment law and policy landscape during the past fifteen years 
or so. Moreover, a number of factors continue to be at work that 
are most likely to lead to further changes in the regulatory frame-
work for international investment, both at the national and inter-
national levels. Various stakeholders are playing a more important 
role, and all seek to make sure that their interests are reflected in 
this evolving regulatory framework. As a result, the substantive 
content of the international investment regime is very likely to 
92   Even one of the strongest critics of this regime, M. Sornarajah, in the 
end argues for a (substantial) improvement of the regime, see his “Toward 
Normlessness: The Ravage and Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in International 
Investment Law” in Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment 
Law & Policy (New York: OUP, 2010), pp. 595-642.
93   For example, in April 2010 South Africa’s Cabinet concluded that South 
Africa should refrain from entering into BITs in the future, except in cases of 
compelling economic and political circumstances, see “Speech delivered by 
the Minister of Trade and Industry Dr Rob Davies at the South African launch 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Investment Policy Framework for sustainable development at the University 
of the Witwatersrand,” July 26, 2012, available at http://www.info.gov.za/
speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=29391&tid=77861.
94   Including Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. See ICSID News Releases: “Bolivia 
Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention,” May 16, 2007; 
“Ecuador Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention,” July 9, 
2009; “Venezuela Submits a Notice under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention,” 
January 26, 2012, all available at icsid.worldbank.org. See also the discussion 
below in section E.
95   Gus Van Harten, David Schneiderman, Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, 
Peter Muchlinski, and others, Public Statement on the International 
Investment Regime: 31 August 2010 (Toronto, 2010), available at http://www.
osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20
%2528June%202011%2529.pdf.
96    CEO & TNI, Profiting from Injustice, op. cit. 
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change, as will procedural aspects, especially as regards the dis-
pute-settlement mechanism. 
The key question, therefore, is: What are options for this regime 
to evolve and, in particular, how should the various interests of 
the principal stakeholders be taken into account? Of particular 
importance here is the challenge of how to balance the needs for 
predictability, stability and transparency that are important for in-
vestors with the need of governments to maintain the policy space 
they require to pursue legitimate public policy objectives, as well 
as how to balance the rights and responsibilities of all principal 
stakeholders in the investment relationship. The legitimacy of 
the international investment law and policy regime depends on 
the manner in which it reflects the main interests of the principal 
stakeholders. Given that the international investment regime is in 
flux – in part because the European Union is defining its approach 
toward international investment and major investment treaty ne-
gotiations are taking place97 – opportunities may exist to improve 
the current regime. The next section, section D, discusses some of 
the critical issues relating to the international investment law and 
policy regime, and section E then outlines options for moving for-
ward.
97   See the discussion at the end of section E.
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D. CRITICAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
REGIME
There are several critical issues affecting the current international 
investment regime, which, mirroring the key features outlined in 
section B, can be grouped under the following six headings: (i) the 
purpose of the regime, (ii) the scope of IIAs, (iii) the substantive 
content of investment disciplines, (iv) investment arbitration, (v) 
managing multiple legal sources, and (vi) the institutional struc-
ture of the regime.  This section discusses each category in turn, 
to identify and illustrate key challenges and present some of the 
options that have been suggested to address those challenges. 
Two preliminary points should be made here. First, the order in 
which these critical issues are analyzed does not reflect their rela-
tive importance.  While it would be difficult accurately to list them 
on a scale of “most critical” and “least critical,” there appear to be 
some issues that are more controversial (e.g., investment arbitra-
tion) than others (e.g., the scope of IIAs).  Second, despite the ana-
lytical usefulness of identifying these several categories, it is also 
crucial not to lose sight of the overall picture.  It may be that the 
most critical aspect (and thus greatest challenge) of the interna-
tional investment regime is not found in any of the six categories, 
but rather, the cumulative effect of the various components.
1. The purpose of the international investment regime
Given the multiplicity of legal sources (principally, the lack of a 
multilateral agreement), it is difficult to identify clearly the cen-
tral purpose of the international investment law and policy re-
gime.  Even focusing (particularly in the context of this paper) on 
a bird’s-eye view of the purpose of the 3,000 plus IIAs that have 
been signed in the past fifty years, there is clearly a controversy 
concerning the purpose of these agreements. For example, is the 
purpose of the 1991 Treaty Between the United States and Argenti-
na Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of In-
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vestments the promotion and protection of foreign investment? Or 
is it to intensify economic cooperation and increase the prosperity 
of both contracting states? Focusing on the title of the treaty, the 
Azurix tribunal stated simply that the purpose of the 1991 United 
States-Argentina BIT is “to encourage and protect investment.”98 
On the other hand, the LG&E tribunal focused on the apparently 
broader language found in the preamble of the same BIT and not-
ed that “[i]n entering the Bilateral Treaty as a whole, the parties 
desired to ‘promote greater economic cooperation’ and ‘stimulate 
the flow of private capital and the economic development of the 
parties.’”99 Alternatively, can it be argued that, as often reflected in 
the preamble, there are various purposes that, in a particular cir-
cumstance, may be conflicting or require a balancing of interests 
or values?
Given the open-textured nature of the various substantive stand-
ards provided in an investment treaty, the identification of a trea-
ty’s purpose represents a crucial element in imparting meaning to 
those standards.100 Tribunals regularly rely on what they identify 
as the purpose or purposes of a treaty to interpret treaty terms. On 
the one hand, the SGS v. Philippines tribunal emphasized the pro-
motion and protection of investment as the object and purpose 
of the Switzerland-Philippines BIT and thus found it “legitimate to 
resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to [favor] the pro-
tection of covered investments.”101 On the other hand, the Saluka 
tribunal emphasized that the protection of foreign investment is 
a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging for-
eign investment and extending and intensifying the parties’ eco-
nomic relations. According to the Saluka Tribunal, this called for “a 
balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substan-
tive provisions for the protection of investments, since an interpre-
98   Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, July 14, 2006, para. 
307.
99   LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, October 
3, 2006, para. 124.
100   For example, tribunals have relied on the object and purpose of the 
investment treaty in interpreting the “fair and equitable treatment” clause 
and the so-called “umbrella” clause as well as the notion of “investment” for 
purposes of determining the subject matter jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals.
101   SGS v. The Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
January 29, 2004, para. 116.
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tation which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign 
investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting for-
eign investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending 
and intensifying the parties’ mutual economic relations.”102
Aside from being an important element in the interpretation of 
existing IIAs, the debate about the purpose of international invest-
ment law also plays a crucial role with regard to future law-making 
in this field. On one level, clearly identifying the purpose of future 
IIAs in the text of an agreement (often in the preamble) may facili-
tate both the interpretation of the agreement and the adjudica-
tion of future claims by investment tribunals called upon to settle 
an investment treaty dispute.103 On another level, clearly identify-
ing the purpose of future IIAs will enable the contracting parties 
to draft an agreement’s substantive provisions so as to make sure 
that those purposes are actually and effectively achieved. 
However, there may be different ways in which a specific pur-
pose is pursued and thus it may be useful to distinguish between 
a treaty’s “object” (i.e., what the treaty is about or contains) and 
“purpose” (i.e., what the treaty is for or seeks to achieve).104 While 
a treaty may have, broadly speaking, several aims or objectives, it 
should be possible to identify whether those several aims stand on 
a hierarchy or are all equally important. In terms of clarity and pre-
dictability, an express hierarchy seems to be preferred, although it 
may be politically more difficult to achieve.
102   Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, op. cit., para. 300. The 
Preamble of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT reads as follows: “Desiring 
to extend and intensify the economic relations between them particularly 
with respect to investments by the investor of one Contracting Party in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party, Recognizing that agreement upon 
the treatment to be accorded to such investments will stimulate the flow of 
capital and technology and the economic development of the Contracting 
Parties and that fair and equitable treatment is desirable.”
103   Andrés Rigo Sureda has explained that the purpose of a treaty is one criteria 
used by a tribunal to assess the “degree of legal merit” of a claim, where there 
is more than one acceptable interpretation of the treaty’s provisions. Andrés 
Rigo Sureda, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Judging Under Uncertainty (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 7-8.
104   “The object of a treaty is the instrument for the achievement of the 
treaty’s purpose.” Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, “The ‘Object and Purpose’ 
of a Treaty: An Enigma?,” 3(3) Austrian Review of International and European 
Law 311 (1998), p. 326.
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Accordingly, when it comes to deciding the (main or ultimate) pur-
pose of future IIAs, policy-makers could well identify, for example, 
any of the following: (i) the protection of foreign investment, (ii) 
the promotion of the contracting parties’ economic development 
or (iii) the promotion of the contracting parties’ sustainable devel-
opment. As noted above, the first two options broadly represent 
the two positions reflected in the practice of investment tribunals. 
The third option, however, has recently found some recognition in 
the practice of investment tribunals,105 gained momentum as an 
option for future treaty-making106 and is increasingly finding ac-
ceptance within the business community, too.107
Crucially, the choice of purpose (understood here as the main or 
ultimate objective of an agreement) influences the various fea-
tures of an IIA, in particular the provisions dealing with the agree-
ment’s scope of application, substantive obligations and dispute-
settlement mechanism. With regard to the subject matter scope, 
for example, an IIA may choose a broad or narrow definition of 
covered “investment.” With regard to the substantive obligations, 
an IIA could include only some or all of the following provisions: 
investment protection guarantees, investment liberalization com-
mitments, obligations on home countries, and obligations on for-
eign investments/investors. With regard to dispute settlement, an 
IIA may, for example, specify the particular qualifications and ap-
pointment processes for arbitrators that best support the ultimate 
purpose of an agreement. Accordingly, these provisions will most 
likely differ depending on an agreement’s chosen purpose.
105   El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, October 31, 2011, para. 361.
106   See the 2004 Canada Model investment treaty, available at http://
italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf; UNCTAD, WIR, 
2012, op. cit. pp. 89-92; Commonwealth Secretariat, Integrating Sustainable 
Development into International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing 
Country Negotiators (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012).
107   See the work carried under the auspices of the United Nations Special 
Representative for Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie: Human Rights 
Council, 17th Session, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises: Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework 
(Principles on Business and Human Rights), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, March 21, 
2011.
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However, the means of implementing the same key purpose could 
also differ from one agreement to another. For example, in order to 
promote sustainable development, the contracting parties could 
choose either (1) simply to restrict an agreement’s subject matter 
scope of application to cover exclusively foreign investment that 
contributes to the sustainable development of the contracting par-
ties (to be verified through a sustainability impact assessment)108 
or (2) to keep the broad definition of covered investment but to 
include in the IIA certain disciplines on home countries and/or 
foreign investors in order to meet sustainable development objec-
tives.109
To sum up, it is fundamental first clearly to identify the main or ulti-
mate purpose of future treaty-making. Second, states will also need 
carefully to identify the specific provisions to be included in future 
IIAs that will most likely help to achieve the chosen purpose. While 
the chosen “purpose” will influence the choice about the “object” of 
a future IIA, the identification of the latter may depend on the con-
tracting parties’ specific political, economic and social factors. Third, 
future clarifications with regard to individual countries’ objectives 
underlying their investment policies and treaties will directly affect 
the purpose of the overall investment regime.
2. Scope of international investment agreements
International investment agreements generally accord protections 
to “investors” who have made “investments”; these two criteria 
must be met before the protections of an investment agreement 
apply.  The debate that has developed in the arbitral practice over 
the past twenty years mainly revolves around the definitions of 
foreign “investor” and “investment” covered by IIAs.  Three addi-
tional critical issues that should be briefly noted deal with state-
controlled entities, the temporal scope of application of IIAs and 
express exclusions.
108   See further discussion in section D.4. 
109   See further discussion in section D.3. 
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a. What is a foreign “investment”?
This question has arisen primarily in the context of determining the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal, partly because that is logically the 
first opportunity for the issue to arise, and partly because the ICSID 
Convention does not expressly include a definition of “investment” 
for purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of an ICSID tribunal 
(pursuant to Article 25 ICSID). As the express object of existing IIAs 
has mainly been the protection of foreign investment, the debate 
surrounding the definition of covered investment has closely mir-
rored the debate about the merits and extent of protection to be 
granted to foreign investment. Accordingly, the key question in this 
debate has to date been who the beneficiaries of the international 
investment regime are, with investors generally advancing a broad-
er interpretation, and state respondents advancing a narrower one.
However, this debate may become more nuanced if future IIAs will 
provide foreign investment and investors with certain responsi-
bilities, as well as rights.  Thus, if future treaty-makers pursue the 
option of moving from a narrow investment promotion approach 
to a broader, “impact enhancing” approach that incorporates sus-
tainability considerations and investment regulation, the terms of 
the debate will change; the key question would then be who are 
the subjects of the international regime.
The traditional open-ended definition of “investment” grants pro-
tection to all types of assets, including FDI, portfolio investment, 
contractual rights, and intellectual property rights; it is considered 
to have the strongest attraction effect (to the extent that the regu-
latory framework is an investment determinant110) in terms of pro-
moting investment flows. This definition also benefits from clarity 
and thus tends to be one of the most predictable approaches with 
regard to identifying the subject-matter scope of application of 
IIAs. However, more recent IIAs have adopted stricter definitions 
of “investment” (e.g., the enterprise based approach), excluding 
short-term and speculative investments.111
110   But see the discussion in section C.
111   UNCTAD, WIR, 2012, op. cit. Several IIAs also condition their protection on 
the basis that an investment is admitted in compliance of domestic laws; ibid., 
pp. 137, 144, 146.
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Particularly in the context of interpreting the jurisdictional basis 
of an ICSID tribunal, some have argued that the notion of invest-
ment, while not defined in the Convention, includes certain ele-
ments such as (i) commitment of resources, (ii) a certain duration 
(iii) assumption of risk, (iv) expectation of a return, and (v) con-
tribution to the host country’s economic development.112 While 
there is disagreement on exactly what elements should be taken 
into account, as well as whether these elements constitute strict 
requirements or mere identifying characteristics, this approach is 
premised on limiting the kinds of investments that should be pro-
tected by IIAs on the basis of a number of economic features. Of all 
the aforementioned elements, the question of contribution to the 
host country’s economic development has been particularly con-
troversial. Those supporting the relevance of this element in the 
definition of covered investment point toward the longer-term ob-
jective of IIAs (i.e., the promotion of economic development) as the 
main rationale for their position. On the other hand, critics argue 
that consideration of the contribution to a host country’s econom-
ic development limits excessively the scope of the investment pro-
tection guarantees in IIAs and brings a level of uncertainty about 
the subject matter (or ratione materiae) scope of the application of 
IIAs, which undermines the very purpose of these agreements.113
In this context, one should highlight the increasing attention that 
is being given to sustainable development and in particular to 
“sustainable international investment” by states, international or-
112   See the “Salini test,” developed in Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, July 23, 2001, para. 52.  In addition, see the decision 
of the tribunal Romak v. Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280, Award, November 
26, 2009, para. 207; Alps Finance v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, March 
5, 2011, paras. 241-245; Saba Fakes v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, 
Award, July 14, 2010, paras. 103-114 (rejecting “economic development” as a 
criterion). See generally the discussion of the “Salini test” in Zachary Douglas, 
The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), pp. 161-232. 
113   Devashish Krishan, “A Notion of ICSID Investment,” in Ian A. Laird & Todd 
J. Weiler (eds.), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law (New York: 
Juris, 2008); Julian Davis Mortenson, “The Meaning of ‘Investment’:  ICSID’s 
Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law,” 51(1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 257 (2010).
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ganizations and civil society.114 While it is a concept that is not yet 
well defined, principles of “sustainability” could be reflected in IIAs 
by using a definition of “investment” that includes “sustainability” 
as an integral part of it.115 
b. When is an investor “foreign”?
The controversy regarding to whom IIAs apply (i.e., personal or ra-
tione personae scope of application) has focused on the required 
“foreignness” of investors, as the traditional approach in IIAs with 
regard to the definition of legal persons has often been to use 
the place of incorporation as the relevant criterion. While this ap-
proach offers a high level of clarity and predictability, it also engen-
ders “nationality planning” and “forum shopping.”116 Accordingly, 
two basic scenarios may be envisaged: First, it may be that a third 
country investor avails itself of the protections granted by an IIA 
through incorporation in the territory of one of the contracting 
parties to an IIA117 and, second, it may be that a national of one of 
the contracting parties avails itself of the IIA protection vis-à-vis 
that same contracting party through incorporation in the territory 
of the other contracting party.118
114   See above section C. This issue was already at the heart of the IISD Model, 
op. cit., and it is the guiding principle of the UNCTAD IPFSD, op. cit. See also 
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W. Gehring & Andrew Newcombe 
(eds.), Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (Alphen: Kluwer Law 
International, 2011) and Olivier De Schutter, Johan Swinnen & Jan Wouters, 
Foreign Direct Investment and Human Development: The Law and Economics of 
International Investment Agreements (London: Routledge, 2013).
115   As discussed by Brigitte Stern at the Seventh Columbia International 
Investment Conference organized by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
International Investment, New York (November 14, 2012). See section E below 
on how to tackle the vagueness of the concept of sustainability in this context.
116   Investment tribunals seem to accept the practice of structuring foreign 
investments in order to gain the benefits of an IIA (nationality planning), 
while they find an abuse of process the practice of restructuring the foreign 
investment after the disputed host country’s conduct has been taken in order 
to provide the investor with a treaty remedy.
117   See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, October 21, 2005.
118   See, e.g., Tokio Tokelés v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, April 29, 2004. There are a number of more complex scenarios 
– in particular where the shareholders have multiple nationalities, whether 
there is sufficient foreign ownership and control both in the case of locally 
incorporated companies and the parent company.  See Martin J. Valasek & 
Patrick Dumberry, “Developments in the Legal Standing of Shareholders and 
Holding Corporations in Investor-State Disputes,” 26(1) ICSID Review 34 (2011).
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While “denial of benefits” clauses may in principle be able to ad-
dress some of the concerns raised with regard to the personal 
scope of application of IIAs, 119 there is still controversy around the 
way in which they operate in practice. For example, while many 
treaties permit the denial of benefits to “sham” or “mailbox” in-
vestors, it is far from clear how that denial of benefits is meant to 
work in practice.  For example, NAFTA article 1113 requires that 
one state party give prior notification to the other treaty party if it 
intends to deny benefits to an apparent investor.120
c. Coverage of state-controlled entities
The growth of state-controlled entities (SCEs) (including SOEs 
and, to a lesser extent, SWFs) as foreign investors121 highlights the 
tensions that have arisen as a result of the changing world FDI 
landscape:122 While SOEs headquartered in developed countries 
have long played an important role in their countries’ outward FDI 
(and continue to hold the bulk of assets abroad controlled by SOEs 
worldwide), states that have traditionally been host countries are, 
through these entities, taking now too an active role in industries 
with political, economic and strategic significance, including in 
traditional home countries.123  At present, most IIAs provide SCEs 
119   Some IIAs also require that an investor has “substantial business activities” 
in the country of incorporation.
120   See, e.g., Meg N. Kinnear, Andrea K. Bjorklund & John F.G. Hannaford, 
Investment Disputes Under NAFTA: An Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11 
(Alphen: Kluwer Law International, updated 2009), pp. 1113.1 – 1113.14.
121   See Sauvant & Strauss, op. cit., p. 1; see also Nilgün Gökgür, “Are Resurging 
State-Owned Enterprises Impeding Competition Overseas?” in Karl P. Sauvant 
& Jennifer Reimer (eds.), FDI Perspectives: Issues in International Investment 
(2nd edition, New York: Vale Columbia Center for Sustainable International 
Investment, 2012), pp. 26-27.
122   In relation to SOEs, see generally UNCTAD, WIR, 2011, op. cit., pp. 28-37. 
For an in-depth analysis of Chinese SOEs, see Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, 
“We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State 
Capitalism in China,” 65 Stanford Law Review (forthcoming).
123   As Blyschak explains, “[b]ecause of their ties to home states, investments 
made by SWFs and [state-owned enterprises] raise different considerations 
among regulators compared to those raised when purely private enterprises 
pursue similar investments.  Chief among these considerations is that in 
conducting their business, SOEs might consider subjugating market interests 
to political goals.” Paul Blyschak, “State-Owned Enterprises and International 
Investment Treaties: When Are State-Owned Entities and Their Investments 
Protected?,” 6(2) Journal of International Law and International Relations 1 
(2011), pp. 7-8.
59
with the same level of protection as privately controlled entities 
from the same jurisdiction.124  In some cases, this protection is ex-
pressly extended to government-owned or controlled entities, but 
in the vast majority of treaties, it is not.125  However, some domes-
tic regulators have responded to the growth of FDI by SCEs with 
more stringent standards for establishment or transaction ap-
proval.126  Fears that such SCEs might pursue political (as opposed 
to commercial) objectives are contributing to a divergence in in-
vestment protection standards for state-controlled and privately 
owned entities.127 In turn, there has been a debate over whether 
SCEs are entitled to seek resolution of disputes under the ICSID 
Framework,128 and arbitral decisions on the matter have not pro-
vided clear guidance.129 As has been pointed out, excluding SCEs 
from the ICSID framework could drive those entities toward alter-
native dispute resolution forums, and could serve to undermine 
the significance of ICSID in the long term.130 
124   Jo En Low, “State-Controlled Entities as ‘Investors’ Under International 
Investment Agreements,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 80 (2012). In a 
review of 852 investor-state dispute resolution clauses in 851 IIAs, only two 
excluded one party’s state-controlled entities from the definition of investor: 
the 1983 Panama-Germany BIT, and 1983 Panama-Switzerland BIT. Ibid. For a 
fuller account, see Jo En Low, “The Status of State-Controlled Entities Under 
International Investment Law” in Andrea K. Bjorklund (ed.), Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy 2012-2013 (forthcoming 2013).
125   81 of the 851 IIAs surveyed expressly included a “state enterprise,” or state-
owned and controlled entities as an “investor,” and 52 expressly stated that 
the contracting party itself may be an “investor” (and some treaties feature 
both provisions). Low, 2012, op. cit. 
126   See, e.g., FINSA, op. cit.; see Blyschack, op. cit., pp. 10-14 (discussing 
domestic regulation on national security grounds in the United States and 
Canada); Sandy Walker, “A New Economic Nationalism? Lessons from the 
PotashCorp Decision in Canada,” Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 77 (2012).
127   See Sauvant & Strauss, op. cit., p. 2; see also Gökgür, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
128   In particular, the “Broches test” for jurisdiction (named for the principal 
drafter of the ICSID Convention) may exclude an entity that is “discharging an 
essentially governmental function” or “acting as an agent” of its home country. 
See Blyschak, op. cit., pp. 28-41; Mark Feldman, “The Standing of State-Owned 
Entities Under Investment Treaties” in Sauvant, 2011, op. cit., pp. 615-637.
129   Cˇeskoslovenska Obchodní Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, May 24, 1999. See discussion in Blyschak, 
op. cit., p. 27ff. 
130  Low, 2012, op. cit., pp. 2-3. This issue is discussed in further detail in section 
E.4.a below.
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d. Temporal scope of treaties
With growing discontent about the impact of existing IIAs, the 
decisions by some governments to “opt out” of ICSID dispute 
settlement,131 or of some of their BITs,132 or out of the regime as 
a whole, have raised questions about when, and how, such “opt-
out” might become effective.133 One key issue is the effect of any 
“survival clause” (which typically guarantees that the provisions of 
the IIA will remain in effect for a number of years after termina-
tion of the treaty) and the ability of state parties to agree to over-
ride the “survival clause” in a treaty.134 Where governments instead 
choose to withdraw from the ICSID Convention, there is the pos-
sibility that the consent to ICSID arbitration found in an IIA will be 
rendered meaningless. Article 72 of the ICSID Convention makes it 
reasonably clear that, if an investor has submitted a claim to ICSID 
prior to the denunciation’s effectiveness, ICSID Convention arbitra-
tion will be available. What is not clear is whether Article 72 could 
be viewed as making ICSID arbitration applicable even if a claim 
has not been submitted prior to the denunciation date.135
131   For example, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, as discussed above. 
132   For example, in 2012 South Africa terminated its BIT with Belgium and 
Luxembourg, as part of its broader review of international investment law and 
policy; see Adam Green, “South Africa: BITs in pieces” Financial Times (October 
19, 2012) available at http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/10/19/south-
africa-bits-in-pieces/#axzz2NQ7g21cu. 
133   See, e.g., UNCTAD, “Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact 
on Investor-State Claims,” IIA Issues Note, No. 2 (2010), available at http://
unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf. 
134   See, e.g., the Ecuador-United States BIT, art. XII; UNCTAD, “Denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention,” op. cit., p. 3. There have been arguments made that, 
since IIAs generally and the “survival clause” in particular, are concluded for 
the benefit of a third-party (private investors), any agreement to amend its 
application would be ineffective.
135   Article 72 of ICSID provides that a denunciation notice given by a party to the 
Convention “shall not affect the rights or obligations under the Convention of 
that State or of any of its constituent subdivisions or agencies or of any national 
of that State arising out of consent to the jurisdiction of the Centre given by one 
of them before [the denunciation] notice was received by the depository.”
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At the other end of the treaty’s life, a number of issues remain to 
be resolved including for example whether tribunals have jurisdic-
tion to determine potential breaches that constitute continuing or 
composite acts that “straddle” the date when a treaty comes into 
force.136
e. Express exclusions from the scope of IIAs
As state parties gain a better understanding of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the international investment regime, there 
has been a debate about the need for express exclusions from the 
scope of IIAs (or, at least, of different substantive standards) for 
specific sectors, policies and public authorities.
Certain sectors may be excluded from the scope of an IIA tempo-
rarily or permanently, in order to address the demands of different 
stakeholders.  For example, many of the concerns raised by public 
interest groups and civil society are directed at the potential detri-
mental effects of investment liberalization in specific sectors, such 
as essential social services or other similarly sensitive industries.137 
Many of the more controversial actions taken by states recently 
relate to renegotiations, restrictions or expropriations with respect 
to investments in extractive industries.138  In some cases, in order 
136   See Nick Gallus, The Temporal Scope of Investment Protection Treaties 
(London: BIICL, 2009). A further temporal issue is the increasing number of 
renegotiated treaties, where states update their BITs (for example, vis-à-vis 
state conduct that temporally overlaps the two treaties).
137   Sector-specific exclusions seem to be popular in those IIAs that include 
liberalization (i.e., pre-establishment) obligations. See, e.g., NAFTA Annex I 
for each of the contracting parties (reserving certain sectors to the state or 
limiting foreign participation). These exclusions are discussed in Kinnear et al., 
op. cit., at 1108.1-1108.32.
138   For example, Argentina’s expropriation of 51% of the share capital of 
both YPF S.A. and Repsol YPF Gas S.A. under Law No. 26.741, Official Gazette, 
May 7, 2012; Ecuador’s 2010 legislation compelling private oil companies 
to renegotiate service contracts to introduce a flat tax rate per barrel of oil: 
Ley Reformatoria a la Ley de Hidrocarburos y a la Ley de Régimen Tributario 
Interno, June 24, 2010; and Indonesia’s requirement that foreign firms 
operating in coal, minerals and metals progressively to divest at least 51% of 
their holdings to private and public Indonesian investors under Presidential 
Decree No. 24/2012, February 21, 2012, each discussed in UNCTAD, WIR, 2012, 
op. cit., p. 80.
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to preserve their ability to give effect to such policy changes, states 
may choose to exclude extractive industries from the scope of in-
vestment liberalization provisions, or from investment protection 
provisions (for example, where management or ownership rights 
to the particular resources are in question).139
IIAs may exclude particular policies from their scope, such as taxa-
tion (usually addressed under a separate agreement), public pro-
curement (addressed under the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement140) or subsidies. Equally, in light of the possible “chilling” 
effect of IIAs vis-à-vis state decision-making processes regarding 
disenfranchised or indigenous groups,141 IIAs may exclude, for ex-
ample, measures taken by a state to provide redress or to restore 
customary rights to resources from the scope of application of IIAs 
(or at least their dispute-settlement mechanisms).142
In addition, there has been some debate as to whether the com-
mitments of the state set out in an IIA should also protect the in-
vestor against actions of public authorities such as municipal or 
139   See, for example, the arguments made by, and on behalf of, indigenous 
claimants in New Zealand in relation to the effects of BIT commitments and 
the ability of the state to provide redress to recognize ownership of fresh 
water and geothermal resources. Waitangi Tribunal, Brief of Evidence of Dr 
Penelope Ridings, July 3, 2012, Wai 2358, #A94; Waitangi Tribunal, Dr Jane 
Kelsey’s Response to the Brief of Evidence of Dr Penelope Ridings, July 6, 2012, 
Wai 2358, #A97. 
140   Agreement on Government Procurement, Marrakesh Agreement, op. cit. 
141  See, e.g., Note and Comments, Anne Debevoise Ostby, “Will Foreign 
Investors Regulate Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination?,” 21(1) 
Wisconsin International Law Journal 223 (2003), p. 242 ff. (discussing the 
impact of investment protections under NAFTA in relation to the state’s ability 
to effect self-determination by indigenous groups).
142   One possible response is to “carve out” state decisions in relation to 
indigenous rights. For example, New Zealand has included “safeguard” 
provisions in a number of its FTAs to maintain policy space to uphold its 
commitments to indigenous groups, and to address historic grievances - see 
e.g., the New Zealand – Australia CER Investment Protocol, art. 23, “Provided 
that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustified 
discrimination against persons of the other Party or as a disguised restriction 
on investment, nothing in this Protocol shall preclude the adoption by New 
Zealand of measures it deems necessary to accord more favourable treatment 
to Maori in respect of matters covered by this Protocol including in fulfilment 
of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.”
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provincial organs.143 The position taken in the United States Model 
BIT confirms that a state party’s obligations apply also to any en-
tity that exercises any delegated regulatory or governmental au-
thority (including local governments),144 but also allows for local 
level governments to maintain, renew, continue, or amend non-
conforming measures (so long as the change does not decrease 
the conformity of the measure), without complying with national 
treatment or most-favored-nation treatment standards.145 In light 
of customary law on state responsibility, if an IIA does not provide 
otherwise, the agreement applies to any conduct of the state, 
whether at the central or territorial level.
While express exclusions are certainly a viable option to address 
specific or temporary concerns (for example, with regard to liber-
alization commitments and developing countries), there is a real 
risk that adopting overly broad exclusions could potentially under-
mine the very function of IIAs.
To sum up, there are several critical issues dealing with the reach 
of the international investment regime, in particular the scope of 
IIAs. While identifying the appropriate scope will depend primarily 
on the overall goal(s) of an agreement negotiated by the contracting 
parties, several complex and interconnected options are available to 
states to make sure that IIAs (and the regime more generally) are 
indeed effective in achieving those goals.
143   See, e.g., Garba Ibrahim Malumfashi, “State Responsibility in Investment 
Arbitration: To What Extent Is the State Responsible for Contracts Concluded 
by State Enterprises and Sub-National Authorities?,” 1 Transnational Dispute 
Management (2005).
144   United States Model BIT 2012, op. cit., art. 2, para. 2(a).
145   Ibid., art. 14. In addition, non-conforming measures are excluded from 
the application of Article 8 (Performance Requirements) and Article 9 (Senior 
Management and Boards of Directors).
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3. The substantive content of investment norms
One can identify at least four distinct debates surrounding the 
substantive content of investment norms. First, the meaning of 
most of the traditional investment-protection standards remain 
controversial, both at the level of interpretation of existing IIAs 
(law-application) and at the level of devising future policies (law-
making). Second, there is an intense debate as to whether cur-
rent investment norms (as applied by investment tribunals) have 
reached the right balance between investment protection and 
states’ right to regulate in the public interest. Third, the merits and 
extent of investment liberalization (so-called pre-establishment 
obligations) in IIAs remain controversial. Fourth, it is even more 
controversial whether, in addition to investment protection stand-
ards and investment liberalization commitments, IIAs should also 
include disciplines directed at home countries and foreign inves-
tors in order to strengthen the promotion of foreign investment 
and compliance with international norms.
a. Investment protection norms as “standards”
When it comes to traditional investment protection norms (such 
as expropriation, national treatment and fair and equitable treat-
ment), the critical issue is that these norms have been drafted, in-
voked and applied over the past fifty years as “standards.”146 On 
the one hand, standards enjoy low administrative and political 
costs of formulation and have a higher flexibility in adapting to 
changing circumstances. On the other hand, the predictability of 
standards is very low, and thus enforcement costs are high. Equal-
ly, standards may enjoy a low democratic legitimacy as their con-
tent is often determined by a less representative body (a tribunal).
For example, the focus of investors’ and host countries’ arguments 
related to the expropriation provision has principally been on 
drawing the line between a compensable indirect taking (where 
146  The distinction between “rules” and “standards” revolves around the 
extent to which efforts to give content to the norm are undertaken before or 
after the conduct to which the norm is applied. Louis Kaplow, “Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis,” 42(3) Duke Law Journal 557 (1992), p. 557.
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there is no formal transfer of title) and a regulatory measure pur-
suing a legitimate public policy, which has an adverse effect on the 
foreign investor’s property.147 In other words, the crucial issue sur-
rounding the expropriation provision in investment treaties has 
been the definition of “indirect expropriation” or “any measure 
having equivalent effect to expropriation.” Various doctrines have 
been advanced by parties and endorsed by the many investment 
tribunals, including the following three doctrines: a measure falls 
under the concept of indirect expropriation whenever it has sub-
stantially deprived a foreign investor of the benefit of its invest-
ment;148 notwithstanding its adverse impact on a foreign invest-
ment, a measure cannot be defined as expropriatory if it pursues 
a non-discriminatory, bona fide and legitimate public purpose;149 
and a finding of indirect expropriation requires balancing various 
factors, including, principally, the measure’s adverse effect on a 
foreign investment and the measure’s public policy benefits.150
Leaving aside the issue of inconsistency, all of these doctrines evi-
dence a standard-like use of the expropriation provision. The con-
tent of the prohibition of uncompensated expropriation is deter-
mined after the conduct has taken place and is principally in the 
hands of the investment tribunal called upon to settle a particular 
dispute and to apply the underlying treaty.151
The same can be said for the national treatment provision as it ap-
plies to measures that do not explicitly differentiate between for-
eign and domestic investors, so-called origin-neutral measures.152 
Whether an origin-neutral measure violates the national treatment 
provision depends on (i) how one identifies the domestic investors 
whose treatment will be compared with the treatment afforded to 
147   Newcombe & Paradell, op. cit., p. 341. 
148   Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, August 30, 2000, 
para. 103.
149   Methanex v. United States, op. cit., Part IV, Chapter D, p. 4, para. 7.
150  Tecmed v. Mexico, op. cit., para. 122. See generally Ursula Kriebaum, 
“Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State,” 8 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 717 (2007).
151   Chemtura Corporation v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Award, August 2, 2010, para. 
249.
152  Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and 
Interpretation (New York: OUP, 2010), p. 377.
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a foreign investor, (ii) the nature of the difference in treatment and 
(iii) whether the difference in treatment is justified by a public pol-
icy reason.153 With regard to the object of the comparison, while 
the majority of tribunals have focused on whether the foreign and 
domestic investors operate at least in the same economic sector 
(if not in competition with each other), a few tribunals have taken 
either a much wider reading (e.g., comparing a foreign oil exporter 
with a domestic flower exporter) or a much stricter reading (e.g., 
limiting the comparison to identical investors). With regard to the 
nature of the difference in treatment, while several tribunals have 
relied on a measure’s adverse effects on foreign investors only, a 
few tribunals have relied more or less expressly on a state’s dis-
criminatory intent in order to sustain a national treatment claim. 
With regard to the public policy justification, some tribunals have 
simply required that a non-discriminatory reason for the different 
treatment existed, while the majority have examined whether the 
measure under review was either capable of achieving the public 
policy objective or is the least restrictive alternative available to 
achieve such objective.154
Once again, notwithstanding the variety of different interpreta-
tions, the national treatment provision has functioned mainly as 
a standard, the normative content of which has been left to the 
ex-post facto determination of investment tribunals.155
Perhaps the clearest example of an investment treaty norm that 
has operated mainly as a standard is the fair and equitable treat-
ment (FET) provision, which usually requires states to accord cov-
ered investments fair and equitable treatment. While there have 
153  Salacuse, op. cit., pp. 248-251; Andrea K. Bjorklund, “National Treatment” 
in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (New York: OUP, 
2008), p. 29.
154  F. Ortino, “Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes” in 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), 
Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (New York: OUP, 
2009), p. 364.
155  See Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International 
Investment Law (New York: OUP, 2nd Ed. 2012), p. 199: “It is generally agreed 
that the application of the [national treatment] clause is fact-specific. […] such 
statement cautions that the standard resists abstract definitions and that no 
hard-and-fast approach to interpreting the clause will be found.”
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been several formulations of this standard156 and different ap-
proaches to the interpretation of a general and unqualified obli-
gation of “fair and equitable treatment,”157 there is little disagree-
ment about two general characteristics of this standard. First, 
the FET standard “is a broad, overarching standard, that contains 
various elements of protection” including denial of justice, due 
process and arbitrariness, as well as “the protection of legitimate 
expectations, non-discrimination, transparency and protections 
against bad faith, coercion, threats, and harassment.”158 Second, 
the determination of whether there has been a breach of the FET 
standard “is highly fact and context dependent.”159 Accordingly, 
like any other standard, determining the applicability of this norm 
to a particular case requires a great deal of work mostly left to the 
dispute-settlement tribunal.160
While they have tried to adopt novel formulations of the tradition-
al investment-protection guarantees, recent IIAs do not seem to 
have engendered a much higher level of clarity and predictabili-
ty;161 thus the meaning of most of the traditional investment pro-
tection standards remains controversial.
156   Vandevelde, op. cit., pp. 192-195.
157   Salacuse, op. cit., pp. 222-228.
158   Newcombe & Paradell, op. cit., p. 279.
159  Newcombe & Paradell, op. cit., pp. 278; Meg Kinnear, “The Continuing 
Development of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard” in Andrea K. 
Bjorklund, Ian A. Laird & Sergey Ripinsky (eds.), Investment Treaty Law:  Current 
Issues III (London: BIICL, 2009), pp. 209-240.
160   See Federico Ortino, “Refining the Content and Role of Investment ‘Rules’ 
and ‘Standards’: A New Approach to International Treaty-Making,” 28(1) ICSID 
Review (2013).
161   With regard to expropriation, see, for example, art. 92 (and Annex 10) of 
the 2011 Japan-India Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA); art. 9.12 (and 
Annex 9B) of the 2011 Korea-Peru Free Trade Agreement; and art. 6 (and 
Annex B) of the 2012 United States Model BIT. While the formulation of the 
expropriation provision in both the 2011 Japan-India EPA and 2012 United 
States Model BIT may be successful in identifying the doctrine applicable in 
defining “indirect expropriation” under each agreement, both provisions will 
continue to operate as standards, in as much as its applicability to a particular 
case will still be left to the international arbitral tribunal. The same can be said 
with regard to FET as part of the minimum standard of treatment (see art. 12 
of the 2011 Australian-New Zealand Investment Protocol and art. 5 and Annex 
A of the 2012 United States Model BIT).
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b. Balancing investment protection and the right to 
regulate
A core debate affecting the current investment regime revolves 
around the following two key values: granting maximum protec-
tion to foreign investors and safeguarding host countries’ right to 
regulate in the public interest (including the right to fit FDI into do-
mestic economic and social development policies). In their recent 
joint Statement on Shared Principles for International Investment, 
the European Union and the United States expressly acknowl-
edged the challenge facing the investment treaty regime: the rec-
ognition that “[g]overnments should provide the highest possible 
level of legal certainty and protection against discriminatory, arbi-
trary, and otherwise unfair or harmful treatment to all investors 
and investments in their territories” was accompanied by a state-
ment of the conviction that “governments can fully implement 
these principles while still preserving the authority to adopt and 
maintain measures necessary to regulate in the public interest to 
pursue certain public policies.”162 While the debate about the right 
to regulate figures prominently across the entire investment re-
gime, it relates specifically with the substantive content of invest-
ment norms (i.e., the obligations imposed on states in the exercise 
of their regulatory functions).
Among the options that have been suggested aimed at finding the 
right balance between investment protection and governments’ 
right to regulate are: (i) to include public policy exceptions (such as 
“general exceptions,” “security exceptions”, “balance-of-payments 
exceptions”) in IIAs, thus explicitly allowing measures (linked with 
legitimate public policy objectives) otherwise inconsistent with an 
162  Statement of the European Union and the United States on Shared Principles 
for International Investment (EU-US Statement), available at http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf, p. 1; see also 
European Commission, Press Release, “EU and US Adopt Blueprint for Open 
and Stable Investment Climates,” Reference: IP/12/356 (4 October 2012), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-356_en.htm.
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IIA’s obligations,163 (ii) to provide for more detailed explanations 
of the core investment protection standards (such as a definition 
of “indirect expropriation,” “fair and equitable treatment” or “de 
facto discrimination”) and (iii) to exclude certain investment-pro-
tection guarantees that may be perceived as limiting excessively 
governments’ regulatory sovereignty (such as the so-called “um-
brella clause”164 or the unqualified FET standard).165
c. Investment liberalization commitments
The debate here revolves around whether investment-liberaliza-
tion commitments should be included in an IIA. As noted above, 
only a few states (such as Canada, Japan, the United States) have 
regularly pursued such commitments to date in their investment-
treaty negotiations. These commitments tend to include princi-
pally non-discrimination obligations with regard to the admission 
of foreign investors and investments (i.e., national treatment and 
most-favored-nation treatment with regard to pre-establishment), 
but also provisions on the admission of key personnel and perfor-
mance requirements.
With regard to non-discrimination obligations applicable at the 
pre-establishment stage, it is often debated whether such obliga-
tions should be subject to a “positive” or “negative” list approach.166 
This issue finds a clear parallel in the trade-in-services negotia-
tions within the WTO. Although those negotiations are limited to 
the service sector (including FDI in services), they emphasize the 
complexity and diversity of positions. In the current (plurilateral) 
negotiations on an International Services Agreement, some WTO 
members are pursuing a hybrid approach, whereby they would 
163   Depending on the public policy at issue, these exceptions may be subject to 
strict requirements (such as proportionality) or to very deferential conditions 
(such as good faith). See Andrew Newcombe, “The Use of General Exceptions 
in IIAs: Increasing Legitimacy or Uncertainty?” in Armand de Mestral & Céline 
Lévesque (eds.), Improving International Investment Agreements (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), pp. 267-283.
164   See, for example, the 2004 and 2012 United States Model BITs which 
omitted the umbrella clause, featured in previous models ,as well as in many 
IIAs concluded by the United States.
165   See in general UNCTAD, WIR 2012.
166   See above the section on “express exclusions.”
70
adopt a negative list approach with regard to national treatment 
and a positive list approach with regard to market access.
Obligations imposed by host countries on investors to conduct 
their business in a prescribed manner (so-called “performance 
requirements”) have only been prohibited in IIAs concluded by a 
handful of countries (such as Canada and the United States). While 
some deem performance requirements to be undesirable as incon-
sistent with the principle of liberal markets, others see them as an 
essential component of a domestic development strategy.167 While 
the use of certain trade-related investment measures is restricted 
by a specific WTO agreement,168 states are in principle free to im-
pose requirements relating to, for example, employment, domes-
tic ownership, technology transfer, and R&D.169 While developed 
countries have generally phased out performance requirements, 
many have implemented trade policy measures that achieve simi-
lar objectives, such as rules of origin, screwdriver regulations, vol-
untary export restraints, and anti-dumping measures.170
d. Disciplines on home countries and foreign investors
Some of the debate here is relatively recent. While it initially fo-
cused on correcting the asymmetry in the substantive content of 
existing IIAs (which traditionally imposed obligations only on host 
countries), it has evolved toward also exploring whether these 
167   See generally Nagesh Kumar, “Use and Effectiveness of Performance 
Requirements: What Can be Learnt from the Experiences of Developed and 
Developing Countries?” in UNCTAD, The Development Dimension of FDI: Policy 
and Rule-Making Perspectives, Proceedings of the Expert Meeting held in 
Geneva from 6 to 8 November 2002 (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2003), 
pp. 59-78; Dani Rodrik, “The Economics of Export-Performance Requirements,” 
102(3) Quarterly Journal of Economics 633 (1987).
168   Restricted measures include: requirements that an enterprise use particular 
levels of local procurement (“local content requirements”); company-level 
import restrictions, or export targets (“trade balancing requirements”); foreign 
exchange restrictions related to the inflows attributable to an enterprise, and 
export controls. The TRIMs Agreement, op. cit., p. 143 (see the Illustrative List 
contained in the Annex).
169   This will often depend on the applicable IIA. See generally UNCTAD, Foreign 
Direct Investment and Performance Requirements: New Evidence from Selected 
Countries (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD, FDI 
and Performance Requirements].
170   Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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agreements can be used as instruments for the promotion of in-
vestment and/or sustainable development. Accordingly, in addi-
tion to investment-protection obligations (and investment-liber-
alization commitments), there is an argument for imposing a set 
of disciplines on both the home country (particularly to promote 
foreign investment to developing countries) and on foreign inves-
tors (particularly to strengthen investors’ compliance with corpo-
rate social responsibility standards).
With regard to home country disciplines, IIAs could include provi-
sions requiring, for example, home countries to provide their in-
vestors with financial and/or fiscal incentives, information about 
investment opportunities and/or insurance mechanisms. While 
such “home country measures” are provided by various states uni-
laterally, they are only rarely the subject of obligations in IIAs.171 
More recently, however, there are growing concerns that such 
home country measures may affect the “competitive neutrality” 
among investors.172 In this sense, IIAs disciplines could be used 
to guarantee that home country measures do not upset the level 
playing field among investors of different origin.
The issue of including in IIAs disciplines on foreign investors is even 
more controversial, principally because this would extend the origi-
nal purpose of IIAs, but also because it is technically more complex 
to include binding obligations on private parties in an international 
instrument. Not only are there difficult issues regarding governing 
law, but increasing the types of obligations found in treaties has the 
potential to increase the authority and reach of investor-state dis-
171   International agreements have incorporated obligations relating to “home 
country measures” (HCMs) in a range of ways. These include, as discussed by 
UNCTAD: (i) those agreements with “specific provisions on HCMs,” such as 
the Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and the ACP; (ii) IIAs 
that “contain cooperation provisions concerning technology transfer,” which 
tend to be hortatory rather than binding, and (iii) “regional and multilateral 
investment insurance schemes (such as that of MIGA).” See UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and 
International Perspectives (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2003), pp. 159-161.
172   See the discussion above with regard to SOEs, also below, in section E.
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pute settlement as well.173 This is one of the most polarized issues 
in the debate about the future of the investment regime, with civil 
society calling for the inclusion of investors’ obligations (next to in-
vestors’ rights),174 and the business world remaining skeptical about 
the use of IIAs as a regulatory instrument in this respect.175 There is 
also a more general skepticism within some parts of the business 
community about the usefulness of corporate social responsibility 
as a tool to encourage sustainable development.176
The spectrum of options that have been suggested is wide, rang-
ing from best-endeavor provisions to binding obligations (im-
posed on inward investment or outward investment) to comply 
with universally recognized standards or existing international 
conventions. One middle-of-the-road option may be to condition 
the availability of certain protections or benefits to an investor’s 
compliance with certain (pre-determined) corporate standards. 
For example, only those investors that comply (at the time of the 
entry or throughout the life of an investment) with such corporate 
standards would be able to avail themselves of (all or some of) the 
investment-protection guarantees provided in the applicable IIA 
173  See Andrea K. Bjorklund, “The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing 
Investment Law,” 17 Lewis & Clark Law Review (forthcoming 2013) (noting the 
potential for the aggrandizement of investment tribunals and difficulties with 
respect to applicable law).
174  IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable 
Development, op. cit. 
175   Although no concrete obligations on investors are contained in the 2012 
United States Model BIT, the model does include provisions to ensure that 
state parties do not weaken or derogate from their existing environment and 
labor standards in order to attract investment (arts. 12 and 13, respectively). 
Further, the parties agree to meet for consultations regarding any matter 
arising under these articles (arts. 12(6) and 13(4)). See Mark Kantor, “Little Has 
Changed in the New US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,” 27(2) ICISD Review 
335 (2012); Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (2nd ed., 
New York: OUP, 2007), pp. 82-85. 
176   See, e.g., “Corporate Social Responsibility: Where’s the Beef?,” News Scan 12, 
14 (2003) (“CEOs want more proof linking CSR [Corporate Social Responsibility] 
performance to financial and market performance.”); David Henderson, 
“Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility,” New 
Zealand Business Roundtable (2001), pp. 63-80, available at http://www.nzbr.
org.nz/site/nzbr/files/publications/publications-2001/misguided_virtue.pdf; 
Michael Blowfield & Jedrzej George Frynas, “Critical Perspectives on Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the Developing World,” 81(3) International Affairs 499 
(2005), pp. 504-506 (criticisms of corporate social responsibility programs 
generally and in the context of developing countries/economies).
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(such as the prohibition of performance requirements or the right 
to investor-state arbitration). Similarly, IIAs could require home 
countries to condition the various incentives and mechanisms 
that are available to investors on compliance with best practices, 
human rights criteria or impact-assessment obligations.177 IIAs 
could also provide that host countries grant preferential admission 
treatment to foreign investors that comply with such practices, 
criteria or obligations.178 Difficulties with all these options revolve 
around (i) identifying the specific corporate standards as well as (ii) 
envisaging effecting enforcement and/or monitoring mechanisms 
(e.g., certification of firms providing impact-assessment services). 
Such mechanisms, for example, may require more elaborated trea-
ties or the establishment of an institutional framework capable of 
implementing these various provisions.
4. Investment arbitration
There are few (if any) issues that receive more attention in interna-
tional investment discussions than the dispute-settlement mech-
anism.179 For its staunchest supporters, investment arbitration 
represents the most important investment-protection guarantee 
(much superior to diplomatic protection or to recourse to domestic 
courts), while for its strongest critics investment arbitration fails 
with regard to the basic standards of openness, accountability and 
independence.
177   Ibid., pp. 45, 58.  Note also, for example, that the criteria for eligibility for IFC 
funding include that a proposal be economically beneficial to the developing 
country community and meet IFC standards for social and environmental 
policy; see IFC, World Bank Group, International Finance Corporation’s Policy 
on Environmental and Social Sustainability, 1 January 2012, available at http://
www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/7540778049a792dcb87efaa8c6a8312a/
SP_English_2012.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
178   Principles on Business and Human Rights, op. cit. 
179  By end of 2012, the number of known investment treaty arbitrations 
has reached almost 500.  See UNCTAD, ISDS Monitor (2013). For comparison 
(although the situation is different), the International Chamber of Commerce 
received 796 requests for arbitration (including principally commercial 
disputes), and 508 awards were rendered in 2011. International Chamber 
of Commerce, “Arbitration Statistics,” available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Introduction-to-ICC-
Arbitration/Statistics/. 
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Ultimately, this debate revolves around the issue of the legitima-
cy of investment arbitration.180 While IIAs often provide for both 
investor-state and state-state arbitration, it is the former that has 
been employed as the almost exclusive dispute-settlement mech-
anism and thus has attracted a greater level of scrutiny. One can 
look at the legitimacy debate over investor-state arbitration in two 
ways. The first perspective focuses on the object of the legitimacy 
concerns, that is, what are the features of investor-state arbitration 
that are problematic? In this context, legitimacy concerns focus 
both on the “process” and “outcome” of investment arbitration.181 
The second perspective focuses on the subjects (or interests) ex-
pressing the legitimacy concerns, that is, who are the parties (or in-
terests) for whom investor-state arbitration is problematic? In this 
second context, one should include not only the principal users of 
investor-state arbitration but also any other stakeholders.
a. Concerns about the “process” and “outcome” of 
investment arbitration
A first set of process-type concerns relate to issues such as (i) par-
ticipation in, transparency of, and due process in investment arbi-
tration proceedings, and (ii) arbitrator selection, independence and 
impartiality.182 More specifically, these concerns focus on the ability 
of third parties to be aware of the proceedings, to attend the hear-
ings and/or to submit amicus curiae briefs. Equally, these concerns 
180  For a critical review, see Khor, op. cit., pp. 2-3; Howard Mann, “Conceptualizing 
International Investment Law: Its Role in Sustainable Development,” Lewis & 
Clark Law Review (forthcoming 2013).
181  Susan D. Franck, “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions,” 73(4) 
Fordham Law Review 1521 (2005), p. 1585 (“The issue facing investment 
arbitration is whether a neutral arbitral tribunal composed of private 
individuals, such as public international law experts who may be chosen by 
the parties, can and actually does apply investment rights in a correct and 
coherent manner.” (emphasis added)).
182   Van Harten has criticized the model of private ad hoc arbitration used 
to adjudicate investment disputes as lacking accountability, openness, 
coherence, and independence. Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and Public Law (New York: OUP, 2007), p. 152; see also Benedict Kingsbury 
& Stephan W. Schill, “Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative 
Law,” IILJ Working Paper 2009/6 (2009), available at http://iilj.org/publications/
documents/2009-6.KingsburySchill.pdf, p. 43.
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focus on (the perception of) conflicts of interests of arbitrators, as 
well as the emergence of a “club” of individuals who serve as coun-
sel, arbitrators and experts in investment arbitrations (the so-called 
“triple-hat” issue), often obtaining repeated appointments.183 There 
is also a lack of diversity (in terms of gender, nationality, expertise) of 
the arbitrators who sit on investment tribunals.
Furthermore, process-type concerns relate to (i) the potential for 
contrasting decisions on the same (or very similar) issues of fact 
or law, undermining the predictability of investment law, as well 
as to (ii) high arbitration costs and the increasing length of arbitra-
tion proceedings (for example, because an arbitral award may be 
subject to annulment proceedings or reviews by domestic courts).
Outcome-type concerns center principally on investment tribunals’ 
ability to interpret and apply treaties, taking into account multi-
ple (and at times diverging) values, as well as on the quality of the 
legal reasoning displayed in their decisions.184 For example, some 
have argued that:
183   UNCTAD, WIR, 2012, op. cit., p 88. In their report Profiting from Injustice, 
CEO and TNI argue that the arbitration industry, driven by financial and 
professional self-interest, plays an “active” role in defending the international 
investment regime against reform. See CEO & TNI, op. cit., pp. 8, 43ff. Although 
the potential for conflicts of interest is regulated by both formal arbitration 
rules (e.g., UNCITRAL, ICSID, SCC, ICC) and informal guidelines (e.g., the IBA 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration and the Burgh 
House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary), the 
lack of any institutional or established monitoring and enforcement body 
undermines the effectiveness of these “ad hoc” mechanisms to address the 
“dual role” of arbitrator and counsel. See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, 
Lise Johnson & Fiona Marshall, “Arbitrator Independence and Impartiality: 
Examining the Dual Role of Arbitrator and Counsel,” IV Annual Forum for 
Developing Country Investment Negotiators, Background Papers (New Delhi, 
October  27-29, 2010), p. 51.
184   Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, “Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented 
but Interconnected Global Order,” 41 International Law and Politics 959 (2009), 
p. 981; Kingsbury & Schill, op. cit., pp. 44-45; U. Petersmann, “Human Rights, 
Constitutionalism, and ‘Public Reason’ in Investor-State Arbitration” in C. 
Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch & S. Wittich (eds.), International Investment 
Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: OUP, 
2009), pp. 892-893.
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“the reasoning of awards and indeed of judicial decisions in 
investment arbitration disputes should reflect a quality of 
publicness in law – it should speak not only to the parties to 
enable them to understand the ratio decidendi of the award, 
but also to the interests and engagements of non-represented 
and non-participating stakeholders. In particular, to the extent 
that it affects general principles of international investment 
law and arbitration, the reasoning should engage with these 
wider and systemic issues.”185
While the record is mixed, there is generally reluctance on the part 
of investment tribunals to take into account a wider set of values 
going beyond the protection of individual investors.186 With regard 
to the quality of the legal reasoning, there is also an ongoing de-
bate around the appropriate scope and criteria for the annulment 
of ICSID awards.187
There is a clear connection between process-type and outcome-
type concerns. A more (or less) transparent and inclusive adjudica-
tory process may in turn engender a more (or less) balanced and 
accurate outcome.188
185   Kingsbury & Schill, op. cit., p. 45.
186   Cf. Toby Landau, “Saving Investment Arbitration from Itself,” International 
Arbitration (forthcoming).
187   Sebastian Perry, “Does ICSID Need an Overhaul?,” 7(5) Global Arbitration 
Review, November 7, 2012; Promod Nair and Claudia Ludwig, “ICSID 
Annulment Awards: The Fourth Generation?,” 5(5) Global Arbitration Review, 
October 28, 2010; George Kahale, III, “Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken?” 
9(7) Transnational Dispute Management (2012), pp. 16-19.
188   Teitel & Howse, op. cit., p. 981 (“The overall outcome of tribunalization 
under these conditions is unclear as yet. One result might be, in a spirit of 
anti-fragmentation, a global movement for a new international investment 
law that embodies what is perceived as a just, humanity-oriented balance 
of rights and obligations. This could be underpinned by the perceived 
interpretative space of tribunals to take into account the law of human rights 
in their decisions. Another more pessimistic prognosis would be the general 
delegitimization or at least further under-legitimation of investment law, 
as the gulf between its perceived aims and effects and the humanity norm 
becomes ever more apparent, and as the response of tribunals to this problem 
makes the jurisprudence increasingly less coherent and predictable.”).
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b. Concerns by the principal users of investment 
arbitration and by any other stakeholders
Focusing on the parties (or interests) raising concerns about invest-
ment arbitration, one can distinguish between concerns regarding 
internal and external legitimacy.189 Internal legitimacy concerns 
center on the views and interests of investors and governments, as 
the principal users of investment arbitration. In this context, both 
investors and governments have demonstrated concerns with the 
efficiency (particularly in terms of costs190 and delays linked with 
investment arbitration proceedings) and predictability of invest-
ment arbitration (particularly in terms of inconsistent decisions). 
Equally important is the issue that all investors (including small 
enterprises) and governments (including developing and least de-
veloped countries) have an opportunity to make use of and take 
part on equal terms in the dispute-settlement system.
Concerns about the fairness of the system as a whole have driven 
some states to denounce their commitments. For example, the 
nature of investor-state dispute settlement means that states are 
necessarily required to defend themselves against claims made 
by investors. While a decision in favor of an investor can impose 
a significant penalty for the state, where a decision is issued in fa-
vor of the state party, this can hardly be described as a “victory.” In 
most cases, at least some of the costs associated with a dispute 
are borne by the state party. Moreover, unless a state can file a 
counterclaim, the best a state can hope for in a case is not to lose; 
it cannot “win.”191 As such, state parties bear the principal burden 
of the dispute-settlement system. 
Furthermore, some governments have pointed out the dispar-
ity between domestic and foreign investors, as only the latter are 
189  Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: 
Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute 
Settlement,” 13 American Review of International Arbitration 177 (2002).
190   Often, costs associated with an arbitration are borne equally by the two 
disputing parties, regardless of whether the claim is ultimately successful or 
not.
191   Bjorklund, “The Role of Counterclaims in Rebalancing Investment Law,” 
2013, op. cit.
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able to benefit from an additional dispute-settlement system,192 
or have raised concern regarding a real or perceived bias of arbitra-
tors193 or the systemic effects of the third-party financing of in-
vestment treaty claims.194
A related issue is the conduct of mass claims, where many inves-
tors are similarly affected by the conduct of a host country, for ex-
ample, through significant regulatory reform or financial crises.195 
This issue has gained prominence since, in August 2011, an ICSID 
tribunal determined that it had jurisdiction to hear a large-scale 
litigation under the 1990 Argentina-Italy BIT relating to defaulted 
Argentine debt, where the number of claimants is now estimated 
to be 60,000.196 Issues relate to when claims should be classified 
as “mass” or large-scale litigation,197 how consent should be deter-
mined198 and how such mass claims should be administered from 
both a legal and technical perspective.199
192   See, for example, Australia and South Africa regarding their recent policy 
change with regard to investor-state arbitration (discussed below at Section 
E.2.c). 
193   George Kahale, III summarized the issue as follows: “In truth, the problem 
goes beyond the question of whether bias in the system actually exists. On this 
issue, perception matters as much as reality. States are not likely to continue 
to play in a game they sense, justifiably or not, is rigged against them. Since it 
takes two to tango, the growing dissatisfaction of states with the international 
arbitral process looms as a major problem in investor/state relations and 
requires a critical assessment of the future of international arbitration as 
a means of settling investment disputes.”  George Kahale, III, “A Problem in 
Investor/State Arbitration,” 6(1) Transnational Dispute Management (2009), p. 1.
194   See discussion at section E(4)(b), below. 
195   Brian King & Alexander Yanos, “Mass Claims in International Investment 
Arbitration,” The Deal, 18 January 2012, http://www.thedeal.com/content/
restructuring/mass-claims-in-international-investment-arbitration.php. 
196   Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, August 4, 2011. A dissenting opinion, written 
by Professor Georges Abi-Saab, was issued on October 28, 2011. For discussion 
of the implications of the case, see: Hans van Houtte & Bridie McAsey, “Abaclat 
and Others v Argentine Republic: ICSID, the BIT and Mass Claims,” 27(2) ICSID 
Review 231 (2012); Karen Halverson Cross, “Investment Arbitration Panel 
Upholds Jurisdiction to Hear Mass Bondholder Claims Against Argentina,” 
15(30) ASIL Insights (2011), available at http://www.asil.org/insights111121.
cfm. 
197   van Houtte & McAsey, op. cit. 
198  Andrea Marco Steingruber, “Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic: 
Consent in Large-Scale Arbitration Proceedings,” 27(2) ICSID Review 237 (2012).
199   Donald Francis Donovan, “Abaclat and Others v Argentine Republic: As a 
Collective Claims Proceeding,” 27(2) ICSID Review 261 (2012).
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Concerns regarding external legitimacy focus, on the other hand, 
on the views and interests of a plethora of other stakeholders (such 
as national political actors, NGOs, local communities) directly or 
indirectly affected by international investment law and arbitra-
tion.200 In this context, one key concern of these wider stakehold-
ers centers on the lack of transparency and accountability of the 
arbitration process. These concerns are linked for example, to the 
ad hoc nature of arbitral tribunals, whose members are appointed 
and paid by the parties to the dispute, rather than being appointed 
strictly on the basis of their qualifications and paid through an in-
dependent mechanism. As parties are, in any given case, motivat-
ed by their desire to have a decision made in their favor, tribunals 
are composed with regard to the particular issues and arguments 
at stake, and not exclusively with regard to whether they are able 
to interpret international investment law in the most independ-
ent, detached and neutral manner.
200   Toby T. Landau, “Reasons for Reasons: The Tribunal’s Duty in Investor-State 
Arbitration” in Albert Jan van den Berg with the assistance of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (eds.), ICCA Congress Series, No. 14 (2008), p. 196: “[T]he 
investor-State tribunal’s audience comprises not only the immediate parties, 
but all other entities that may be affected by the decision. As explained above, 
depending on the issues at stake, this could well include broad sections of a 
given population. A dispute, for example, between a foreign investor and a State 
over the exercise of the State’s emergency powers (e.g., an urgent decision to 
nationalize a major bank, in order to alleviate a rapid economic slowdown or 
“credit crunch”) could well be as critical for the domestic population as it is 
for the foreign investor. There may also be other non-parties with a legitimate 
interest in the substantive matters at stake, such as NGOs, international policy 
and funding institutions (such as the World Bank) or even other governments.”
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Another key concern in this context is linked to the fear that de-
cisions by investment tribunals may undermine a government’s 
proper exercise of its public functions. For example, criticism has 
been advanced with regard to the almost exclusive focus on the 
award of damages as the remedy par excellence in investment ar-
bitration.201
The connection between internal and external legitimacy concerns 
is more complex than the connection between process-type and 
outcome-type concerns. While the interests of the principal users 
of investment arbitration may at times be in unison with those of 
other stakeholders (for example, regarding consistency of invest-
ment tribunals’ decisions), there are often cases in which those in-
terests diverge dramatically (for example, relating to participation 
in, and transparency of, the investment arbitration proceedings).202 
The issue of appointing arbitrators is a clear illustration of this ten-
sion: While states (and investors) may be comforted by the control 
201   For a discussion of the dominance of monetary awards, and of alternative 
remedies, see: Carole Malinvaud, “Non-Pecuniary Remedies in Investment 
Treaty and Commercial Arbitration” in Jan van den Berg, op. cit., pp. 209-230; 
Christoph Schreuer, “Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration,” 20(4) 
Arbitration International 325 (2004); Anne van Aaken, “Primary and Secondary 
Remedies in International Investment Law and National State Liability: A 
Functional and Comparative View” in Stephan W. Schill (ed.), International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (New York: OUP 2010), pp. 
721-754; see also Michael Schneider, “Non-Monetary Relief in International 
Arbitration – An Overview of Principles and Arbitration Practice” in Michael 
E. Schneider & Joachim Knoll (eds.), Performance as a Remedy: Non-Monetary 
Relief in International Arbitration, ASA Special Series No. 30 (Huntington: 
JurisNet, 2011) (dealing primarily with commercial arbitration, but also with 
specific issues relating to non-pecuniary remedies in investment arbitration).
202   Cf. Federico Ortino, “External Transparency of Investment Awards,” paper 
presented at SIEL Inaugural Conference (Geneva, July 2008).
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afforded through selecting a panel member,203 other stakeholders 
believe that arbitrators assigned in accordance with a predeter-
mined roster, or selected by an institution, would achieve greater 
coherence and neutrality.204
Many options have been pursued or put forward to deal with the 
various legitimacy issues in investment arbitration. For example, 
despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm expressed by several state 
representatives, UNCITRAL arbitration rules have just recently been 
modified to include transparency provisions specific to investor-
state arbitrations.205 Furthermore, states such as Canada and the 
United States have opted to incorporate public disclosure require-
ments in all of their post-2001 IIAs, and the NAFTA parties used 
the Free Trade Commission process to issue a note of interpreta-
203   Eugene I. Farber discusses several arguments that are made in favor of 
party-appointed arbitration generally, including that (i) “drafters of arbitration 
clauses do not fully understand the arbitration process and feel more secure in 
having their own arbitrator”; (ii) “parties fear the irrational neutral arbitrator 
and therefore the rulings of a “problem” neutral can be overruled by the two 
party- appointed arbitrators voting together”; and (iii) “parties feel that they 
have more direct input in the deliberation if they have appointed one of the 
three arbitrators.” Eugene I. Farber, “The Role of the Neutral in Party-Appointed 
Arbitrations,” New York Law Journal, 13 September 2002, col. 4. In addition, 
Seth H. Lieberman pointed out that, in the context of international arbitration, 
the party-appointed arbitrator also plays an important role as “translator” 
– both of language and of legal norms and culture. See Seth H. Lieberman, 
“Something’s Rotten in the State of Party-Appointed Arbitration: Healing 
ADR’s Black Eye that is ‘Nonneutral Neutrals,’” 5(2) Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 215 (2004), p. 222, referring to Andreas F. Lowenfeld, “The Party-
Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some Reflections,” 30(1) 
Texas International Law Journal 59 (1995), p. 65.
204  For example, Jan Paulsson, “Moral Hazard in International Dispute 
Resolution,” 8(2) Transnational Dispute Management (2011), p. 6; Albert Jan van 
den Berg, “Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment 
Arbitration” in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. (eds.), Looking to the Future: Essays 
on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2011). However, some commentators have argued that even such 
new rules and guidelines would be insufficient to “challenge the pro-investor 
bias in the system” or “to solve all possible conflicts of interest,” CEO & TNI, op. 
cit., pp. 45, 49. 
205   UNCITRAL’s Working Group II had, since 2008, been tasked to prepare a 
legal standard on transparency in treaty-based investor-state arbitration 
(granted at the 41st session, New York, June 16 – July 7, 2008, and affirmed 
at the 43rd session, New York, June 21 – July 9, 2010). The Working Group, 
composed of all states members of the Commission, agreed to the new rules 
at the 58th session from February 4-8, 2013, in New York. 
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tion regarding transparency in NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings.206 
Although both measures can contribute to a greater external le-
gitimacy of the international investment regime, it is important to 
maintain a clear distinction between measures to provide great-
er transparency in respect of investment-treaty arbitration and 
measures that facilitate greater public (and third-party) partici-
pation.207 The latter have potentially a greater structural impact 
on the manner in which investor-state (and potentially also state-
state) dispute-settlement is currently conducted.208
Another example deals with the question of ensuring quality and 
a level of consistency of investment decisions. Options advanced 
range from the setting up of a roster of eminent individuals from 
which arbitrators would be selected,209 to the establishment of a 
206  For example, the 2012 United States Model BIT, op. cit., art. 29; FTAs 
with Singapore (May 6, 2003, art. 15.20), Chile (June 6, 2003, art. 10.20), 
the Dominican Republic and CAFTA nations (May 28, 2004, art. 10.21); 
Morocco (June 15, 2004); BITs with Uruguay (November 4, 2004) and Rwanda 
(February 19, 2008). Cf. Canada’s FIPA, op. cit., art. 19, and the FTA with Peru. 
See discussion in Andrea J. Menaker, “Piercing the Veil of Confidentiality: 
The Recent Trend Towards Greater Public Participation and Transparency in 
Investor-State Arbitration” in Katia Yannaca-Small (ed.), Arbitration Under 
International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues (Oxford: 
Oxford, 2010), p. 139. According to Parra, the time may have come for ICSID 
“to reverse the general rules regarding access to documents and attendance 
at hearings in arbitration cases” and, more particularly, “ICSID might amend 
its Regulations and Rules to provide for the publication of all documents 
generated in proceedings, unless or to the extent decided otherwise by the 
arbitrators, and for tribunals to have full authority to allow third parties to 
attend or observe hearings (eliminating a party’s right to veto such attendance 
or observance of hearings).” Antonio Parra, The History of ICSID (Oxford: OUP, 
2012), pp. 323-324.
207   See Menaker, op. cit., pp. 129-160.
208  See Andrea K. Bjorklund, “The Promise and Peril of Precedent:  The Case of 
Amici Curiae” in A Hoffmann (ed.), ASA Bulletin Special Series, No. 34 (2010), p. 
165
209  See the roster created in the European Union-Korea FTA with regard to 
the state-state dispute settlement mechanism and the draft of the European 
Union-Canada FTA with regard to investor-state dispute settlement.
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hierarchical appeals mechanism,210 to the creation of an Interna-
tional Investment Court.211 In terms of greater consistency and 
predictability, one of the concerns is that all these options may 
simply replicate (rather than solve) the existing difficulties in the 
arbitration system, particularly in light of the multiplicity of rel-
evant legal sources. 
Finally, in order to address legitimacy concerns with regard to 
investment arbitration, some have suggested a wide range of 
options to limit the overall role of investor-state arbitration in 
the regime. These have included (i) strengthening the role of the 
treaty parties themselves in dispute settlement, (ii) making use 
of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms (and, for that mat-
ter, national conflict-management mechanisms) especially during 
the cooling-off period foreseen in IIAs, (iii) allowing for a certain 
gate-keeping role for governments regarding the initiation of such 
disputes (e.g., raising the threshold for access to investor-state dis-
pute settlement), and (iv) excluding investor-state dispute settle-
ment from IIAs, while providing for a state-state mechanism.
As the primary enforcement mechanism within the international 
investment regime, investor-state arbitration faces a diversity of (at 
times conflicting) critiques from a variety of stakeholders, ranging 
210  Within the ICSID system, some have also suggested the introduction 
of a “permanent consultative body” from which any ICSID tribunal could 
request guidance about legal issues (possibly based on the preliminary 
ruling procedure of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, pursuant to which national courts of Member States request 
interpretative rulings from the Court of Justice of the EU). See G. Kaufmann-
Kohler, “Annulment of ICSID Awards in Contract and Treaty Arbitrations: Are 
There Differences?”, in E Gaillard and Y Banifatemi (eds.), Annulment of ICSID 
Awards (2004),p. 221. See also Parra, The History of ICSID, p. 325.
211   One of the principal proponents of an international investment court has 
been Gus Van Harten, who has presented arguments for an independent, 
permanent adjudicative tribunal in various articles, books and presentations. 
See, e.g., Van Harten, 2007, op. cit., pp. 180ff (arguing for the creation of a 
permanent court with full jurisdiction over international investment disputes, 
and state-appointed judges); “A Case for an International Investment Court,” 
Society of International Economic Law Inaugural Conference Paper (Geneva: 
SIEL, 2008) (arguing that, as a form of international public law adjudication, 
international investment disputes require an international court that operates 
in accordance with principles of judicial decision-making, including openness 
and independence).
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from lacking effectiveness and finality to being too effective and 
restrictive of host countries’ regulatory powers. While investment 
arbitration cannot, and will not, be “all things to all stakeholders,” 
it is crucial that any reform process takes into account and balances 
the diverse needs and preferences of participants and civil society. 
A key challenge will be to find solutions that reach a compromise 
to strengthen, rather than undermine, dispute-resolution processes 
within the regime. Efforts to address the purpose, scope and content 
of investment agreements will be of little consequence if concerns 
about the process, outcome and legitimacy of investment arbitra-
tion are not also given sufficient attention.
5. Managing multiple legal sources
The issue here is one of the overall coherence of the international 
investment regime, and it plays itself out in two parallel contexts. 
First, the current regime is characterized at its core by more than 
3,000 IIAs principally aimed at protecting foreign investment. As 
noted above, the regime has grown, rather organically but also 
haphazardly, over several decades, beginning with customary in-
ternational law and later with a complex and overlapping network 
of treaties, including BITs, investment chapters in FTAs, regional 
agreements, and the GATS. 
Accordingly, the multiplicity of IIAs creates a number of problem-
atic issues. For example, the great number of separate instruments 
with often substantial similarities but also often with substantial 
differences (even if only in important nuances) makes it difficult 
for a clear and uniform international investment law and policy 
regime to emerge. Therefore, it is difficult for governments to as-
sess the full range of commitments that they have entered into, 
how those commitments interact or conflict with one another and 
the liabilities they may be subject to in cases of infringements. It 
is equally difficult to establish the transparency and predictabil-
ity that international investors need for long-term investment 
decisions. This situation is further accentuated by the fact that 
various instruments have different strength in terms of sources 
of investment law (as they range from mandatory to entirely vol-
untary) and the nature of a dispute-settlement process in which 
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tribunals are stand-alone institutions and are not (at least formal-
ly)212 bound by the decisions (and their underlying reasoning) of 
preceding tribunals.
Similarly, there is incongruence between IIAs and the reality of 
today’s foreign investment. While most IIAs involve bilateral re-
lationships, the phenomenon of international investment typi-
cally involves firms that control economic assets in a number of 
jurisdictions, under the common governance of headquarters. As 
a result, the regulatory reach of most IIAs is narrower than the op-
erational reach of many international investors, which can result 
in “underlaps” in jurisdiction. This incongruence is further accen-
tuated by the reality that firms seek to maximize the benefits of 
their international investments on a firm-wide global level, while 
governments seek to maximize the benefits of this investment on 
the national level. As noted above, “nationality planning” and “fo-
rum shopping” are a consequence of the current regime.
Second, the issue of overall coherence of the international invest-
ment regime is also relevant within a broader context going be-
yond the world of traditional IIAs. As noted above, while govern-
ments do not typically go beyond the protection of investors (and, 
in some cases, liberalization requirements) in IIAs, they are pre-
pared to address some issues related to certain negative externali-
ties of international investment in voluntary instruments (such as 
the ILO Declaration, the OECD Guidelines, the restrictive business 
practices code, the consumer protection code).  Equally, interna-
tional organizations have issued instruments that can be used as 
guidelines (e.g., the World Bank, SADC, the Commonwealth Sec-
retariat, and, most recently, UNCTAD).213  Business itself has is-
sued guidelines regarding the international behavior of firms.214 
Noteworthy also are efforts by NGOs to offer contributions for the 
212   In reality, tribunals do refer to earlier decisions of other tribunals, but they 
do not need to follow their reasoning if they prefer a different logic. See Andrea 
K. Bjorklund, “Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante” 
in Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W. Arner (eds.), International 
Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline, pp. 265-280.
213   See discussion at section E.3 below.
214  ICC, ICC Guidelines for International Investment (Paris: ICC, 2012) 
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/Document-
centre/2012/2012-ICC-Guidelines-for-International-Investment/. 
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improvement and rebalancing of investment law. Among these, 
the best known is the IISD Model International Agreement on 
Investment for Sustainable Development.  Accordingly, the issue 
of coherence of the investment regime may also be assessed in a 
broader context, requiring a level of coordination between differ-
ent legal institutions and instruments broadly affecting interna-
tional investment.
One option to address the problems linked with the multiplic-
ity of IIAs is to encourage harmonization – whether through a 
model international investment treaty or through a multilateral 
investment agreement.215 Achieving greater overall coordination 
may also require reaching beyond IIAs, to involve “human rights” 
or “sustainability impact assessments” of IIAs. States may need 
to consider their human rights obligations or challenges stem-
ming from domestic constitutional provisions or international 
conventions,216 for instance, where investments can have adverse 
impacts on the local population’s access to essential goods such as 
water.217 In order for states to clarify and harmonize competing ob-
jectives, a number of United Nations committees and reports have 
called upon states to prepare human rights impact assessments of 
215   See further section E below.
216   At the ICCA’s 50th anniversary conference, in June 2011, Judge Bruno Simma 
of the International Court of Justice argued that human rights considerations 
should be considered during investment treaty negotiations and built into the 
text of any investment contract. See Sebastian Perry, “Arbitrators and Human 
Rights,” Global Arbitration Review, June 13, 2011. Such an approach may be 
necessary where states wish to introduce human rights standards into the 
international investment regime, given the various arguments launched by 
practitioners and arbitrators against “broadening the interpretive canvas” at 
the dispute-settlement stage to take human rights obligations into account, 
see Perry, op. cit., and further discussion below.
217   P. Thielborger, “The Human Right to Water Versus Investor Rights: Double-
Dilemma or Pseudo-Conflict?” in Dupuy, Petersmann & Francioni, op. cit., pp. 
487-510. 
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the trade and investment agreements they negotiate.218  Similarly, 
“sustainability impact assessments” have been prepared in rela-
tion to a number of trade policies and negotiations, particularly 
by the European Commission.219  Such assessments completed ex 
ante (and particularly if combined with wide public participation) 
provide a policy tool to measure the economic, social and environ-
mental implications of treaty commitments.  Sustainability im-
pact assessments of IIAs present one option for states to integrate 
sustainability considerations at an earlier stage of international 
investment policy-making.220
Given the haphazard evolution of the international investment 
regime and the diverse interests and priorities of different stake-
holders, there is a risk that further developments could merely add 
to the complexity and fragmentation of international investment 
law.  States, investors and other stakeholders are now recognizing 
the need to develop mechanisms that move toward greater coher-
ence.  Mechanisms may be needed to achieve a greater alignment of 
voluntary and binding rules, to address overlapping and “underlap-
ping” jurisdictions and to balance investment protection alongside 
broader concerns about the impact and effectiveness of internation-
al investment as a contributor to development.
218   See, for example, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Olivier De Schutter, Guiding Principles on Human Rights Impact Assessments 
of Trade and Investment Agreements, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, and 
recommendations by: the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Concluding Observations Regarding Ecuador, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.100, para. 
56; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: El Salvador, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.232, para. 48; Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Concluding Comments: Colombia, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/COL/CO/6), para. 29; CEDAW, Concluding Comments: 
Philippines, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6, para. 26; CEDAW, Concluding 
Comments: Guatemala, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GUA/CO/7, para. 32; Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, Promotion 
and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Mission to the World Trade 
Organization, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/5/Add.2, paras. 37-38. 
219   See, for example, ECORYS, “Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in 
Support of Negotiations of a DCFTA [(Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area)] between the EU and the Republic of Armenia: Final Inception Report,” 
prepared for European Commission, DG Trade (January 10, 2013), and the 
general discussion on the European Commission website, “Sustainability 
Impact Assessments,” http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/sustainability-
impact-assessments/ (last visited 9 March 2013).
220   See M. Gehring, “Impact Assessment of Investment Treaties” in Segger, 
Gehring & Newcombe, op. cit., p. 145.
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6. Institutional structure 
As noted above, the traditional IIA did not envisage a standing in-
stitutional structure, whether in terms of (regular) meetings of the 
contracting parties, a standing secretariat with specific tasks (e.g., 
compliance monitoring, capacity building, interpretation of obli-
gations) or the establishment of a permanent dispute-settlement 
body. This institutional lacunae effectively delegates substantially 
all treaty interpretation and implementation to dispute settle-
ment (and in particular to investment-treaty tribunals). However, 
more IIAs (often in the context of economic integration agree-
ments) have started to include provisions for permanent institu-
tional arrangements that perform a number of specific functions. 
For example, agreed interpretation can help ensure consistency in 
arbitral awards and maximize the effectiveness of IIAs. Similarly, 
deliberations can ensure informed decision-making on further in-
vestment liberalization, or prolonging or amending IIAs. Further-
more, a standing institutional structure provides the mechanism 
“to reach out to other relevant investment stakeholders includ-
ing investors, local community representatives and academia.”221 
There are clearly costs involved in strengthening the institutional 
structure, particularly in light of the fact that most IIAs are con-
cluded on a bilateral level.
The institutional issue may also be assessed at a more centralized 
level. As noted above, while there are several international organi-
zations whose activities are relevant for the regulation of foreign 
investment (such as UNCTAD, the World Bank Group, the WTO, the 
OECD), they do not provide a comprehensive and integrated insti-
tutional structure.222 The disconnect between different agencies 
can lead to inefficiencies. 
Although each of the issues discussed above can be addressed 
by individual state parties on a progressive or ad hoc basis (e.g., 
through IIA negotiations or domestic regulation), options that in-
volve a permanent institution of some sort or another to monitor, 
address and respond to the challenges of the international invest-
221   UNCTAD, IPFSD, op. cit., p. 60.
222  See supra section B.
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ment regime have specific advantages (and disadvantages). As well 
as acting as a venue for comprehensive, “big picture” analysis and 
reform, well designed, inclusive institutional structures (whether 
centralized, regional or bilateral) could contribute to coherence 
and consistency, and lend greater legitimacy to the regime.
In light of its thin and fragmented institutional structure, the invest-
ment regime lacks the necessary effectiveness.  In order to strength-
en its ability to achieve its underlying objectives (whatever stake-
holders decide they should be), improving the regime’s institutional 
framework should be seriously considered.
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E.  OPTIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD
Although, as discussed in section A, international investment has 
become the most important vehicle to bring goods and services 
to foreign markets and, in addition, to integrate the production 
systems of individual economies through global value chains and 
other mechanisms, issues related to the international investment 
regime for such investment do not have high political saliency on 
the international policy agenda. This contrasts strongly with the 
international trade area, in that trade issues have a clear national 
and international institutional focus, namely in trade ministries of 
individual countries and the WTO, as well as a constituency associ-
ated with these issues and institutions.  This difference has arisen 
primarily because, in the past, trade was seen as the primary driver 
of globalization, making international investment “the neglected 
twin of international trade.”223 Now, as patterns of international 
production and direct investment capital flows have a growing role 
in shaping economic development, the time may well have come to 
address the regulatory framework on investment in a comprehen-
sive manner. This is not an easy matter because of the large num-
ber of mostly bilateral treaties that make up the international in-
vestment regime and the regime’s light and fragmented structure. 
However, as will be discussed below, a number of initiatives could be 
undertaken to improve the international investment regime.
Still, it is a basic challenge to raise the level of awareness among 
decision-makers about the importance of international invest-
ment, to encourage the strengthening of national and internation-
al institutions dealing with international investment issues and to 
support the building of national (and international) investment 
constituencies. This requires a process involving all stakeholders to 
understand the main concerns about the current regime, to iden-
tify options of how these concerns can be addressed and to raise 
awareness, while, at the same time, making progress in clarifying 
or reframing a number of key issues. 
223   DeAnne Julius, “Foreign Direct Investment: The Neglected Twin of Trade,” 
Group of Thirty, Occasional Papers, No. 33 (Washington D.C.: Group of Thirty, 
1991).
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This section discusses a range of options for improving the in-
ternational investment regime, from less to more ambitious ap-
proaches: (i) engaging in fact finding processes, (ii) establishing 
consensus-building Working Groups on key issues, (iii) formulat-
ing an International Model Investment Agreement(s), (iv) building 
specific mechanisms to improve the regime, and (v) commencing 
intergovernmental processes.  Under each heading, options are 
outlined, with a discussion of the purpose, challenges and feasibil-
ity of each. The presentation of these options is meant to consti-
tute a menu to assist in the identification of priority actions that 
could be pursued. Given the purpose of this paper, the options fo-
cus on initiating inclusive processes that involve all stakeholders, 
with the substantive outcomes to be decided by participants.   
1. Engaging in fact finding processes
As illustrated in section D, there are some issues within the inter-
national investment regime that can be (and are being) resolved by 
individual states in the context of negotiating their own IIAs. How-
ever, there are other issues that require an international approach. 
In particular, given the decentralized nature of the regime, formal-
ized fact-finding processes could be of assistance, to identify and 
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the regime and to provide 
an authoritative account of the current situation. Such processes, to 
be credible, would require input from a broad range of stakeholders 
across national and regional boundaries. Two options, international 
hearings and undertaking a stocktaking of the law, are outlined 
here. Their scope would cover the entire range of issues related to 
the international investment law and policy regime, including the 
principal areas discussed in section D.  Each of these processes could 
be pursued independently, or in parallel with one another.
a.  Holding international hearings
To begin with, given the range of stakeholders involved and the 
range of concerns they have, one option is to have international 
hearings on the entire range of issues related to the international 
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investment regime.224 Consultations of this kind would ensure that 
the voices of all stakeholders (including those from governments, 
the private sector, trade unions, other civil society organizations, 
and academia) are heard and that all concerns and considerations 
are put on the table. A small panel of eminent persons (consisting 
of representatives of key stakeholder groups) could conduct such 
hearings. On the basis of written submissions, the panel would 
explore with invitees from stakeholder groups from around the 
world their concerns and proposed solutions, beginning with the 
need for a regime and its reform, as well as its purpose. The re-
sults of such hearings could be summarized in a report that, at a 
minimum, would reflect the range of views on the current state 
of international investment law and policy and, in addition, con-
tain a menu of proposals made by stakeholders on how to move 
forward. Such hearings could therefore be an important part of a 
transparent consensus-building process as to what concerns need 
to be considered in relation to the current regime, and they would 
identify a wide range of options regarding what to do next. They 
could also contribute to raising awareness about the importance 
of the international investment problematique.
A consortium of universities from around the world could organize 
such hearings, perhaps in cooperation with international organi-
zations with competence in this area and in conjunction with an 
established international investment event, such as the World In-
vestment Forum. The advice of an advisory committee consisting 
of representatives of stakeholders could help guide the prepara-
tions for such an event. 
Organizing international hearings and recording their results 
would require the agreement of a number of eminent persons to 
participate in them as panelists, as well as stakeholders to partici-
pate as witnesses. The organization of such an effort would also 
require substantial resources (perhaps provided by one or several 
governments), including funds to ensure that the process is acces-
sible to stakeholders in different regions and well publicized.225
224  If hearings were to be conducted, this could be done on a regional basis or 
as one overall international hearing.
225  The Ruggie process, described below, may offer one template.
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b.  Undertaking a restatement 
Another (ambitious) option that could be pursued in conjunction 
with, or following up on, international hearings is to undertake 
a restatement of the principles and norms contained in IIAs and 
related instruments.226 A restatement could determine and ex-
plain “the law as it now stands (from a positive perspective) and 
how we should think about it (normatively).”227 More specifically, 
it could examine what (if anything) is “black letter” international 
investment law, i.e., provisions that are widely accepted in the in-
ternational investment law community; on which issues there is 
no consensus and why this is so; and what alternative approaches 
could be considered for unresolved issues, what their advantages 
and disadvantages are and what the legal implications are of al-
ternative approaches. Such a restatement could also establish the 
226  Such a stocktaking would be akin to the “restatements” undertaken 
since 1923 by the American Law Institute (ALI), primarily for domestic law 
areas, except that the stocktaking as envisaged here would also need to be 
forward-looking. ALI has published “Restatements of the Law,” a series of 
treatises that codify significant case law decisions into principles and rules 
organized by topic. The Restatements have become a persuasive secondary 
source for academics, practitioners and judges in the United States, because 
of their broad scope and their thorough drafting process. Each Restatement is 
prepared over the course of several years by a primary Reporter, in consultation 
with a panel of experts, ALI members and the ALI Council (composed of 
judges, professors and lawyers). A project is currently underway to prepare 
a Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, now 
in its second tentative draft status. See American Law Institute, Restatement 
(Third) U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, Tentative Draft No. 
2, November 2, 2012. This Restatement covers a range of topics, including 
a separate section dealing with investment arbitration as it intersects with 
United States courts, in order to reflect the distinct procedural issues and 
treatment that arise under United States law. However, substantive standards 
such as “fair and equitable treatment” or the definition of “expropriation” are 
not being addressed in this Restatement. See George A. Bermann, Jack J. Coe 
Jr., Christopher R. Drahozal & Catherine A. Rogers, “Restating the U.S. Law of 
International Commercial Arbitration” in Thomas E. Carbonneau & Angelica 
M. Sinopole (eds.), Building the Civilization of Arbitration (London: Wildy, 
Simmonds & Hill, 2010), p. 327. The Reporter is George A. Bermann. For a full 
list of persons involved, see “Current Projects: Restatement Third, The U.S. Law 
of International Commercial Arbitration,” available at http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.members&projectid=20.
227  Petros C. Mavroidis, “All Clear on the Investment Front: A Plea for a 
Restatement” in José E. Alvarez & Karl P. Sauvant, with Kamil Gérard Ahmed 
& Gabriela del P. Vizcaíno (eds.), The Evolving International Investment Regime: 
Expectations, Realities, Options (New York: OUP, 2011), p. 103.
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issues that are not typically (or at all) reflected in IIAs, but have 
been suggested for inclusion in such agreements by various stake-
holder groups, how they could be included and what the argu-
ments for and against their inclusion are. In other words, it could 
be forward-looking and innovative, by including sounder principles 
and provisions. A restatement could also address issues relating 
to interrelationships with other international legal regimes and 
the implications of such interrelationships for the future of the in-
ternational investment regime. At a minimum, a restatement (if 
successful) would establish what is accepted in the area of inter-
national investment law and policy.228
The outcome of a restatement could potentially become a source 
of inspiration and guidance for IIA negotiators229 and an authorita-
tive secondary source of law for arbitrators, who have to negotiate 
and arbitrate, respectively, under circumstances in which such a 
broadly accepted inventory does not exist. It could also become a 
starting point for negotiating bilateral, regional and plurilateral 
investment agreements, or even a multilateral framework on in-
vestment, should governments wish to do so.
228  In the context of a Restatement on International Trade Law, annual 
“stocktaking” and analyses of decisions by WTO adjudicating bodies are 
being prepared. These reports are published as The American Law Institute 
Reporters Studies on WTO Law by Cambridge University Press, and incorporate 
critical discussions of key developments in WTO jurisprudence. Studies are 
submitted for discussion to the annual meeting of ALI members. The two 
appointed Reporters are Petros C. Mavroidis and Henrik Horn. See, e.g., Petros 
C. Mavroidis & Henrik. Horn (eds.), The WTO Case Law of 2010 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). In addition to the annual reviews, a series 
of background materials have been prepared. See, e.g., Douglas A. Irwin, Petros 
C. Mavroidis & Alan O. Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Petros C. Mavroidis & Henrik Horn (eds.), Legal and 
Economic Principles of World Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming 2013).
229  Various organizations convene events for IIA negotiators, inter alia, to 
facilitate an exchange of experience and inform them about recent trends. 
UNCTAD, for example, has done so for a number of years, as has the South 
Centre (in cooperation with the International Institute for Sustainable 
Development and others). See Mariama Williams, “Challenges Posed by BITs 
to Developing Countries,” 69 South Bulletin (2012), pp. 13-15, reporting on the 
sixth such event. Technical assistance for developing countries (and especially 
the least developed among them) is an important matter as it is in the interest 
of all stakeholders that IIA negotiators from all parties are in the best possible 
position to undertake negotiations.
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There is of course the possibility that such a restatement would 
be inherently “conservative” as it could reflect primarily what is, 
as opposed to what could be. Therefore, it would be important to 
ensure that a restatement, were it to be undertaken, would in ad-
dition do two other things: First, it would need to take into account 
how the law has developed over time so as to establish trends; 
second (as already mentioned), the undertaking would also need 
to be forward-looking, i.e., one would need to make sure that it 
fully reflects proposals that go beyond the status quo, beginning 
with the purpose of the regime (and, in this manner, give new op-
tions to negotiators). Moreover, given the dynamic nature of de-
velopments in international investment law, a restatement would 
need to watch closely new IIAs and arbitral decisions. In any event, 
a restatement would be an ambitious undertaking; an alternative 
may therefore be an approach that focuses on specific areas (see 
below, under “Consensus-building Working Groups”).
To be credible, such a restatement would have to be prepared by 
an international group of prominent scholars in international in-
vestment law,230 drawn from all continents. The group would have 
to make sure that the views of all stakeholders are fully taken into 
account, including the views of governmental officials negotiating 
IIAs, as they have the actual experience of negotiating such agree-
ments, know best why they have made certain choices regarding 
specific issues and would be the potential beneficiaries of a stock-
taking. One would also have to recognize that, in each stakeholder 
group, there are likely to be different views as to what needs to be 
done. A consortium of universities from around the world could 
organize such an effort, benefitting from the advice of an advisory 
committee consisting of representatives from stakeholder groups.
230  Conducting such an effort in an intergovernmental context would be very 
difficult, as government representatives could easily consider this to be a 
negotiating effort. The International Law Association has convened a working 
group studying the feasibility of drafting a soft-law instrument, possibly along 
the lines of a restatement, with special attention to whether the field is ripe 
for such an endeavor.  See Christian Tietje & Emily Sipiorski, “The Evolution of 
Investment Protection Based on Public International Law Treaties: Lessons to 
be Learned” in Bjorklund & Reinisch, op. cit., pp. 192-237.
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Organizing such a restatement would require the agreement of 
a number of international experts to participate in such an ef-
fort. Judging from past experience, a restatement would take a 
substantial amount of time, might require regular updating and, 
therefore, demand substantial resources.
2. Establishing consensus-building Working Groups
The multiplicity of sources of law of the current international in-
vestment law and policy regime, its light and fragmented insti-
tutional structure and a number of issues related to the precise 
meaning of various concepts raise a range of questions whose 
solutions cannot be “discovered” through a fact-finding process 
alone. Some of these are of a relatively focused nature (e.g., how to 
deal with the question of capital controls231) and can be addressed 
in a specific manner, as illustrated in section D. Others are more 
challenging and central to the investment regime, requiring sub-
stantial analysis and discussion, with a view toward arriving at a 
widely shared consensus.
Establishing Working Groups can be a useful step toward consen-
sus building on specific issues.  In the investment context, working 
groups or roundtables could be convened to address both substan-
tive and procedural matters232 – but they can also be useful to fos-
ter a dialogue among stakeholders and build confidence. The topics 
identified below are examples of subject areas in which such Work-
ing Groups could be of particular importance. (Other areas, relating 
to more specific contexts, are mentioned elsewhere in this section.)
231  See, e.g., Manuel F. Montes, “Capital Controls, Investment Chapters and 
Asian Development Objectives” in Capital Account Regulations and the 
Trading System: A Compatibility Review, Pardee Center Taskforce Report 
(Boston: Boston University, 2013) available at http://www.bu.edu/pardee/
files/2013/02/Pardee-CARs-and-Trade-TF-March2013-copy.pdf.
232   For example, a working group of UNCITRAL has been meeting since October 
2010 on the question of transparency, with the sixth meeting having taken 
place in February 2013. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) on the work of its fifty-eighth session (New York, 4-8 February 
2013), A/CN.9/765 (February 13, 2013) available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/
TMP/4706465.60192108.html. The UNCITRAL transparency negotiations are 
indicative of how difficult it is to arrive at a consensus as states had widely 
divergent views on this subject.
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a. Convening a Dialogue Roundtable between business 
and civil society
Among stakeholders, the difference in opinion and approach re-
garding a wide range of issues relating to the investment regime 
has nowhere been greater than between some members of civil 
society and some members of the business community.  Simpli-
fied, while representatives of the business community often begin 
from the premise that all foreign investment is the basis of eco-
nomic growth and development and its encouragement and pro-
tection is therefore key, representatives of civil society often begin 
from the premise that foreign investment is not necessarily a good 
thing – that, in fact, it can do harm – and therefore needs to be 
controlled and tightly supervised to make sure that it contributes 
as much as possible to a host country’s sustainable development. 
Accordingly, in the past, the approach of both groups to the inter-
national investment regime has been quite different.  Naturally, 
this stylized description is a simplification: the landscape now fea-
tures a broad range of attitudes and approaches within both civil 
society and the business community and there is significant com-
mon ground and growing instances of productive cooperation. In-
creasingly, there is a shared view that the regime needs improve-
ment, but the question is how this can best be done.  
However, important differences in opinion and approach persist 
among some segments of each group.  On the grounds that more 
communication, understanding and cooperation are useful for the 
investment regime, it may be desirable to convene one or more in-
formal, off-the-record Dialogue Roundtables between representa-
tives of these two groups of stakeholders.  Such roundtables would 
seek to bring about a better understanding of the concerns and 
solutions each group advocates and, more generally, seek to build 
confidence between them.  While the primary focus could be on 
these two groups, one might also want to invite representatives of 
governments (e.g., from investment promotion agencies, especially 
from emerging markets) to add the views and experiences of host 
countries.  It may be possible to interest one of the many foundations 
concerned with development issues (e.g. the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) 
to organize and finance such an event (or a series of such events), 
especially if it takes place in the context of a broader process.
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b.  Addressing substantive issues: purpose, sustainable 
international investment, contents of norms, treaty 
shopping
In light of the discussion in section D of this paper, four substan-
tive issues may deserve particular attention from consensus-
building Working Groups: the purpose of international investment 
agreements, the question of sustainable international investment, 
the scope and content of norms prescribed by IIAs, and the specific 
question of treaty shopping.
• The first concerns the purpose of IIAs, as the content of these 
agreements flows from their purpose. The parties to an IIA 
may agree to pursue a range of different objectives through 
an agreement – from a purely investor protection focus, 
through to the promotion of sustainable development. As 
discussed in section D, the purpose identified and expressed 
by the parties will not only act as an interpretive aid for tri-
bunals, but also determines aspects of an agreement’s scope 
of application, substantive obligations and dispute-settle-
ment mechanism. A broadening of the purpose of IIAs from 
a focus on investment protection to include also sustainable 
development – not only in the preamble of IIAs but also in 
their body -- would represent a paradigm shift in internatio-
nal investment law.233 Accordingly, a Working Group on the 
purpose of IIAs would aim at building consensus around the 
general purpose(s) of IIAs, as well as identify the necessary 
components of IIAs necessary to achieve that purpose
• A second key substantive issue (also giving an orientation to 
the contents of agreements) that deserves dedicated analysis 
233   Arguably, at least part of the discussion is already shifting in this direction: 
Witness UNCTAD’s new framework, the Commonwealth Secretariat Guide to 
investment negotiations from a sustainable development perspective and the 
SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: UNCTAD, IPFSD, op. cit.; J. Anthony 
Van Duzer, Penelope Simons & Graham Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable 
Development into International Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing 
Country Negotiators (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2013); Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), SADC Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Template with Commentary (Gaborone: SADC, 2012), available at http://
www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-
Final.pdf. [hereinafter SADC Model BIT]; Mann, op. cit., pp. 16-23.
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involves the increasing attention that is being given to sus-
tainable development and, with that (in the particular con-
text of this paper), to sustainable international investment. 
However, it is a concept that is not yet well defined. IIAs have 
traditionally been meant to contribute to one accepted core 
element of “sustainable international investment,” namely 
“economic development” – via the (by now debated) assump-
tion that these agreements per se help to increase FDI flows 
and the equally debated assumption that, the more FDI a 
country attracts, the more of a contribution to development 
will be obtained automatically.234 Still, IIAs are meant to cont-
ribute to development, and this is beginning to be recognized 
by arbitrators.235 But treaty-makers and arbitrators are ham-
pered by the absence of a test as to what “sustainable inter-
national investment” is.236 Using evidence-based research 
and multi-stakeholder consultations, a working consensus 
of what constitutes “sustainable international investment” 
could be elaborated, taking into account the different con-
ditions that exist in various jurisdictions, and formulations 
could be found to reflect this concept in IIAs237 (e.g., as men-
234   See the discussion in section C, above.
235   See especially the Salini criteria discussed above (“The doctrine generally 
considers that investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of 
performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction 
[…]. In reading the Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the 
economic development of the host State of the investment as an additional 
condition.” Salini v. Morocco, op. cit., para. 52, discussed in Malaysia Historical 
Salvors.v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, May 17, 2007, para. 78.
236   Alternatively, if there were well defined and specific obligations that go 
toward ensuring that the elements of sustainable development are reflected 
in the making of investments, this may be sufficient. Some of these elements 
are already reflected in existing instruments, e.g., in the outcome of the work 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, see 
Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, 17/4 Human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4 
(July 6, 2011) available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/
GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement.
237   See in this context the UNCTAD, IPFSD, op. cit. (referring to the concept of 
“sustainable development friendly investment”) and the IISD Model, op. cit., 
which provide directions in this respect for IIAs. There is no question that it is 
very difficult to arrive at a definition of “sustainable international investment.” 
Among other things, there may be trade-offs among the different dimensions of 
this concept, some may be difficult to measure and different local communities 
may come to very different decisions about what this concept means for them.
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tioned earlier, by using a definition of “investment” that ma-
kes “sustainability” an integral part of it238). Such a delinea-
tion of this concept could also help investment promotion 
agencies in their work when seeking to attract FDI; many of 
them already keep at least some sustainability elements in 
mind (especially economic development) that could be core 
elements of a sustainable international investment defini-
tion, but largely ignore what could be other core elements, 
for example, social issues (including labor).239 An effort to de-
velop a working definition of this concept – difficult as this 
would be – that lays out criteria/provides a check-list that 
could be used to assess whether, in a particular situation, 
an investment is a “sustainable international investment,” 
could therefore help to clarify this particular issue and, in the 
process, help to promote sustainable development.  
• A third key substantive issue that requires special attention 
concerns the substantive content of the norms contained in 
IIAs. The role of a Working Group on this subject could include 
the clarification of a number of standards contained in IIAs to 
provide a clear and preferably unambiguous indication of the 
commitments governments undertake;240 an assessment of 
whether any standards should be dropped;241 and an analysis 
238  As discussed by Brigitte Stern at the Seventh Columbia International 
Investment Conference organized by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
International Investment, New York (November 14, 2012). For example, 
treaty partners could provide in the definition of “investment” in IIAs that 
an investment is an “investment” under the terms of a treaty if it is made in 
accordance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: 
OECD, 2011) available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
239  Vale Columbia Center (VCC) and World Association of Investment 
Promotion Agencies (WAIPA), Investment Promotion Agencies and Sustainable 
FDI: Moving Toward the Fourth Generation of Investment Promotion (New York 
and Geneva: VCC and WAIPA, 2010), available at http://www.vcc.columbia.
edu/files/vale/content/IPASurvey.pdf, p. 4. 
240  Greater clarity in this respect could itself reduce the incidence of 
investment disputes. 
241  For example, the 2004 (and 2012) United States Model BIT dropped 
the conventional umbrella clause from the various investment protection 
obligations (“Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered 
into with regard to investments”) in favor of an explicit provision allowing 
claims based on a breach of an investment agreement (and not a contract) 
to be subject to arbitration. See Katia Yannaca-Small, “Interpretation of the 
Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements,” Working Papers on International 
Investment, No. 2006/3 (Paris: OECD, 2006), p. 14.
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of whether any standards need to be added. Among the last 
of these, pre-establishment national treatment, home count-
ry measures and issues related to the responsibilities of home 
country governments and investors are particularly relevant. 
• Finally, the issue of treaty shopping (or “nationality plan-
ning”) requires attention, as the practice of obtaining the 
protection of IIAs via the incorporation of certain types of fo-
reign affiliates (which often are not more than simple offices) 
in countries that have IIAs with a host country in which an 
investment is to be made may extend the protections of a gi-
ven treaty in a manner that the treaty partners may not have 
anticipated when concluding the treaty. Since this is a specific 
issue (and it is recognized that treaty shopping can be used 
opportunistically),242 it might be relatively easy to find a con-
sensus formulation for a model clause through which treaty 
partners can protect themselves against this practice (or cer-
tain aspects of it) in the future if they so desire; 243 perhaps it 
would even be possible to find ways to clarify this matter in 
regard to past treaties that are not clear in this respect (e.g., 
through a joint statement of interested governments).244 
242   See, e.g., Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, op. cit., para. 
240 (where the panel expressed “some sympathy for the argument that a 
company which has no real connection with a State party to a BIT, and which 
is in reality a mere shell company controlled by another company which is 
not constituted under the laws of that State, should not be entitled to invoke 
the provisions of that treaty. Such a possibility lends itself to abuses of the 
arbitral procedure, and to practices of ‘treaty shopping’ which can share many 
of the disadvantages of the widely criticized practice of ‘forum shopping.’”), 
discussed in Rachel Thorn & Jennifer Doucleff, “Disregarding the Corporate Veil 
and Denial of Benefits Clauses: Testing Treaty Language and the Concept of 
‘Investor’” in Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin 
(eds.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 
(Alphen: KluwerLaw International BV, 2010), pp. 18-21. For a critical report of 
the practice of treaty shopping, see Roos van Os & Roeline Knotterus, “Dutch 
Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Gateway to ‘Treaty Shopping’ for Investment 
Protection by Multinational Companies” (Amsterdam: SOMO, 2011), available at 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/Dutch_Bilateral 
_Investment_Treaties.pdf.
243  But all may not so desire. See e.g., Nikos Lavranos, “In Defence of Member 
States’ BITs Gold Standard: The Regulation 1219/2012 Establishing a 
Transitional Regime for Existing Extra-EU BITs -- A Member State’s Perspective,” 
10(2) Transnational Dispute Management (2013).
244   While such a joint statement may not be determinative of the outcome of 
a concrete dispute due to concerns about abuse of process if a defendant can 
intervene in a dispute to which it is a party, it could nevertheless signal state 
practice and potentially influence tribunals.
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c. Addressing procedural issues: dispute settlement
As discussed earlier, investor-state dispute settlement is one of 
the critical areas for all stakeholders, given the central role it occu-
pies in modern IIAs, the costs that these disputes can involve, the 
role of arbitrators and others in the process, the trend toward an 
increasing number of disputes, questions of consistency, and the 
potential that the great number of IIAs that contain an investor-
state dispute-settlement clause (combined with the great num-
ber of foreign investors and investments) could give rise to many 
more disputes.245 Opposition to the current arrangements among 
a small but growing number of countries seems to be hardening, 
as reflected, for example, by the following recent developments: 
(i) Australia’s is now opposed to including investor-state dispute 
settlement in its IIAs, (ii) three countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Vene-
zuela) have denounced the ICSID Convention,246 (iii) South Africa 
has decided that most of its BITs “are now open for either review 
245   For comparison (although the situation is different), the ICC received 796 
requests for arbitration, and 508 awards were rendered in 2011. International 
Chamber of Commerce, “Arbitration Statistics,” op. cit.
246 Reportedly, Argentina is considering doing the same, and has introduced 
a bill to that effect; the text of the draft bill (March 21, 2012) is available 
at http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/proyxml/expediente.asp? fundamentos =si& 
numexp=1311-D-2012. At the date of writing, Argentina remained a signatory of 
ICSID.  See ICSID, “Membership  Database,” available at https://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDataRH&reqFrom=Main&action 
Val=ViewContractingStates&range=A~B~C~D~E (last visited March 13, 2013); 
ICSID, “List of Contracting States and Other Signatories,” July 25, 2012, 
available at https://icsid.worldbank org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
ICSIDDocRH&actionVal= ContractingStates& ReqFrom=Main.  For discussion, 
see: “Argentina Faces 65bn Dollars in Claims,” op. cit. (explaining that  “Argentina 
is considering stepping down from ICSID,” and instead bringing investment 
disputes to domestic courts or to a regional mechanism, discussed below); 
Nicolas Boeglin, “Argentina: Towards a Possible New Withdrawal from ICSID?,” 
Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt, May 4, 2012, available at 
http://cadtm.org/Argentina-towards-a-possible-new.  However, note that, even 
if Argentina does choose to withdraw from ICSID, its denunciation will come into 
effect six months after the World Bank receives notice. See Daniel E. González, 
Michael Davison, Richard C. Lorenzo, Jonathan T. Stoel, H. Deen Kaplan & Mark 
S. McConnell, “If Argentina Withdraws from the ICSID Convention: Implications 
for Foreign Investors,” February 4, 2013, available at http://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=080c79bc-cce7-485f-97aa-27a5b2bdec5c. 
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or termination,”247 (iv) India has put its BIT talks on hold (trig-
gered by concerns with the dispute-settlement mechanism),248 (v) 
the Parliament of Argentina has adopted a resolution calling for 
the denunciation of the country’s BITs,249 and (vi) there is a call to 
establish a Latin American Centre for Investment Dispute Settle-
ment with its own rules.250 In sum, while IIAs with robust dispute-
settlement provisions continue to be concluded (as alternatives -- 
such as state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms or recourse 
to local courts -- are perceived by investors as much less effective 
means of dispute settlement), there is dissatisfaction with the cur-
247  Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, “Policy 
Statement: The South African Government’s Approach to Future International 
Investment Treaties,” September 18, 2010, p. 3, available at http://www.jadafa.
co.za/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9A6eXZstRl0%3D&tabid=432. 
248   Sujay Mehdudia, “BIPA Talks Put on Hold,” The Hindu, January 21, 2013, 
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/bipa-talks-put-on-hold/
article4329332.ece; “India Places All BIT Talks on Hold, Pending Review of Own 
Model Deal,” 31(5) Inside U.S. Trade, February 1, 2013, p. 1.
249   “Argentina Faces 65bn Dollars in Claims,” op. cit.; González et al., op. cit.
250   The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) seeks to establish a 
regional forum for the settlement of investment (and other commerce-
related) disputes in 2013, to replace ICSID for the region. The proposal was 
originally put forward by Ecuador in 2009. (UNASUR members are Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.) See “Declaration of the 1st Ministerial Meeting of 
the Latin American States Affected by Transnational Interests,” April 22, 2013 
(http://cancilleria.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/22abr_declaracion_
transnacionales_eng.pdf), supporting the constitution and implementation 
of regional organisms for settling investment disputes, ensuring fair and 
balanced rules when settling disputes between corporations and States and 
encouraging UNASUR in the approval of a regional mechanism currently 
under negotiation. See also Ewan Robertson, “Unasur Creates Electoral 
Council, Moves toward Greater Economic Cooperation,” Venezuelanalysis.
com, December 3, 2012, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7518 (stating 
that, following a November 2012 meeting, representatives agreed to 
continue work on a South American forum for investment disputes that 
could begin operating in 2014); Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, “UNASUR Arbitration 
Centre: The Present Situation and the Principal Characteristics of Ecuador’s 
Proposal,” Investment Treaty News, January 12, 2012, http://www.iisd.org/
itn/2012/01/12/unasur/; Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, “The Challenge of UNASUR 
Member Countries to Replace ICSID Arbitration,” 2(3) Beijing Law Review 134 
(2011); Ignacio A. Vincentelli, “The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America,” 
16(3) Law and Business Review of the Americas 409 (2010), pp. 454-455. 
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rent dispute-settlement regime, and pressure on it is increasing.251 
Accordingly, a Working Group could also be convened to build con-
sensus relating to the dispute-settlement process.
i.  Establishing a Working Group on the dispute-settlement 
process 
As discussed in section D, the key challenge in relation to this topic 
is how best to ensure the legitimacy of dispute settlement, from 
the perspective of all stakeholders. The focus of a Working Group 
on this subject could include one or more of the following:
• Exploring a number of questions relating to the process and 
outcomes of investor-state dispute settlement system, and 
its internal and external legitimacy (discussed in detail in se-
ction D), beginning with the rationale of the dispute-settle-
ment process itself.  Specific issues might include clarifying 
the roles of arbitrators and others in dispute settlement, 
examining whether the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
could or should be re-invigorated, strengthening the role of 
the treaty partners in dispute settlement (including, e.g., 
251   As Charles N. Brower observed in an interview with Arbitration Trends 
(2013), available at http://quinnemanuel.com/media/371211/arbitration%20
trends%20-%20winter%202013%20-%20final.pdf, pp. 12-13, in response to the 
question “Some arbitration practitioners, corporate counsel, and government 
officials have expressed dissatisfaction with recent investor-state awards 
and annulment decisions. Do you think this ’backlash’ against investor-state 
arbitration is real or overstated?” the following: “Of course it is real. It exists, 
though the degree to which it exists is debatable. Definitely a couple of recent 
ICSID annulments of awards have caused great, and in my view justified, 
concern. And to anyone it is unsatisfactory that different tribunals take 
different views of essentially the same issues because that militates against the 
predictability that investors and host countries both undoubtedly desire. The 
cure for that has not yet been found, however.” For specific proposals to improve 
investor-state arbitration see Antonio Parra, The History of ICSID (Oxford: OUP, 
2012). See also UNCTAD, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In 
Search of a Roadmap”, IIA Issues Note, no. 2 (May 2013). It might be argued that, 
compared to substantive treaty norms, the recalibration of dispute-settlement 
norms in investment treaties has proceeded at a slower pace.
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through interpretive statements),252 allowing for a certain 
gate-keeping role for governments regarding the initiation of 
such disputes (e.g., by requiring notifications before a dispu-
te is launched, instituting a public interest check,253 raising 
the threshold for access to investor-state dispute settlement, 
allowing the treaty partners first to seek to resolve a dispu-
te), exploring the greater use of counter-claims, giving a great 
role to ICSID to screen disputes254 (especially regarding frivo-
lous suits255), and considering the implications of excluding 
investor-state dispute settlement from IIAs. 
252   For a discussion of the role of the state in treaty interpretation and an 
analysis of various ways in which that role could be strengthened (including 
through “interpretive dialogue”) in the dispute-settlement process, see Anthea 
Roberts, “Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual 
Role of States,” 104(2) American Journal of International Law 179 (2010); see 
also UNCTAD, “Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do,” IIA Issues Note, No. 
3 (2011), available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2011d10_en.pdf.  
253  NAFTA, for example, has a screening process for certain types of claims (i.e., 
taxation measures).
254  However, for ICSID to screen claims would still mean to investigate the 
facts and examine the law -- which can require substantial resources.
255   Third-party funders, whose own resources are at stake, seem to have a 
rigorous screening process before they decide to finance a claim. See, in 
relation to third-party funding for both commercial and investment arbitration 
generally, Bernardo M. Cremades, Jr., “Third Party Litigation Funding: Investing 
in Arbitration,” 8(4) Transnational Dispute Management (2011), pp. 15-16.
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• Investigating to what extent alternative dispute-resolution 
mechanisms (and, for that matter, national conflict-manage-
ment mechanisms256) could be used more, especially during 
the cooling-off period foreseen in IIAs. 
• Considering the interface between domestic and interna-
tional law and dispute resolution.  For example, there is the 
question as to what extent foreign investors should have 
more rights than domestic ones by having access to inter-
national dispute settlement;257 and, conversely, whether, if 
foreign investors have access to international dispute settle-
256   There is evidence that conflict-management mechanisms have proven 
useful in relations between private investors in certain sectors, in particular 
in the construction/infrastructure/concessions areas. See Lee L. Anderson 
Jr. & Brian Polkinghorn, “Managing Conflict in Construction Megaprojects: 
Leadership and Third-Party Principles,” 26(2) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 167 
(2008). In the context of investor-state relations, investors and host country 
governments would seek to address any possible conflicts at a very early 
stage, well before disagreements have escalated into full-blown disputes, i.e., 
before any legal claims for compensation for alleged damages derived from an 
alleged wrongful act by the government of a host country are brought. Such 
mechanisms could include the fostering of greater intra-agency coordination 
to respect the rule of law, early neutral evaluation, the establishment of 
dispute-settlement boards, and the institution of fact-finding procedures. 
Several years ago, Peru instituted a process that incorporates elements of 
this approach. Peru’s structure follows a dispute prevention policy, and the 
government implemented a dispute-prevention mechanism that promotes 
alternative dispute resolution. See UNCTAD, “Best Practices in Investment for 
Development: How To Prevent and Manage Investor-State Disputes: Lessons 
from Peru,” Investment Advisory Series, Series B, No. 10  (New York and Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2011); see also Ricardo Ampuero Llerena, “Peru’s State Coordination 
and Response System for International Investment Disputes,” Investment 
Treaty News, January 14, 2013, http://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/01/14/perus-
state-coordination-and-response-system-for-international-investment-
disputes/ (describing the work of this System). The use of such mechanisms 
is being explored by the Investment Climate Department of the World Bank 
Group and would include the provision of technical assistance.
257   This is one of the reasons for round-tripping (i.e., when a firm establishes 
an affiliate abroad, and this affiliate then invests in the home country), which 
was particularly important in China, but is also relevant for other countries.
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ment, domestic investors should have the same option.258 In 
addition, issues relating to coordination with domestic sys-
tems could be considered, including questions of applicable 
law and exhaustion of local remedies.
ii.  Creating an appellate body
A broader consideration concerns the justification for, and feasibil-
ity of, an independent appellate body for the decisions taken by ad 
hoc tribunals. ICSID’s annulment process is being used increasing-
ly, but it, too, is of an ad hoc nature and is undertaken on the basis 
of narrowly defined criteria. This raises the question of whether 
this approach could be improved, or whether there is a need for a 
hierarchical appeals mechanism.259 This would of course be a ma-
jor step, akin to the movement, within the WTO, from an ad hoc 
dispute-settlement process during the GATT to the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding in the WTO.260 (In the trade system, this 
step took place after 101 panel reports were adopted,261 providing 
258  The Ghana Investment Promotion Center Act of 1994 “guarantees the right 
to international arbitration not only for foreign investors, but all investors 
covered by the Act (i.e., including those local investors registered with the 
GIPC).” UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Ghana (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2002), 
p. 28. UNCTAD continues: “Guaranteeing nationals the right to international 
arbitration (at their choice) is uncommon.” Ibid. See the Ghana Investment 
Promotion Center Act, 1994, Section 21(1): Establishment of enterprises, 
which provides that the act applies to enterprises established in accordance 
with law except mining and petroleum enterprises, and Section 29: Dispute 
settlement procedures, which provides for recourse to arbitration (e.g. under 
UNCITRAL rules) for all “investors.” Note, however, that the Act does not apply 
to mining and petroleum enterprises. Ibid, Section 17.
259   For a discussion of the pros and cons of an appeals mechanism, see Karl 
P. Sauvant with Michael Chiswick-Patterson (eds.), Appeals Mechanism in 
International Investment Disputes (New York: OUP, 2008).
260    “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes” (WTO DSU), Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm. See the discussion 
in Erin E. Gleason, “International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid 
Of?,” 7(2) Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 269 (2007), pp. 273-
286 (arguing that the WTO Appellate Body could provide a model for an 
investor-state appeals mechanism within ICSID), discussed in Irene M. Ten 
Cate, “International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review,” 44(4) N.Y.U. 
Journal of International Law and Politics 1109 (2012), p. 1199.
261    WTO, “Adopted Panel Reports Within the Framework of GATT,” available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gt47ds_e.htm (last visited 
March 10, 2013). 
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sufficient experience to undertake such a step; under the invest-
ment regime, over 500 treaty-based disputes had been initiated 
by the end of 2012.) Proponents argue that a permanent appeals 
mechanism could provide a focal point for resolving widespread 
and difficult questions of law and interpretation and would lend 
greater legitimacy to the regime as a whole.262  However, there are 
also concerns that an appeals mechanism would undermine the 
“finality” of the arbitral award,263 “re-politicize” the process,264 and 
that the added “layer” of an appeals mechanism would simply rep-
licate (rather than solve) the existing difficulties in the arbitration 
system. Issues such as perceived bias or conflicts of interest could 
persist, even with a permanent court.  The cost of disputes could 
continue to rise, unless access to an appeals mechanism were to 
be granted on very limited grounds.265 While some matters could 
be addressed with a careful and inclusive process of institutional 
design,266 others relate to the essential features of the regime at 
present such as, for example, a “harmonization” of the substantive 
262   See Gleason, 2007, op. cit.; Doak Bishop, “The Case for an Appellate Panel 
and Its Scope of Review” in Federico Ortino, Audley Sheppard & Hugo Warner 
(eds.), 1 Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues 15 (BIICL, 2006), p. 17; James 
Crawford, “Is there a Need for an Appellate System?” in Ortino et al., 2006, op. 
cit., p. 13, cited in Ten Cate, op. cit., p. 1112.
263   See, e.g., ICSID Secretariat, “Possible Improvement of the Framework 
 for ICSID Arbitration,” Discussion Paper, October 22, 2004, para. 21, available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSID 
PublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType= 
archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.pdf (raising the question of whether ICSID should 
seek to create an appeals mechanism); see also ICSID Secretariat, “Suggested 
Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations,” Working Paper, 12 May 2005, 
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSID 
PublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementType= 
archive&AnnounceNo=22_1.pdf, para. 4 (concluding that the creation of an 
appellate mechanism within the ICSID framework was “premature” at that 
time). See the discussion of ICSID Secretariat reasoning in Ten Cate, op. cit., 
pp. 1183-1185.
264  Jan Paulsson, “Avoiding Unintended Consequences” in Sauvant with 
Chiswick-Patterson, op. cit., pp. 241, 258-262, cited in Ten Cate, op. cit., p. 1170. 
265   Ilija Mitrev Penusliski argues that, given the additional cost of an appeal 
is marginal once preparation has been done for the initial arbitration, an 
appellate body could risk creating a “permanent two-tier review system.” See 
Ilija Mitrev Penusliski, “A Dispute Systems Design Diagnosis of ICSID” in Waibel 
et al., op. cit., pp. 530-31.
266   David A. Gantz, “An Appellate Mechanism for Review of Arbitral Decisions in 
Investor-State Disputes: Prospects and Challenges,” 39(1) Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 39 (2006), p. 74 (emphasizing that staffing and structure are 
crucial to improve decision-making outcomes), cited in Ten Cate, op. cit., p. 1112.
109
investment protection standards is difficult (if not impossible) in 
the absence of a common text, such as a multilateral framework 
on investment.267
*****
To be credible, any Working Group that would be established 
would need to consist of the best international minds dealing with 
the issues under examination. Its work would need to be open and 
transparent and, in particular, take into account the views of all 
stakeholders. It would also have to draw on the expertise of the 
premier institutions dealing with international investment, in-
cluding UNCTAD, the OECD and, as appropriate, ICSID and regional 
institutions. Universities with a recognized capacity in the respec-
tive areas (or international organizations) could provide back-stop-
ping to such a Working Group, in the framework of an overall coor-
dination mechanism. The findings of such a Working Group could 
be made available widely to those negotiating, interpreting and 
adjudicating IIAs, as a source of inspiration and guidance.
Naturally, organizing and servicing an international Working Group 
of this kind (or several of them), and recording their results, would 
require the agreement of key international experts to participate 
in them, as well as a substantial effort and therefore a substantial 
commitment of resources.
267   Barton Legum, “Visualizing an Appellate System” in Ortino et al., 2006, op. cit., 
p. 121; Asif H. Qureshi & Shandana Gulzar Khan, “Implications of an Appellate 
Body for Investment Disputes from a Developing Country Point of View” in 
Sauvant with Chiswick-Patterson (eds.), op. cit., p. 272 (arguing that given the 
bilateral, “disorganized” nature of investment arbitration, with an absence of 
consensus on substantive issues, the case for an appeals mechanism is unclear), 
discussed in Ten Cate, op. cit., p. 1173. For a cautionary note about harmonization, 
see A. Bjorklund, “Practical and Legal Avenues to Make the Substantive Rules 
and Disciplines of International Investment Agreements Converge” in P. Sauvé 
& R. Echandi (eds.), New Directions and Emerging Challenges in International 
Investment Law and Policy (CUP, forthcoming 2013).
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3. Formulating a Model International Investment 
Agreement
Another (very ambitious) approach could be to prepare a global 
Model International Investment Agreement.268 Today, no interna-
tional model investment agreement exists, although individual 
countries have their own templates. Past practice suggests that 
countries would make use of a Model IIA if it existed: In 1967, the 
OECD published a “Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property.”269 Although the Council of the OECD never formally 
adopted the draft, treaty makers used it as a basis for negotiating 
BITs, since no other model existed that could serve as guidance. By 
now, however, the Draft Convention (which was written solely by 
representatives of capital-exporting countries and at a time when 
FDI was discouraged by the threat of confiscation) is out of date. A 
new model could therefore conceivably be of considerable help to 
investment treaty negotiators, especially those from least devel-
oped and developing countries that do not have their own model 
treaties to refer to when negotiating with partner countries that 
often do. (In the international taxation area, such models – pre-
268  A variation of this approach (which would have to reflect that a growing 
number of countries are both host and home countries) is to prepare, in 
addition to one model, two additional ones: one reflecting the interests of 
capital exporting countries and one reflecting the interests of capital importing 
countries. This approach was used by the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Organization (AALCO), which published three draft BITs, reflecting different 
models of investment liberalization and protection. The models are published 
at (1984) 23 ILM 237.
269  OECD, Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, C(67)102 
(1967), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/39286571.pdf 
(While the Draft Convention carries a 1967 date on the OECD Legal Directo-
rate page, there are also other versions with earlier dates. As a 1963 comment 
by the Council of Europe (COE) on the draft shows, some of its key elements, 
notably in relation to dispute settlement, were as controversial back then as 
they are today. See Parliamentary Assembly, Opinion No. 39 on the OECD Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (1963), available at http://as-
sembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta63/EOPI39.htm). 
The OECD Draft Convention appeared to have been used at least until 1990, 
when the Czech Republic negotiated its BIT with Canada. See Filip Cerny & 
Jaroslav Heyduk, “Report: New Czech-Canadian BIT Concluded” in Alexander J. 
Beˇlohlávek & Nadeˇžda Rozehnalová (eds.), Czech Yearbook of International Law 
(New York-Huntington: Juris Publishing, 2010), p. 342.
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pared by the United Nations and the OECD – are being used;270 the 
same applies to investment contracts.271)
Like any model treaty, it would provide a baseline, i.e., be an ideal 
type that would identify the desirable content of an international 
investment treaty (or investment chapters in free trade agree-
ments), reflecting and balancing, among other things, the inter-
ests of host and home countries, and on which negotiating parties 
could build in light of their specific interests. Explanatory notes 
could indicate alternative options for specific articles; in any event, 
the legal implications of various options would need to be spelled 
out. UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable 
Development,272 the OECD’s Policy Framework for Investment,273 
the SADC Model BIT Template,274 the Commonwealth guide on in-
tegrating sustainable development,275 and the IISD Model Interna-
tional Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development276 
could well serve as starting points for such an effort – all of which 
are of great value for IIA negotiators, but not all of which are actual 
models or the result of broad, formalized consultative processes.277 
The timing for such a Model may be right, given the accumulated 
stock of agreements and the confluence of a number of important 
negotiations (see below). On the other hand, it may make sense to 
wait until these important negotiations are concluded and poten-
tially have set new data points. 
270  United Nations, Department of Economic & Social Affairs, United Nations 
Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries (New York: United Nations, 2011); OECD, Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, 2010). 
271  See especially the Model Mine Development Agreement, described in Luke 
J. Danielson & Mark D. Phillips, “The International Bar Association Model Mine 
Development Agreement Project: A Step Toward Better Practice and Better 
Development Results” in Sauvant, 2013, op. cit., pp. 185-248. This Model also 
reflects sustainable international investment principles.
272   Op. cit.
273   OECD, Policy Framework for Investment (PFI) (Paris: OECD, 2006). 
274   SADC Model BIT, op. cit.
275   Van Duzer, Simons & Mayeda, op. cit. 
276   Mann et al., 2005, op. cit.
277   Which is not to say that no consultations took place in these cases. 
UNCTAD, for example, consulted a wide range of experts and has invited 
stakeholders to comment on the outcome of its work. The Commonwealth 
Secretariat had several sets of consultations in London and regionally. 
112
Preparing a Model IIA involves some of the same issues discussed 
above with regard to a restatement, in particular such challenges 
as conservatism, credibility, participation, and resources.
4. Building specific mechanisms to improve the 
investment regime
There are a number of options that can be pursued in a concrete 
manner to improve the international investment law and policy re-
gime and help ensure that its stakeholders benefit from it. In fact, 
it is a key challenge for the legitimacy of the investment regime 
to see to it that governments remain bound by their international 
commitments, that the policy measures they take are transparent 
and that justice is available to all parties. For example, the rise of 
FDI protectionism (including a possible movement to establish 
separate rules for different classes of investors) and facilitating the 
use of, and access to, the dispute-settlement process are issues 
that require attention in this respect 
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a.  Monitoring FDI protectionism
It is one thing for governments to make the national regulatory 
framework less welcoming for international investors (as observed 
in section C, e.g., by abolishing incentives). It is another thing if na-
tional FDI regulatory and policy measures, including in developed 
countries, have protectionist purposes or at least protectionist ef-
fects, be it overtly so or in what UNCTAD calls278 a “hidden” form.279 
For example, at times it appears that investors from emerging 
markets are particularly affected by such measures (e.g., through 
national screening mechanisms), hindering in the process also the 
integration of these economies into the world economy and not 
furthering the rule of law in the international investment field.
Similarly, as regards the development of separate rules for different 
classes of investors, it appears that state-controlled entities are for-
mally accorded the status of a separate class of investors in some 
278   See UNCTAD, WIR, 2010, op. cit., p. 80. For more than two decades, UNCTAD 
has monitored policy changes in the investment area, including discriminatory 
changes, and explicitly warned against “a considerable risk of countries 
resorting to protectionist investment measures.” UNCTAD, WIR, 2012, op. cit., 
p. 82; see also UNCTAD, WIR, 2011, op. cit., pp. 98, 110. The concept of “hidden 
protectionism” is analogous to the concept of “murky” protectionism used in 
the trade area; see Richard Baldwin & Simon Evenett (eds.), The Collapse of 
Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the 
G20 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2009). For definitions of 
different types of “investment protectionism,” see UNCTAD, WIR, 2012, op. 
cit., pp. 83, 101; see also Efraim Chalamish, “Protectionism and Sovereign 
Investment Post Global Recession,” Paper Presented the OECD Global Forum 
on International Investment (2009). This work was undertaken on the basis of 
a mandate given by the Group of 20 which, in communiqués starting in 2008, 
has warned against the rise of protectionist measures in the area of trade 
and investment: “We are firmly committed to open trade and investment, 
expanding markets and resisting protectionism in all its forms […].” G20, The 
G20 Los Cabos Summit Declaration (Los Cabos, 18-19 June 2012), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ 
131069.pdf, para. 26.
279  UNCTAD, WIR, 2010, op. cit., p. 80. The rise of FDI protectionism has been 
noted by Karl P. Sauvant, who identifies two key situations that qualify as “FDI 
protectionism”: First, in the context of inward FDI, when public authorities 
take new measures to prevent or discourage foreign direct investors from 
investing, or staying, in a country; second, in the context of outward FDI, when 
measures are “directed at domestic companies that require them to repatriate 
assets or operations to the home country or discourage certain types of new 
investments abroad.” See his “FDI Protectionism is On The Rise,” Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 5052 (World Bank, 2009), p. 7.
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countries, for example, when there is a presumption in statutory 
provisions that mergers and acquisitions by them are subject not 
only to notifications but investigations before approval can be given 
or denied.280 These measures are then carved out (or are otherwise 
reflected) in IIAs (e.g., via exemptions for non-conforming measures 
such as national screening mechanisms) or even lead to separate 
regulatory regimes (e.g., for sovereign wealth funds), fragmenting in 
this manner the overall regime and (potentially) undermining equal 
treatment. The Santiago Principles for sovereign wealth funds, al-
though voluntary, are one step in this direction.281 If the identifica-
tion of separate classes of investors and the promulgation of rules 
for them gain currency, other classes of investors may also become 
targets, e.g., hedge funds or private equity funds282 (for example, be-
cause their investments often are not of a long-term nature). 
The approach of distinguishing different classes of investors can 
also be observed in the discussions on “competitive neutrality.”283 
Here, it is asserted that state-controlled entities (especially state-
owned enterprises), because of their nature (and for other rea-
sons), have an advantage over their private counterparts when 
investing abroad and, therefore, require special disciplines to level 
the playing field. Such advantages can include financial and fiscal 
measures, the provision of information and the availability of in-
surance for outward investments.284 
280  See, for example, the United States FINSA, op. cit., § 2. Similar review 
mechanisms exist in other countries, including Australia, Canada and Germany.
281  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Santiago 
Principles, op. cit.
282  Special rules for hedge funds and private equity in the European Union 
were introduced in 2010, in an attempt to establish common requirements for 
authorization and supervision, and to ensure greater stability in the financial 
markets. Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives, June 8, 2011. 
283  For a discussion of this issue, see Capobianco & Christiansen, op. cit.
284  One argument is that governments may tolerate a lower rate of return on 
capital than private investors, and that SOEs benefit from favorable borrowing 
terms, see Gökgür, op. cit.
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These issues are discussed in the OECD and in the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership negotiations, where a text to this effect has been tabled.285 
One approach mooted is to leverage the work already done in this 
area by incorporating the Santiago Principles286 into more formal ar-
rangements.287 However, such an approach has advantages and dis-
advantages – states must be satisfied that the principles represent 
an appropriate standard for domestic purposes.288 Crucially, howev-
er, those advantages typically are not available to state-controlled 
entities only, but also extend to private outward investors.289 The 
crucial issue here is that protectionism and distinguishing among 
different classes of investors tend to judge form over substance – it 
is not only state-controlled entities that receive support from gov-
285  The United States State Department and other parties to the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) have been working informally on how to address the 
conduct of state-owned enterprises; the United States has tabled a proposal 
for binding international disciplines within the TPP. See “State Capitalism 
and Competitive Neutrality,” Remarks by Deborah A. McCarthy, United States 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 
at APCAC 2012 U.S.-Asia Business Summit (Washington D.C., March 2, 2012), 
available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/181520.htm; “USTR 
Under the Gun To Generate Draft TPP Language Dealing with SOEs,” 29(28) 
Inside U.S. Trade, July 15, 2011; “U.S. Efforts To Craft State Capitalism TPP Rules 
Raise Defensive Interests,” 29(17) Inside U.S. Trade, April 29, 2011; see also 
discussion of United States efforts to press for rules within the OECD, “China 
Update: State Department Official Lays Out U.S. Strategy to Battle ‘State 
Capitalism,’” 30(12) Inside U.S. Trade, March 23, 2012.
286  International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Santiago 
Principles, op. cit.
287  Anna Gelpern notes that, while no express mention was made to the 
Santiago Principles, some members of the United States Congress have 
suggested that CFIUS regulations should provide guidance on factors relevant 
to review, in order to place constructive pressure on SWFs to comply with 
“best practices.” Press Release, House Financial Services Committee, “Frank, 
Maloney, Gutierrez Call on Treasury to Address Sovereign Wealth Funds in 
FINSA Regulations,” March 13, 2008, discussed in Anna Gelpern, Hard, Soft, 
and Embedded: Implementing Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign 
Lending and Borrowing (New York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012), p. 30, n.109.
288  As identified by Gelpern, the Santiago Principles were originally formulated 
as non-binding because of the absence of “leverage” -- since “SWF sponsors 
had no need for official funding, conditionality was not available as a lever to 
change individual SWF behavior.” However, formalizing the guiding principles 
could be counter-productive -- it could “undermine the Principles’ legitimacy 
in the home countries, and scuttle cooperation between new and old powers 
and institutions.” Gelpern, op. cit., pp. 29-31.
289  See Persephone Economou & Karl P. Sauvant, “FDI Trends in 2010–2011 and 
the Challenge of Investment Policies for Outward Foreign Direct Investment” 
in Sauvant, 2013, op. cit., pp. 3-39, and Sauvant et al., op. cit., forthcoming.
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ernments, but also other enterprises that invest abroad.  Therefore, 
if there is indeed a need to level the playing field in the area of out-
ward investment, it would appear that the discussions and negoti-
ations should address advantages given to all kinds of enterprises 
investing abroad, regardless of ownership characteristics.
In light of the possible rise of FDI protectionism and the possible 
development of separate rules for different classes of investors, it 
may be worthwhile to consider the creation of an FDI Protectionism 
Observatory to analyze national investment laws, regulations and 
policies, with a view toward establishing whether they have pro-
tectionist implications and publishing the results on a regular ba-
sis. Such an Observatory (which could perhaps be partly patterned 
on the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism) could also provide a 
locus for meetings at which governments and other stakeholders 
could exchange experiences and discuss ways of satisfying legiti-
mate national policy objectives (such as protecting national secu-
rity, protecting public health and the environment, promoting de-
velopment, maintaining public order), without unduly restricting 
the flow of investment across borders. Such an Observatory could 
therefore provide an objective, nongovernmental focal point for 
stocktaking and analyzing governmental actions at a time when 
measures to restrict FDI appear to be on the increase in the face 
of threats, perceived or actual, to national security and national 
economic well-being from terrorism, global economic crises and 
the emergence of new investors (including state-controlled enti-
ties) from emerging markets. However, its “power” would merely 
lie in the credibility of its research and reporting (which could also 
be submitted to the investment committees of intergovernmental 
organizations) and its ability “to name and shame.”290
An FDI Protectionism Observatory could be established as a sep-
arate research and reporting activity dedicated entirely to regu-
latory developments regarding international investment, or as a 
290  For a suggestion on how to deal with FDI protectionism in the context 
of the global trade regime, see Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, Payoff from 
the World Trade Agenda 2013 (Washington: Person Institute for International 
Economics, April 2013), pp. 50-51. 
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substantial extension of the current Global Trade Alert291 which 
focuses on trade, but also takes investment measures into ac-
count, at least to a certain extent.292 The resources required for 
such an effort could come from public institutions (both, national 
and multilateral ones) and/or from the private sector (which, after 
all, is most affected by these developments).
b.  Facilitating the use of, and access to, the dispute-
settlement mechanism
To a large extent, the legitimacy of the international investment 
regime is not only grounded in the regime reflecting the needs 
and interests of all stakeholders, but also in establishing an ap-
proach that allows all parties affected by the regime to benefit 
from it. A particularly important issue here is that parties have 
a fair opportunity to use its dispute-settlement mechanism if 
they feel aggrieved or if they need to defend themselves if they 
are respondents. If this is not the case and only, say, (relatively) big 
enterprises or (relatively) rich countries can de facto use the dis-
pute-settlement mechanism effectively, the very legitimacy of the 
investment regime is at stake.293 (Similar considerations played a 
291   Global Trade Alert (GTA) is a reporting service that provides information 
about governmental measures, with a focus on those policies that are 
potentially detrimental to foreign commerce. Its monitoring includes 
investment measures, such as restrictions on foreign ownership of land, tax 
treatment, listing rules, international payments, as well as establishment 
restrictions. GTA is coordinated by a London-based think tank, the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, and the analysis is provided by a number of different 
research institutes located around the world. Funding is provided by the World 
Bank, the Trade Policy Unit of the United Kingdom Government, the Centre 
for International Governance Innovation (a think tank based in Canada), 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the International 
Development Research Center (a Canadian Crown corporation).  
292  Although the OECD’s “Freedom of Investment Roundtable” process 
(involving the OECD members and a number of observers), as well as the G20-
mandated monitoring procedure for both trade and investment measures 
undertaken by the WTO, the OECD and UNCTAD, are relevant here, both 
efforts are constrained by their intergovernmental nature.
293  There is also the question of access by others, e.g., to submit amicus briefs. 
Relevant here are also issues relating to counterclaims.
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role when the Advisory Center for WTO Law was established.294) 
However, the regime’s current dispute-settlement structure – 
apart from the problems addressed earlier – entails several access 
issues for parties from poorer countries and small or medium-
sized enterprises.  As discussed above, the costs of arbitration can 
be prohibitively high – and those costs are greater for parties lo-
cated in jurisdictions without an established arbitration center or 
qualified arbitrators and practitioners. As ICJ President Guillaume 
observed some time ago: “Access to international justice should 
not be impeded by financial inequality.”295 Furthermore, as inter-
national investment is increasingly affecting a wider set of stake-
holders, serious consideration should be given to providing greater 
voice and rights of recourse to these stakeholders.
Several options exist to address these issues, including through 
the creation of an independent Advisory Center, the establishment 
of a small claims tribunal, dealing with third-party financing, and 
the establishment of a recourse mechanisms for a wider set of 
stakeholders. 
i.  Establishing an Advisory Center on International 
Investment Law
To enable relatively poor countries and countries that do not have 
many claims (and therefore no particular interest in having a strong 
in-house team) to defend themselves effectively against claims, 
an independent Advisory Center on International Investment Law 
294  See, for example, the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the Advisory 
Centre on WTO Law, December 1, 1999, available at http://www.acwl.ch/e/
documents/agreement_estab_e.pdf (“Recognising further that the credibility 
and acceptability of the WTO dispute settlement procedures can only be 
ensured if all Members of the WTO can effectively participate in it[.]”).
295  Speech by H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International 
Court of Justice, to the General Assembly of the United Nations (New York, 
October 30, 2001) (calling on member states of the United Nations to make 
further contributions to a trust fund established in 1989 to assist developing 
countries to bring disputes to the ICJ), cited by Pieter H. F. Bekker, note presented 
at the “Roundtable on States and State-Controlled Entities as Claimants in 
International Investment Arbitration,” hosted by the Vale Columbia Center on 
Sustainable International Investment (New York, March 19, 2010).
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could be established.296 It could provide state parties with legal 
and administrative assistance to respond to investor claims,297 in-
cluding pre-dispute advice (such as, for example, whether a claim 
brought by an investor is strong and, therefore, whether it might 
be advisable for the respondent state to seek settlement). It could 
also encourage the usage of alternative dispute-resolution mech-
anisms (such as mediation or conciliation) and help countries 
build dispute prevention and conflict-management mechanisms. 
A broader mandate could incorporate assistance to developing 
countries on the negotiation of IIAs and state contracts and the 
strengthening of local dispute-settlement capacity, as well as 
training in this respect.298 An Advisory Center of this kind could be 
modeled on the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, based in Geneva,299 
bearing in mind the differences between state-state disputes 
based on multilateral rules and investor-state disputes based on a 
multitude of bilateral and regional treaties.  
296  This option was proposed by Eric Gottwald, “Leveling the Playing Field: Is 
It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration?,” 22(2) American University International Law Review 237 
(2007); Thomas W. Wälde, “Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation 
and Investment Disputes: Competition and Choice as the Path to Quality and 
Legitimacy” in Sauvant, 2009, op. cit., p. 563 (describing the absence of any 
“legal aid facility” as a “serious deficiency” of the regime), discussed by Karl 
P. Sauvant, “Multinational Enterprises and the Global Investment Regime: 
Toward Balancing Rights and Responsibilities,” Initiative for Policy Dialogue 
Working Paper Series (New York: Initiative for Policy Dialogue, 2011), pp. 4-5.
297  Such an Advisory Center may also be of use for counterclaims and in cases 
involving contracts.
298  Even independently from the existence of such an Advisory Center, technical 
assistance (in particular training) of especially representatives of developing 
countries in matters related to investment disputes -- and, for that matter, the 
negotiation of IIAs -- is an important matter that deserves more attention.
299  The WTO Advisory Centre is a “legal aid” center in the form of an independent 
intergovernmental organization, established in 2001 in accordance with the 
“Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre on WTO Law” op. cit. The Centre, 
which is independent from the WTO, provides legal services and training to 
developing country members or members with economies in transition, and 
to any member country or acceding country designated as a least developed 
country by the United Nations (Ibid., Annex III). The assistance provided 
includes pre-dispute advice and representation of states in dispute settlement 
proceedings. The services are provided free, or at discounted rates depending 
on the type of advice, level of economic development of the state and whether 
or not the state is a “member” of the Advisory Centre (Ibid., Annex IV). The 
Centre also runs a secondment program for trade lawyers to contribute to the 
capacity-building of developing country officials. For further information, see 
the Advisory Centre website, www.acwl.ch.
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A modest effort in this direction in the trade sector has been 
undertaken at the regional level through The Office of the Chief 
Trade Adviser to the Pacific Forum Island Countries.300 Moreover, 
discussions were also held to establish an Advisory Facility on In-
ternational Investment Law and Investor-State Disputes for Latin 
American countries.301 However, the negotiations on an intergov-
ernmental agreement creating such a facility, its financial aspects 
and an action plan have, so far, not come to fruition. More recently, 
UNASUR launched an initiative for an advisory facility in conjunc-
tion with a new regional arbitration center (as an alternative to 
ICSID), when a working group chaired by Peru tabled several pro-
posals in this respect at a meeting in Asuncion on October 10-11, 
2012.302 This facility would provide “legal guidance, technical as-
sistance, research, specialized studies and legal representation in 
terms of investment disputes.”303 
300  The Office of the Chief Trade Adviser (OCTA) was established in the 
Pacific Island region to provide independent advice and support to the 
Pacific Forum Island Countries in the negotiations of the Pacific Agreement 
on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus agreement with Australia and 
New Zealand (which is likely to include an investment chapter). Initial 
arrangements provided for annual funding of AU$ 500,000 and NZ$ 650,000 
by Australia and New Zealand, respectively, for the first three years of the 
arrangement. However, negotiations have continued as Australia has sought 
to limit its funding of OCTA’s work to matters relating specifically to PACER 
Plus. See http://www.octapic.org (last visited March 11, 2013). Moreover, it 
appears that this facility does not cover investment disputes.
301   The increase in investor-state disputes has been particularly significant 
in Latin America. Argentina and Venezuela account for a significant number 
of those cases, but many other countries have become respondents as well, 
including Central American countries. On request of several countries in 
the region, an effort was therefore initiated in 2007 by UNCTAD, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Organization of American States, the 
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment at Columbia 
University and Academia de Centroamerica (located in Costa Rica) to establish 
a regional Advisory Facility on Investor-State Disputes. A number of meetings 
and consultations were held in the framework of this project, and an in-
depth feasibility study was prepared. See UNCTAD, Consultation Report on the 
Feasibility of an Advisory Facility on International Investment Law and Investor-
State Disputes for Latin American Countries, (Geneva: UNCTAD, February 2, 
2009). Participating countries agreed in principle about the feasibility of 
establishing an Advisory Facility.
302    According to press reports, Ecuador’s Undersecretary of Public Investment 
predicted that the arbitration facility could begin operating later in 2013; see 
Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2013.
303   UNASUR, Proposed Operating Rules of UNASUR Arbitration Centre, art. 2, 
discussed in Fiezzoni, 2011, op. cit., p. 142. 
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As the experience with the WTO Advisory Center demonstrates, it is 
possible to establish such a facility (or multiple regional facilities) if 
a few countries pursued this effort with determination. The views of 
stakeholders would have to be ascertained, including those of pri-
vate law firms (who might consider such a facility unwanted com-
petition, although there may be ways to associate them with such a 
facility). Establishing such a facility would of course involve a num-
ber of practical issues, such as funding, staffing and how to ensure 
its independence, efficiency and effectiveness.304 If this option were 
to be pursued, a scoping exercise would have to be carried out to de-
termine the needs and preferences of developing countries and to 
map the existing support structures in place, to make sure that an 
eventual new institution filled important gaps. In particular, region-
al centers (with staff that speak regional languages) could specialize 
in addressing the concerns of their constituents. 
ii.  Considering a small claims settlement court
To facilitate “access to justice” for smaller enterprises that feel ag-
grieved, consideration could perhaps be given to the establishment 
of a small claims settlement court/facility/procedure tailored to ad-
judicate small claims in a cost-effective and timely manner, akin to 
small claims courts in many national jurisdictions. Such a process 
could take the form of an expedited or “fast-track” arbitration, and 
could be coordinated around regional centers. This approach could 
also incorporate alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, such 
304   Lessons can also be drawn from approaches to funding developing country 
access to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). For example, Cesare P. R. Romano has observed 
that the ICJ Trust Fund the fund has only occasionally been used. This is partly 
due to the complex procedure required for developing countries to benefit 
from the fund, and because of the limited contributions made by donors. More 
importantly, however, the funds cannot be accessed when a dispute has been 
brought unilaterally by a party. By contrast, the voluntary fund established to 
facilitate access to the ITLOS has less stringent access requirements. See the 
discussion in Cesare P. R. Romano, “International Courts and Tribunals: Price, 
Financing and Output” in Stefan Voigt, Max Albert & Dieter Schmidtchen 
(eds.), International Conflict Resolution (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp. 
198-199. Any financial or technical assistance provided to state parties in the 
international investment context would need to ensure that the process for 
application is straightforward, that conditions for access do not undermine its 
effectiveness or indirectly discriminate against particular states and that an 
adequate provision of funds to support the service is secured in advance. 
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as mediation; conflict-management mechanisms (such as those 
described earlier in reference to Peru) could be particularly helpful 
here. In its favor, a facility tailored for smaller entities could provide 
an independent mechanism for those who need it the most – small 
and medium-sized enterprises that cannot marshal the political in-
fluence or financial resources to address unfair treatment through 
existing means. On the other hand, it could be argued that a small 
claims settlement process may further the diversion of judicial ac-
tivities from local courts, undermining the development of local ca-
pacity and decision-making. Moreover, having such a facility could 
lead to an increase of claims, overwhelming the court; governments 
may therefore not be interested in establishing it.
iii.  Dealing with third-party financing
Larger companies, often for reasons of opportunity costs,305 may 
not always take advantage of international arbitration when they 
feel that they have a claim.306 Here, the rise of third-party financ-
ing of claims has opened an opportunity for enterprises in such a 
position.307  At the same time, and for similar reasons as in a domes-
tic court context, this development has been controversial.308 As a 
third-party funder generally has no direct interest in the substan-
tive issues in the arbitral proceedings, there are concerns that the 
305   See the discussion by Eric De Brabandere and Julia Lepeltak: Even where 
(larger) MNEs have the resources to use the investor-state dispute-settlement 
system, they “may be unwilling to allocate their own resources to finance 
such lengthy and costly proceedings, and instead prefer to invest in other 
new opportunities within their normal business activities,” and “the inherent 
uncertainty [of gaining the award] … may warrant a transfer of the risk of the 
proceedings to a third party.” “Third-Party Funding in International Investment 
Arbitration,” 27(2) ICSID Review 379 (2012), p. 379.
306   Third-party funding is typically not available to smaller enterprises as 
these normally have smaller claims; hence financial calculations may not 
make it interesting for third-party funders to back claims by smaller firms.
307  Lisa Bench Nieuwveld & Victoria Shannon, Third-Party Funding in 
International Arbitration (Alphen: Kluwer, 2012).
308  Susanna Khouri, Kate Hurford & Clive Bowman, “Third-Party Funding in 
International Commercial and Treaty Arbitration -- A Panacea or a Plague? A 
Discussion of the Risks and Benefits of Third-Party Funding,” 8(4) Transnational 
Dispute Management 1 (2011); Joseph M. Matthews & Maya Steinitz, 
“Editorial: TDM Special Issue: Contingent Fees and Third Party Funding in 
Investment Arbitration Disputes,” 8(4) Transnational Dispute Management 1 
(2011); CEO & TNI, op. cit., pp. 56-63.
123
profit motive will override the normal factors that might encourage 
parties to resolve a dispute through negotiations (reducing risk, 
maintaining relationships, etc.).309 Others point out the potential 
for third-party funding to increase access to justice, to manage risks 
better and to contribute expertise for the assessment of a claim-
ant’s prospects and the conduct of a claim itself.310 They emphasize 
that domestic third-party funding has been accepted in many ju-
risdictions, where it is supported by legal or regulatory frameworks 
that mitigate some of its detrimental effects.311 One example may 
be to require that all third-party funding arrangements be disclosed 
to panels and to counterparties.  This could help to address the 
potential influence of funders on the conduct of disputes.  How-
ever, since arbitrators generally do not have powers to issue orders 
against third parties, regulating the conduct of funders of inter-
national investment disputes will require action by states – and a 
cohesive framework would require multilateral cooperation.312 The 
situation is complicated and may require an international working 
group of interested stakeholders, to identify the key risks of third-
party funding and to formulate a coherent response to those risks 
(e.g., through model BIT provisions, a code of conduct or guidelines 
for domestic regulation of funders).
309  National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) State & 
Policy Affairs Department, “Third-Party Litigation Funding: Tipping the Scales of 
Justice for Profit” (2011), discussed in Khouri, Hurford & Bowman, op. cit., p. 2.
310  Khouri, Hurford & Bowman, op. cit., pp. 3-5. 
311  Ibid., p. 2. 
312  Ibid., p. 10. Action could also be taken by the funders themselves, or indirectly 
through the procedural and substantive requirements of dispute-settlement 
provisions. Investor-state dispute-settlement provisions could also require that 
the key terms of any funding agreement be disclosed to the tribunal, and taken 
into account (or not) by arbitrators when awarding costs. Note that a failure 
to disclose participation of a funder in an arbitration may be a breach of the 
procedural good faith implied as part of an agreement to arbitrate.  However, 
no tribunal has gone that far yet, and it is difficult to identify or distinguish 
the types of third-party funding that might warrant disclosure and the types 
that might not. In many cases, this would require access to a third-party 
funding contract, assuming one exists. De Brabandere & Lepeltak, op. cit., p. 2, 
suggest that it may be necessary for “tribunals to be involved in and discuss 
the influence and power of a third-party funder, for instance when deciding on 
the allocation of costs.” See also Khouri, Hurford & Bowman, op. cit., pp. 9-11. 
But see the decisions of the ad hoc committee in RSM Production v. Grenada, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/14, Award, March 13, 2009, para. 68, and of the tribunal 
in Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. Georgia, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 
and ARB/07/15, Award, March 3, 2010, para. 691, stating that they knew of 
no principle requiring that a third-party financing arrangement be taken into 
consideration when determining the allocation of costs in an arbitration.
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iv.  Recourse mechanism for a wider set of stakeholders
In order to give greater voice and participation to a wider set of 
stakeholders, consideration could be given to the establishment of 
a recourse mechanism for anyone who may be affected by inter-
national investment activities. The Inspection Panel of the World 
Bank, the public submission process of the North American Agree-
ment on Environment and Cooperation (NAAEC) within the con-
text of NAFTA and the complaint system under the OECD Guide-
lines on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), provide examples of 
such mechanisms.313 These mechanisms are normally linked to a 
variety of policies, obligations or guidelines that may be imposed 
on international organizations, states or MNEs. For example, the 
Inspection Panel of the World Bank is linked to specific policies 
and procedures imposed on the Bank in order to ensure that Bank-
financed operations avoid and minimize social and environmen-
tal harm. The NAFTA public submission process permits NGOs to 
submit claims alleging that a NAFTA Party is failing to effectively 
enforce its own environmental laws. The OECD complaint process 
allows members of the public to submit enquiries or complaints 
with “national contact points” established by governments to 
deal with specific instances of business conduct that may not be 
in line with the norms of conduct set out in the OECD Guidelines 
on MNEs. Accordingly, while establishing a recourse mechanism 
would increase the voice and participation of a wider set of stake-
holders in international investment activities, it would require the 
identification of the relevant norms, processes and institutions.
Overall, and to conclude this set of options, having access to trans-
parent and impartial information about the regulatory measures 
being promulgated by states, having access to justice and being able 
to defend oneself are important dimensions of the legitimacy of any 
regulatory regime. Hence, making sure that this is the case -- and 
that all parties benefit from the international investment regime -- 
is an important consideration bearing on its future evolution.
313  See, Peter Lallas “International investment activities: Giving affected 
people a greater voice and rights of recourse”, in J Nakagawa (ed.), Transparency 
in International Trade and Investment Dispute Settlement (Routledge, 2013), at 
pp. 159 et seq.
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5.  Commencing intergovernmental processes
Intergovernmental negotiations relating to international invest-
ment are being held on a continuous basis at the bilateral and re-
gional levels, in the context of negotiating IIAs. Governments can 
do a number of things at these levels to change the substantive 
content and procedural aspects of their IIAs and, in this manner, 
influence the overall character of the regime.  For example, they 
can take new developments into account when negotiating new 
agreements (e.g., clarifying specific concepts), they can issue clari-
fications or engage in an “interpretive dialogue”314 and they can 
renegotiate agreements (instead of simply extending existing 
ones).315 All this is part and parcel of the process of putting inter-
governmental investment relations into the framework of law.  
But negotiators still face the challenge that, as was pointed out 
earlier, international investment does not receive the kind of at-
tention by decision-makers that it deserves and that bilateral or 
even regional agreements may not do justice to a global phenom-
enon. Some developments (such as the rising number of disputes, 
especially costly ones, and the denunciation of IIAs mentioned ear-
lier) are raising the profile of the investment issue, and some of the 
options presented in other parts of this section (e.g., international 
hearings) conceivably could help to do the same. At the same time, 
though, the international investment issue is a complicated one, 
for a number of reasons. As noted above, some problems are linked 
to the “underlaps” and “overlaps” in investment regulation (be-
tween states and across subject matters), compared to the opera-
314   Roberts, op. cit., pp. 194ff.  
315   For example, UNCTAD undertakes, upon request, (confidential) reviews 
of countries’ IIAs to identify inconsistencies, gaps and overlaps and to 
provide recommendations. Based on its investment framework, op. cit., 
possible follow-up work includes assisting in the drafting of model clauses, 
modernizing model treaties and helping address the challenges of formulating 
new IIAs and their implementation. These IIA-specific reviews also include 
recommendations about possible ways to foster dispute prevention policies 
and alternative dispute resolution.  
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tional reach of international investors.316  Other issues arise from 
the multiplicity of legal sources, including the legal effects of bind-
ing IIAs that exhibit significant similarities, but also have impor-
tant differences.  In both cases, while the origin of these issues is 
international, the complexity they create threatens to undermine 
key aims of the regime – an individual state’s ability to establish 
and maintain, domestically, the transparency and predictability 
that international investors need for long-term investment deci-
sions, while maintaining the state’s right to regulate to pursue 
legitimate public policy objectives. The underlying question, there-
fore, is whether a global phenomenon calls for a global solution.
If the answer to this question is “yes,” one needs to look for options 
at the multilateral and purilateral levels. This, too, is not an easy 
task as the current regime has grown on the basis of its own mo-
mentum and, not surprisingly, shows therefore a path dependency 
that is difficult to overcome – unless and until, perhaps, there is 
an imminent threat that the regime itself could unravel, whether 
wholly or partially. 
In the end, of course, it is for governments to decide whether or 
not they want to engage in multilateral or plurilateral negotiations 
on investment and, if so, how and where they want to do that. 
a. At the multilateral level: Organizing an informal 
meeting of ambassadors to the WTO 
If history is any guide, negotiating a multilateral framework on in-
vestment would be a challenging task under any conditions: All past 
efforts have come to naught. (The concept of “framework” has been 
chosen here deliberately as it leaves open whether such an agree-
ment would merely constitute a framework with minimum rights 
and obligations that needs to be filled out through further nego-
tiations, or whether it would be a treaty covering the range of in-
316   The recent debate on issues related to the taxation of multinational 
enterprises testifies to the saliency of this issue. See, e.g., George Osborne, 
Pierre Moscovici & Wolfgang Schäuble (respectively Ministers of Finance 
of the United Kingdom, France and Germany), “We Are Determined that 
Multinationals Will Not Avoid Tax,” Letter to the Editor, Financial Times, 
February 16, 2013.
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ternational investment issues.317) Moreover, the WTO’s Doha Round 
currently dominates multilateral economic policy-making.318 Until 
this Round has come to an end, it is not likely that countries will 
be prepared to launch another effort, especially one that involves 
a controversial issue and would involve parties that are likely to ap-
proach negotiations with different levels of ambition. Also, it would 
have to be established that a multilateral framework is needed and 
that it would provide (for all countries and especially smaller ones) a 
more favorable arrangement than bilateral or regional agreements; 
it would also have to be clear what its purpose(s) should be, since 
(just as for bilateral IIAs) the substantive contents of such an agree-
ment would flow from its purpose(s). Finally, and learning from past 
efforts, any multilateral negotiations would need to be undertaken 
on a transparent and consultative basis. However, at the present 
time, there seems to be no interest in the WTO to address the full 
spectrum of investment issues.319 Moreover, seeking to move for-
ward on the multilateral level and not succeeding to do so could 
prejudice a similar effort at a later date.
317  As, for example, in the case of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Nairobi and Geneva: UNEP/WMO Information 
Unit on Climate Change, 1992).
318  Beyond that, key countries are preoccupied with the negotiation of 
major regional or plurilateral trade agreements with investment chapters 
(especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and International Services 
Agreement), as well as major bilateral investment agreements. See the 
discussion below.
319   Interviews by the authors in Geneva in January 2013. This echoes UNCTAD’s 
assessment from several years ago. As UNCTAD concluded in its International 
Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way Forward (New 
York and Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008), pp. 4-5: “Existing challenges are largely 
due to system-immanent deficiencies inherent in the IIA universe. As long as 
it continues to be highly atomized, there is limited prospect for achieving a 
substantially higher degree of homogeny, transparency and recognition of 
legitimate development concerns. There is a risk that the system eventually 
degenerates into an increasingly non-transparent hodgepodge of diverging 
rules that countries, especially capacity-constrained developing countries, 
find more and more difficult to cope with. These deficiencies could be 
effectively addressed only by an evolution of the IIA system itself. Therefore, 
an international investment framework remains an important goal, although 
there is currently little prospect to make substantial progress in this area.” 
UNCTAD reiterated this assessment in 2013: “There is currently no appetite for 
negotiating a binding multilateral framework for investment.” See, UNCTAD, 
“Towards a New Generation”, op. cit., p. 6.
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On the other hand, a few informal discussions seem to be beginning 
about a new WTO agenda, and such an agenda could conceivably in-
clude investment,320 as also advocated in some quarters.321 Several 
of the changing circumstances discussed in section C may influence 
the outlook of a number of countries on a multilateral framework 
on investment, including especially the rise of a number of emerg-
ing markets as important outward investors, the efforts of key tradi-
tional home countries to circumscribe investment protections that 
lend themselves to expansive interpretations (potentially restrict-
ing the right to regulate) and changing expectations concerning the 
role of international investment in sustainable development. This 
may make it opportune to convene an informal meeting of ambas-
sadors to the WTO to discuss, away from Geneva, the range of issues 
related to international investment rule-making, to obtain their 
views about this issue and to put them in a better position to take 
decisions on this subject in the future.
Then there is the question of the intergovernmental forum for 
informal exchanges of views and/or negotiations on investment. 
There are three intergovernmental organizations – the WTO, UNC-
320  Interviews by the authors in Geneva in January 2013. 
321  See a report to the ICC Research Foundation, released in April 2013, in 
which the authors observed that “the WTO can do useful work preparing 
the ground for a multilateral framework” for investment; see, Gary Hufbau-
er and Jeffrey Schott, Payoff from the World Trade Agenda 2013 (Washington: 
Person Institute for International Economics, April 2013), p. 50. During the 
same month of April, the ICC adopted during its 2013 World Trade Agenda 
Summit in Doha its “Business Priorities”. This agenda included as one of five 
priorities, in a section that looked beyond the WTO Doha Round, the folowing 
recommendation: “Encourage moving towards a high-standard multilateral 
framework for international investment to support economic growth and 
development, while preserving the level of protection provided under ex-
isting internaional agreements”. See, ICC, “Business Priorities”, available at 
footnote 22, available athttp://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/
Document-centre/1999/World-business-priorities-for-a-new-round-of-mul-
tilateral-trade-negotiations/http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Glob-
al-Influence/World-Trade-Agenda/ICC-WTA-Draft-Trade-Recommendations/. 
Similarly, the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment released, in June 2013, a report entitled Foreign 
Direct Investment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case 
for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Geneva: WEF, 2013) which, as its 
title indicates, calls for a multilateral agreement on investment. While not all 
national chapters of the ICC may support this approach equally strongly, the 
statement does seem to signal that the international business community, a 
key stakeholder, is in support for a multilateral framework for investment.
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TAD and the OECD – that are potential venues for this purpose, 
and each has certain advantages and disadvantages.
Assuming that the desired outcome is to arrive at a legally binding 
and enforceable multilateral instrument, the WTO would be one of 
the most suitable organizations in which to negotiate. This might 
be supported by the Organization’s capacity both for multilateral 
negotiations as well as the enforcement of treaty obligations. It is 
certainly true that the Doha Round negotiations have faced enor-
mous difficulties; however, these seem to have been due mainly to 
the specifics of the agenda itself and how it is structured, rather 
than the Organization’s capacity to conduct negotiations. Moreo-
ver, when it comes to enforcement, the WTO has a good record.322 
The possibility of cross-sectoral retaliation in the framework of 
the Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding323 provides 
a deterrent against non-compliance with legal obligations – but 
precisely this possibility may be of concern to a number of mem-
bers of the Organization, as could be the possibility on the part of 
some countries that access to markets in, say, developed countries 
could be conditioned on investment access in, say, emerging mar-
kets. Furthermore, this would not be the first instance in which the 
WTO would address investment-related issues. The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) deals with one specif-
ic aspect of investment and, more importantly, the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS) already contains legal obligations 
regarding some aspects of international investment, insofar as 
they relate to the supply of services through commercial presence 
(mode 3).324 In addition, while the Doha Round negotiations on the 
relationship between trade and investment were discontinued as 
the result of a WTO decision in the aftermath of the Cancún Minis-
322   One of the main reasons why the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated within 
the multilateral trading system was the effectiveness of the Organization’s 
enforcement of international treaty obligations. 
323   WTO Agreement, op. cit.
324   It should be noted in this context that nearly two-thirds of the world’s FDI 
inward stock and flows were in the services sector in 2010. See UNCTAD, WIR, 
2012, op. cit., Annex Tables 24, 26. For a comparison of BITs and the GATS, see 
Rudolf Adlung & Martin Molinuevo, “Bilateralism in Services Trade: Is There 
Fire Behind the (BIT-)Smoke?,” 11(2) Journal of International Economic Law 365 
(2008).
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terial Conference in 2003,325 the early WTO process on investment 
would provide a useful information base and could be a helpful 
starting point in considering what might be a sound way forward, 
should member states decide to take up the subject again.326 Hav-
ing said that, it should be noted that the Organization’s expand-
ing (although not universal) membership, combined with shifts in 
geo-political forces, have added to the complexity of negotiations 
in the WTO; in any event, until the Doha Round is concluded in 
one way or another, it is not likely (as mentioned earlier) that new 
issues will be taken up. Moreover, introducing investor-state dis-
pute-settlement into the WTO would be a challenge for an organi-
zation that is based on state-to-state dispute resolution. A further 
difficulty is to distinguish between having informal “preliminary 
discussions” and starting actual negotiations: If a dialogue starts 
in the WTO, it could well be perceived as a first step in negotiations 
and, in this manner, inhibit free discussions. 
UNCTAD, for its part, is the United Nations focal point for all matters 
dealing with investment and development, including IIAs. It ben-
efits from an established intergovernmental consensus-building 
process, through its World Investment Forum and its Investment 
Commission. Its Investment Division has a stock of research and a 
critical mass of expertise accumulated over the past four decades 
covering the full spectrum of investment issues. It has an extensive 
technical assistance and capacity-building program (which con-
stitutes an important part of rule-making and implementation), a 
large network of development stakeholders (which is indispensable 
as part of a multilateral consensus building) and, most importantly, 
long standing credibility in the international investment commu-
nity in both developing and developed countries. Moreover, even in 
the absence of multilateral negotiations, UNCTAD has already em-
barked on building consensus through its recently launched Invest-
ment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development,327 which pro-
vides guidance for formulating investment policies at the national, 
325  WTO, Decision Adopted by the General Council on August 1, 2004, 
WT/L/579, (August 2, 2004) para. 1(g), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dda_e/ddadraft_31jul04_e.pdf. 
326   Strictly speaking, the WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment, while 
dormant, could be revived if member countries so decide.
327   IPFSD, op. cit.
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bilateral and regional levels, and could be one basis for consensus at 
the multilateral level. However, there is skepticism by a number of 
developed countries negotiating investment issues in the realm of 
the United Nations.  This, however, does not necessarily imply that 
preliminary discussions, consensus-building and pre-negotiation 
capacity building could not be undertaken in UNCTAD, considering 
in particular its core competencies mentioned earlier. 
The OECD, too, has played an important role with respect inter-
national investment in general and investment agreements in 
particular. Its 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of 
Foreign Property328 was the template for the first generation of 
BITs. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it hosted negotiations on a 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, which produced a wealth 
of information regarding possible investment rules reflecting 
changing circumstances, although no agreement was achieved 
in the end. Since then, its Investment Committee -- and, more re-
cently, its Freedom of Investment Roundtable -- have resulted in 
substantial work on various aspects of investment rules, including 
provisions on dispute settlement, most-favored-nation treatment, 
national security, fair and equitable treatment, and indirect expro-
priation. The Organisation also has a comprehensive set of guide-
lines on responsible business conduct329 and due diligence in min-
erals supply chains,330 which include innovative dispute-resolution 
mechanisms through national contact points. OECD membership 
has, and continues, to expand; the number of non-members ad-
herents to its investment instruments is growing; and its Freedom 
of Investment Roundtable includes active participation by Brazil, 
China, Russia, South Africa, and other non-member countries. 
Nonetheless, the OECD is not a universal membership organiza-
tion and is perceived in some quarters to be attuned primarily to 
the interests of developed economies -- which would raise doubts 
whether it alone could host negotiations.
328  OECD, Draft Convention, op. cit.
329  OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, op. cit.
330  OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (2nd ed., preliminary version, Paris: OECD, 
2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf.
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It might, however, be an option to have a process serviced by a group 
of intergovernmental organizations, 331 although this is not always 
easy to do effectively. Such a group could consist not only of repre-
sentatives of the above-mentioned three organizations (and, for that 
matter, ICSID), but also from such regional efforts dealing with in-
ternational investment matters as, for example, ASEAN,332 MERCO-
SUR333 and SADAC.334 (This assumes of course that the organizations 
involved would receive a mandate from their respective governing 
bodies to support such an effort, although informal arrangements 
may also be conceivable.) Together, these organizations could pro-
vide a “comfort zone” for investment discussions and ensure uni-
versal, inclusive and transparent participation by all countries and 
stakeholders, so as to establish legitimacy and development focus.  
331  Note that the UNCTAD, WTO and OECD Secretariats are cooperating in 
preparing reports for the G20 on investment policies, op. cit.
332  ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, February 26, 2009, Cha-
Am, Thailand, available at http://www.asean.org/22244.htm.
333  Protocol of Colonia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection Of 
Investments in Mercosur (January 17, 1994) MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC No 11/93, 
available at http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/inter/mercosul/coloni-e.asp. 
334     SADC, Protocol on Finance and Investment (August 18, 2006) available at http://
www.sadc.int/files/4213/5332/6872/Protocol_on_Finance__Investment 
2006.pdf.
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b.  At the plurilateral level: Launching an open stand-
alone intergovernmental process
The lack of a compelling forum to conduct multilateral discussions 
and/or negotiations does not exclude, as another option, that one 
or two countries – or a group of interested (preferably developed 
and developing) countries – initiate an open stand-alone intergov-
ernmental process335 to explore the desirability and feasibility of a 
plurilateral approach (which may eventually turn into a multilat-
eral approach), beginning with the purpose of such an approach. 
Apart from any newly created ad hoc group, the G8 and the G20 
could be potential candidates for launching such a process (or en-
couraging its launch). The G8, however, has the disadvantage that 
it does not include any developing countries; any initiative by it, 
335   Such an approach is not new. For example, in 1996 a group of governments, 
later to be known as the Core Group (initially composed of Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Ireland, the Philippines, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, South Afri-
ca, and Switzerland, but later also including Brazil, Colombia, France, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe), dis-
satisfied with the lack of progress in the Geneva-based Conference on Disar-
mament, took the lead in establishing, independently from the Conference 
on Disarmament, a negotiating process on a mine-ban convention (and they 
underwrote the budget). Many other governments joined later, culminating 
in more than 100 delegations attending the signing ceremony of the Ottawa 
Treaty in 1997 (Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Produc-
tion and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, signed 
December 3, 1997, entered into force on March 1, 1999, Ottawa, Ontario, Can-
ada), even though such key countries as China, Egypt, Russia, and the United 
States did not sign the Convention. See the discussion of the influence of the 
Core Group in Steffen Kongstad, “The Continuation of the Ottawa Process: In-
tersessional Work and the Role of Geneva,” 4 Disarmament Forum 57 (1999), p. 
58. Similarly, while the United Nations General Assembly established in 1990 
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and adopted the Convention in May 1992, the negotia-
tions were serviced by a stand-alone independent interim secretariat that was 
not part of the United Nations structure. One of the reasons the negotiations 
proceeded so rapidly was that governments could draw on earlier preparatory 
work undertaken by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. UNFC-
CC, op. cit., p. 1. It should be noted, however, that the Framework Convention 
was, as its name implies, only a “framework”; more specific commitments 
(e.g., on emission limitations) followed later. The International Services Agree-
ment being mooted in Geneva also seems to involve a process independent 
from the WTO, whereby a conditional plurilateral agreement would be nego-
tiated by interested parties, and lodged for future accessions by other states. 
See Chakravarthi Raghavan, “The Plurilateral Service Agreement Game at the 
WTO,” 47(43) Economic and Political Weekly (2012). 
134
therefore, is not likely to find favor with developing countries.336 
The G20, on the other hand, includes a wide spectrum of impor-
tant countries from all groups of countries;337 together, they ac-
counted for about 70% of the world’s inward FDI flows and about 
80% of its outward FDI flows during 2010-2011.338 Moreover, the 
Group has addressed the international investment issue in its 
communiqués.339 If the G20 were to take up this issue, it could 
simply encourage the initiation of an exploratory process as to 
336  However, the G8 had established the Heiligendamm process on investment. 
In its framework, a number of important developing countries participated 
in investment discussions with representatives of the G8, to explore, among 
other things, whether there is common ground regarding rule-making in the 
investment area. The last meeting in the framework of this process had taken 
place (as of May 13, 2013) in April 2012.
337  One drawback of the G20 may be that it consists of Finance Ministers, 
and these are not necessarily responsible for international investment in all 
countries -- part of the problem that international investment does not have a 
ministerial-level institutional focus in most countries.
338  The Members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United 
States plus the European Union, which is represented by the President of the 
European Council and by Head of the European Central Bank.  
339  During the first G20 Trade and Investment Promotion Summit held in 
Mexico City on November 5-6, 2012, participants “agreed to establish a 
platform for the regular exchange of experiences and good practices in trade-
investment promotion and policy advocacy.” UNCTAD, G20 Fosters Synergies 
Between Trade and Investment Promotion, November 12, 2012, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=351. One 
strength of the G20 is its role as a platform not only for states, but also for 
the business community. On December 12, 2012, the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs hosted the first meeting of the Business 
20 Working Group on Investment and Infrastructure, which focused on the 
potential for joint investments between G20 members’ governments and 
multinational enterprises as a catalyst for economic growth and recovery. 
Russia G20, “Moscow Hosted a Meeting of the Business 20 Working Group on 
Investment and Infrastructure,” December 12, 2012, available at http://www.
g20.org/news/20121212/781066016.html; see also the earlier discussion 
in the context of investment protectionism: During its many Summits, the 
G20 has consistently noted its commitment “to resisting protectionism 
in all its forms” and individual countries have taken many “investment and 
investment-related measures made in response to this mandate.” OECD and 
UNCTAD, Eighth Report on G20 Investment Measures (2012), available at http://
unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_oecd2012d8_en.pdf; see also 
 UNCTAD, Joint UNCTAD-OECD Reports on G20 Investment Measures, available 
at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G20/UNCTAD-OECD-reports.aspx. The 
main G20 event for 2013 will be the summit held in St. Petersburg on 
September 5-6, 2013. Russia G20, Leaders’ Summit 2013, available at http://
www.g20.org/docs/summit/summit_2013.html.
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the desirability and feasibility of a plurilateral/multilateral frame-
work on investment. Going further, it could give some overall 
political guidance (as the European Union and the United States 
did in respect to their own negotiations).340 For example, it could 
recognize that the present regime can be improved; it could indi-
cate the purpose(s) that IIAs should serve; and it could confirm, for 
instance, a number of core principles such as the importance of 
protection, the right to regulate, the need for responsible business 
conduct, and the need to have an adequate dispute-settlement 
process.341 This could set an intergovernmental process in motion 
(perhaps serviced by staff from international and regional organi-
zations with competence in the investment area) in which other 
countries could participate and that could lead, for example, to the 
clarification of key concepts in IIAs, issues related to dispute set-
tlement and issues related to the institutional framework of the 
international investment regime – even if it does not lead to the 
creation of a multilateral framework on investment.342
*****
Any intergovernmental negotiating process, whether undertaken 
on a multilateral or plurilateral level, could be supported (or pre-
ceded) by an international consensus-building process similar to 
the one pursued in the preparations of the “Guiding Principles for 
Business and Human Rights”343 (and which could include a number 
of the options mentioned earlier). The Guiding Principles were de-
340   See their “Statement on Shared Principles for International Investment,” 
which lists seven broad principles for investment liberalization and protection. 
See European Commission, Press Release, “EU and US Adopt Blueprint for 
Open and Stable Investment Climates,” op. cit.; EU-US Statement, op. cit.
341   The EU-US Statement, op. cit., for example, affirmed that both parties 
would pursue: (i) open and non-discriminatory investment climates, (ii) a level 
playing field, (iii) strong protection for investors and investments, (iv) fair and 
binding dispute settlement, (v) robust transparency and public participation 
rules, (vi) responsible business conduct and (vii) narrowly-tailored reviews of 
national security considerations. 
342   Anders Åslund suggested that the “G-20 should give the necessary 
political impetus to an MIA [Multilateral Investment Agreement] negotiation 
at its St. Petersburg Summit in September 2013”; in his view, “an MIA would 
have to be a plurilateral agreement within the framework of the WTO and not 
a universal one.” Anders Åslund, “The World Needs a Multilateral Investment 
Agreement,” Policy Brief, No. PB13-01 (2013), p. 7.
343   Principles on Business and Human Rights, op. cit.
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veloped during the second phase of the Special Rapporteur’s man-
date on Business and Human Rights, with a focus on supporting the 
“Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework already developed.  A 
broad and extensive program of stakeholder consultations helped 
to ensure a robust set of principles, and also to gather support and 
buy-in.344 In fulfilling the mandate to prepare the Guiding Princi-
ples, 47 international consultations were held (on all continents), 
and “the Special Representative and his team [visited] business 
operations and local stakeholders in more than 20 countries.”345 In 
addition, some of the principles were “road-tested” through pilot 
programs, for example, to establish effectiveness criteria for non-
judicial grievance mechanisms involving business enterprises and 
communities.346 This process benefitted, among other things, from 
the low profile that this particular undertaking had at the beginning 
– an advantage that any undertaking on a plurilateral/multilateral 
investment framework most likely would not have. Still, the success 
of this process has established a template for multi-stakeholder 
consensus-building in the investment area. 
c.  A template might be emerging from key 
negotiations
The key question is, therefore, whether governments are ready for 
the major step of engaging themselves in broader intergovernmen-
tal processes, especially in having intergovernmental negotiations 
on investment, even within a limited framework and in an informal 
forum, and whether important stakeholder groups support such an 
endeavor. Or should the focus be more modest for the time being 
and explore other options, such as ascertaining the views of stake-
holders on investment issues and the solutions they propose (e.g., 
in the framework of international hearings); seeking to prepare a 
model international investment agreement; establishing various in-
ternational Working Groups to build consensus on key issues; and/
or establishing specific mechanisms to improve the investment 
344   Useful lessons may also be learned from the several review processes 
that individual countries have recently undertaken with regard to their 
international investment law and policy programs (such as South Africa, 
Australia, the United States).
345   Ibid., para. 8.
346   Ibid., para. 11. 
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regime. Each of these latter activities would also be of immediate 
relevance to ongoing bilateral and regional investment negotiations 
– and ultimately also to a multilateral or plurilateral approach.
Any decision on the foregoing must also consider that a number of 
important countries are currently (as of May 2013) engaged in bi-
lateral and regional investment negotiations, suggesting not only 
that the investment regime is in flux (including because these ne-
gotiations offer opportunities to introduce changes), but also that 
these negotiations could lead to a certain harmonization in the 
substantive content and procedural approaches of IIAs – result-
ing perhaps in a de facto model approach.347 Particularly relevant 
are here the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations;348 the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in Asia,349 the FTA 
negotiations of Canada with the European Union (which also cover 
347  This may also occur in the context of the renegotiation of existing 
IIAs, which are becoming more frequent, because a great number of old 
treaties are reaching their termination date. But renegotiations can also 
take place in other contexts, e.g., when both parties agree to do so (as in 
the case of the United States-Uruguay BIT, which was renegotiated in 2005 
prior to Uruguay’s ratification, discussed in Salacuse & Sullivan, op. cit., p. 
78. Moreover, BITs can be terminated if both parties agree, although the 
survival clause may apply. See Martin Shabu, “Czechs Face Uphill Battle To 
Cancel US Investment Treaty,” CzechPosition.com, April 7, 2011, http://www.
ceskapozice.cz/en/news/politics-policy/czechs-face-uphill-battle-cancel-us-
investment-treaty?page=0%2C2%2C1). For example, the Australia-Chile BIT 
was terminated when the two countries concluded a free trade agreement. 
See Australia-Chile FTA, Annex 10-E.
348  See the leaked draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) investment 
chapter: Citizens Trade Campaign, “Newly Leaked TPP Investment Chapter 
Contains Special Rights for Corporations,” June 13, 2012,  http://www.
citizenstrade.org/ctc/blog/2012/06/13/newly-leaked-tpp-investment-
chapter-contains-special-rights-for-corporations/. See also Julien Chaisse 
“The regulation of investment in the TPP : Towards a defining international 
agreement for the Asia-Pacific region” in J Calamita (ed.) Current Issues 
in Investment Treaty Law V (London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2013)
349  Involving the ASEAN countries, as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, 
New Zealand and the Republic of Korea; the agreement is meant to cover 
investment issues and is epected to be concluded at the end of 2015. See, 
UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor, no. 9 (March 2013), p. 8.
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investment),350 India and Japan; the BIT negotiations of China with 
the United States351 and possibly the European Union;352 the Europe-
an Union negotiations with India and Japan,353 as well as the United 
States on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership;354 and 
the BIT negotiations of India with the United States.355 Notwith-
standing this activity, note that Brazil is not negotiating BITs, that 
South Africa has declared that it would “refrain from entering into 
BITs in future, except in cases of compelling economic and political 
350 At the beginning of 2013, Canada and the European Union were in the 
process of agreeing on a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which 
will include an investment chapter. See EC Trade, “Canada,” available at http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/ 
canada/ (last updated January 15, 2013).
351  China and the United States began negotiating a bilateral investment 
treaty in June 2008. See Karl P. Sauvant & Huiping Chen, “A China-US Bilateral 
Investment Treaty: A Template for a Multilateral Framework for Investment?,” 
85 Columbia FDI Perspectives (December 17, 2012) for a brief discussion of the 
main issues.
352  See the “Roadmap” released by the European in March 2012: DG Trade, 
ROADMAP: EU-China Investment Relations, (2012), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_trade_03_china_
investment_agreement_en.pdf. 
353  EU Member States agreed to begin negotiations for an agreement with Japan 
on 29 November 2012. See EC Trade, “Japan,” available at http://ec.europa.eu/
trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/japan/. European 
Commission, “EU-Japan Free Trade Agreement: Commissioner De Gucht 
Welcomes Member States’ Green Light To Start Negotiations,” November 29, 
2012, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=847; 
see also European Commission, EU Trade, “Overview of FTA and Other Trade 
Negotiations,” February 5, 2013, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf, pp. 3-4. 
354  Memorandum, European Commission, “Statement from United States 
President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy 
and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso,” MEMO/13/94, 
February 13, 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-94_en.htm; European Union Memorandum, “European Union and United 
States To Launch Negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership,” MEMO/13/94, February 13, 2013, available at http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=869. 
355  Anirban Bhaumik, “India, US Set To Sign Bilateral Investment Treaty,” 
Deccan Herald (New Delhi), October 1, 2012, http://www.deccanherald.
com/content/282459/india-us-set-sign-bilateral.html (quoting Nirupama 
Rao, Ambassador of India to the United States, who explained that the two 
countries were working toward progressing a bilateral agreement that would 
“enhance transparency and predictability for investors, and support economic 
growth and job creation in both countries”).
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circumstances”,356 and that India has suspended (triggered by dif-
ficulties with the dispute-settlement process) all BITs negotiations 
until a review of the country’s Model BIT has been carried out and 
completed.357 In addition, the European Union is in the process of 
establishing its own approach to international investment negotia-
tions in light of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.358 
These negotiations, if successful, could create important data-points 
for future negotiations. Conceivably, they could lead to a narrowing 
in the differences for key provisions (including, for example, the clar-
ification of central protection standards, delineating the contours 
356  “Speaking Notes for Minister [Robert Davies, Minister of Trade and 
Industry] at the Discussion of UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development (IPFSD), Geneva, Switzerland, 24 September 2012,” 
mimeo., p. 5, reprinted in 69 South Bulletin (21 November 2012), pp. 7-8. The 
same statement says that the Cabinet “Instructed that all ‘first generation’ 
BITs which South Africa signed shortly after the democratic transition in 1994, 
many of which have now reached their termination date, should be reviewed 
with a view to termination, and possible renegotiation on the basis of a 
new Model BIT to be developed.” Xavier Carim, “Speech on A South African 
Perspective on International Investment Agreements,” reprinted in 69 South 
Bulletin (November 21, 2012), p. 9.
357  Mehdudia, op. cit.; “India Places All BIT Talks on Hold, Pending Review of 
Own Model Deal,” 31(5) Inside U.S. Trade, February 1, 2013, p. 1.
358   Since 2009, in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, investment policy has been 
the domain of the European Commission, rather than of individual member 
states. See Treaty of Lisbon, op. cit., art. 2B, which provides in para. 1(e) that the 
Union shall have exclusive jurisdiction to set “common commercial policy,” and 
art. 188C, which provides for FDI policy as part of the “common commercial 
policy.” Implementation of these provisions has been gaining momentum. 
See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment 
Policy (Brussels: European Commission, July 7, 2010), available at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147884.pdf; European 
Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future 
European International Investment Policy (Strasbourg: European Parliament, 
April 6, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0141&language=EN (describing the scope 
of the European Union’s competence, outlining key priorities and standards for 
the new investment policy and addressing future IIAs, dispute resolution and 
sustainable development); see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral 
Investment Agreements Between Member States and Third Countries (Brussels: 
European Commission, July 7, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146308.pdf, pp. 2-3 (describing the role of the 
European Union in assuming regional responsibility for FDI regulation).
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of the right to regulate, answering some sustainable international 
investment questions, and resolving some dispute-settlement is-
sues359) in key IIAs. As a result, an approach may be emerging for 
future international investment agreements.  Moreover, until some 
or most of these negotiations are concluded, it may well be that key 
countries would not be interested in beginning a broader intergov-
ernmental negotiating process on investment, preferring to wait 
until they have found solutions to key issues with principal partners.
359  Relatively recent United States IIAs contain, for example, a provision 
that calls for an appeals mechanism (although no action has been taken 
on this matter). See, e.g., the 2005 United States-Uruguay BIT, art. 28, paras. 
9(b) and 10. UNCITRAL’s work on transparency is relevant here as well, with 
finalized rules agreed in February 2013. See UNCITRAL, “Report of Working 
Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session 
(New York, 4-8 February 2013),” U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/765, 13 February 2013, 
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V13/808/19/
PDF/V1380819.pdf?OpenElement; Luke Eric Peterson, “UN Working Group 
Finalizes UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, But They Won’t Apply Automatically 
to Stockpiles of Existing Investment Treaties,” Investment Arbitration Reporter, 
February 14, 2013, http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20130215_4. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE NEED FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CONSENSUS-
BUILDING PROCESS 
Foreign direct investment has become the most important vehi-
cle to bring goods and services to foreign markets and, beyond 
that, integrate national production systems. Yet, while trade – an-
other important form of international economic transactions -- is 
governed by a coherent multilateral trade regime and enforced 
through a respected dispute-settlement mechanism, internation-
al investment relations among countries are characterized by a re-
gime whose hallmarks are an almost exclusive orientation toward 
the protection of investment, on the basis of a broad subject-mat-
ter coverage, with investment standards at its core, arbitration as 
the chosen mechanism to settle disputes, shaped by a multiplicity 
of legal sources, and serviced by a light and fragmented institu-
tional structure.
While the great majority of governments are party, in one way or 
another, to the international investment law and policy regime 
(consisting of over 3,000 IIAs, an indication that governments 
want international rules for international investment), it is widely 
acknowledged that the current regime can be improved. Calls for 
changes range from tweaking the current regime, to repairing it, 
to transforming it fundamentally. In other words, there are widely 
diverging views among stakeholders about the extent to which 
changes are needed, in what direction they should go and how 
they should be brought about. More specifically, many in the busi-
ness community (and many international arbitration practitioners) 
are reluctant to contemplate drastic changes, although a growing 
number of individual firms and practitioners appear to become 
more flexible in this respect. On the other end of the spectrum are 
various civil society organizations that typically seek fundamental 
changes, although there too is a wide range of opinions concern-
ing the precise nature of the changes that are needed. Govern-
ments, for their part, are actively and overwhelmingly continue 
to build the regime, although some are withdrawing from it and 
many are introducing new elements that may, cumulatively and 
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over time, change the nature of the regime. Together, this makes 
for a complex situation in which none of the stakeholder groups 
holds monolithic views, but in which bridges need to be built be-
tween various stakeholders. While a modernization and reform of 
the regime is possible, this will require a careful process that seeks 
to accommodate a range of different interests. 
Developments in treaty and arbitral practice may well contribute 
to an improvement in the international investment law and policy 
regime. In many ways, a number of the challenges that the regime 
faces reflect a “crise de croissance – a teenager’s crisis,”360 resulting 
from the fact that the regime is very young and has grown rapidly. 
But there are fundamental challenges that the regime faces, re-
quiring, at least to a certain extent, a paradigm change.  
It is not clear, how rapidly these various challenges will be ad-
dressed in the normal course of the maturing of the regime, or to 
what extent fundamental issues such as the purpose and content 
of the regime will be addressed in this process. Allowing the re-
gime to mature is a time-consuming process. 
What to do in this situation? What could be the way forward?
To begin with, it would be desirable to speed up the evolution 
toward a regime that reflects the interests of all stakeholders by 
finding, most importantly, the right balance between strong inves-
tor protection and the right of governments to pursue legitimate 
public policy objectives, in the overall framework of a modernized 
purpose of the regime, from which its substantive and procedural 
provisions would flow. 
360  Brigitte Stern, “The Future of International Investment Law: A Balance 
Between the Protection of Investors and the States’ Capacity to Regulate” in 
Alvarez et al., op. cit., p. 175. In an interview with Arbitration Trends, Winter 
2013, op. cit., p. 13, she added: “Of course, the teenager is now in his twenties 
and should become more reasonable. In fact, in my view, he does.”
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However, given the light and fragmented institutional structure of 
the international investment regime,361 there is no obvious agency 
that could take the lead in moving the investment issue forward. 
For sure, the principal international organizations active in this 
area – especially UNCTAD, the OECD and ICSID -- should continue, 
if not intensify, their valuable work. At the same time, though, it 
does not seem likely that governments will give any of these or-
ganizations a mandate in the foreseeable future to go far beyond 
what they are already doing; besides, open discussions are diffi-
cult in intergovernmental forums, as government representatives 
always need to keep in mind that, what they say in such forums, 
could eventually be held against them in actual negotiations. If the 
WTO Doha Round is being brought to conclusion and a new agen-
da is being agreed upon, it might include investment (building on 
the work already done in that Organization in relation to the GATS 
agreement and earlier work on investment) – but that is a big “if” 
and a big “might”. Furthermore, all the most important players are 
engaged in bilateral and/or regional investment negotiations, and 
they might simply want to wait for the outcome of those negotia-
tions before considering any broader efforts. 
Given this situation (and in light of past failed efforts in the United 
Nations, OECD and WTO), an independent, open-minded Interna-
tional Investment Consensus-building Process is needed to exam-
ine the range of issues associated with international investment 
law and policy, to determine systematically what the concerns 
are, to discuss how and where to address them, and to propose 
solutions. To be credible, such a process would have to involve 
representatives of the principal stakeholder groups, including 
representatives of international and regional intergovernmental 
organizations dealing with international investment; in fact, rep-
resentatives from these organizations perhaps could even service 
this process, at least in an informal manner. The impetus would 
need to come from smaller countries, as this would be more fa-
vorably received by others. The best option is for one government 
361  As mentioned earlier, this fragmentation can also be found at the 
national level, where various ministries (and other offices and organizations) 
are responsible for various aspects of international investment, making 
it sometimes difficult for governments to agree on the international 
organization that should be entrusted with a particular task.
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– or better yet, a few governments, from developed countries and 
emerging markets -- to initiate such an inclusive, informal, but 
structured multi-stakeholder consensus-building process -- an 
incremental thought-, discussion- and confidence-building pro-
cess on issues related to improving the international investment 
regime. The G20 could help initiate such a process by encouraging 
interested countries to launch it. It is a promising sign that Fin-
land has already begun consultations to launch such an initiative 
within the framework of the Helsinki Process for global govern-
ance that it chairs with Tanzania.
Such a process could undertake various activities (or encourage 
others to undertake them). The menu from which to choose could 
include any of those mentioned earlier in this paper (as well as 
others that may become desirable in the course of its delibera-
tions): fact-finding (e.g., international hearings on the investment 
regime, a restatement of international investment law); dialogue 
roundtables between business and civil society; consensus-build-
ing working groups on substantive issues (e.g., the regime’s pur-
pose, sustainable international investment, contents of norms) 
and procedural issues (e.g., dispute settlement); a model bilateral 
investment treaty; specific mechanisms to improve the invest-
ment regime (e.g., an FDI protectionism observatory, an advisory 
center on international investment law, a recourse mechanism for 
a wider set of stakeholders); and establishing the desirability (or 
not) of a multilateral investment framework. It could also encour-
age greater cooperation by the international organizations already 
working on investment. Furthermore, it could identify “low-hang-
ing fruits” (i.e., specific issues that command broad agreement on 
the need to tackle them, e.g., abusive treaty shopping, frivolous 
claims), backed by research, and suggest alternatives to deal with 
them, for governments to consider. 
Such a consensus-building process might eventually solidify into 
an international investment steering group that could seek to 
influence the broader intergovernmental discourse. It is in the 
framework of this discourse that decisions would eventually have 
to be made about the future evolution of the international invest-
ment law and policy regime, whether at the bilateral, regional or 
multilateral level.
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ANNEX
Annex table 1. Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 1990-2011
(Billions of dollars, value at current prices)
Item 1990 2005-2007 
pre-crisis 
average
2009 2010 2011
FDI inflows 207 1 473 1 198 1 309 1 524
FDI outflows 241 1 501 1 175 1 451 1 694
FDI inward stock 2 081 14 588 18 041 19 907 20 438
FDI outward stock 2 093 15 812 19 326 20 865 21 168
Income on inward FDI 75 1 020 960 1 178 1 359
   Rate of return on inward FDI  4.2 7.3 5.6 6.3 7.1
Income on outward FDI 122 1 100 1 049 1 278 1 470
   Rate of return on outward FDI 6.1 7.2 5.6 6.4 7.3
Cross-border M&As 99 703 250 344 526
Sales of foreign affiliates 5 102 20 656 23 866 25 622 27 877 
Value added (product) of foreign 
affiliates 
1 018 4 949 6 392 6 560 7 183 
Total assets of foreign affiliates 4 599 43 623 74 910 75 609 82 131 
Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 003 5 060 6 267 7 358 
Employment by foreign affiliates 
(thousands)
21 458 51 593 59 877 63 903 69 065 
Memorandum:
GDP 22 206 50 411 57 920 63 075 69 660 
Gross fixed capital formation 5 109 11 208 12 735 13 940 15 770
Royalties and licence fee receipts 29 156 200 218  242
Exports of goods and non-factor 
services
4 382 15 008 15 196 18 821 22 095 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of In-
vestment Policies (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012), p. 24 (footnotes omitted).
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Annex table 2.  National regulatory changes, 1991-2011*
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of 
countries that 
introduced 
changes in their 
investment 
regimes
35 43 57 49 64 65 76 60 63 45 51 43 59 80 77 74 49 41 45 57 44
Number of regu-
latory changes
82 79 102 110 112 114 151 145 140 81 97 94 126 166 145 132 80 69 89 112 67
  of which:
  More favorable 
to FDI a
80 79 101 108 106 98 135 136 131 75 85 79 114 144 119 107 59 51 61 75 52
  Less favorable 
to FDI b
2 - 1 2 6 16 16 9 9 5 2 12 12 20 25 25 19 16 24 36 15
  Neutral/Indeter-
minate
… … … … … … … … … 1 10 3 - 2 1 0 2 2 4 1 -
Source: UNCTAD, based on national sources, World Investment Report 2000: Cross-bor-
der Mergers and Acquisitions and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2000), p. 6; UNCTAD, 
Investment Policy Monitor Database, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Gene-
ration of Investment policies (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2012), p. 76. 
a  Includes liberalizing changes or changes aimed at strengthening market functioning, as 
well as increased incentives.
b  Includes changes aimed at increasing control, as well as changes reducing incentives.
*The methodology was changed as of 2000.
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Annex table 2.  National regulatory changes, 1991-2011*
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of 
countries that 
introduced 
changes in their 
investment 
regimes
35 43 57 49 64 65 76 60 63 45 51 43 59 80 77 74 49 41 45 57 44
Number of regu-
latory changes
82 79 102 110 112 114 151 145 140 81 97 94 126 166 145 132 80 69 89 112 67
  of which:
  More favorable 
to FDI a
80 79 101 108 106 98 135 136 131 75 85 79 114 144 119 107 59 51 61 75 52
  Less favorable 
to FDI b
2 - 1 2 6 16 16 9 9 5 2 12 12 20 25 25 19 16 24 36 15
  Neutral/Indeter-
minate
… … … … … … … … … 1 10 3 - 2 1 0 2 2 4 1 -
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